A DC10 FLT CREW IS UNABLE TO MEET THEIR XING RESTR.

Date: 2001-08 · Aircraft: DC-10 30 · Phase: descent

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-crossing-restriction-not-met|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

A DC10 FLT CREW IS UNABLE TO MEET THEIR XING RESTR.

Narrative

FLT ZZZ TO IND; PROCEEDING DIRECT VHP AND IN CONTACT WITH ZID AT THE TIME OF EVENT. CTLR CLRED US TO CROSS 85 DME W OF VHP AT FL270. CAPT WAS IN THE LAVATORY AT THE TIME OF CLRNC; SO I INITIATED THE DSCNT FROM FL350 TO FL270. WITHIN A MIN; CAPT TOOK CTLS AGAIN AND CONTINUED THE DSCNT. HE CALLED TO MY ATTN THE 60+ KT TAILWIND AND CONTINUED DSCNT USING SPOILERS. I WAS NOT CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE XING RESTR; AS LONG AS HE CONTINUED HIS CURRENT RATE OF DSCNT; AND I COMMENTED TO HIM HE SHOULD HAVE NO PROB MAKING IT. AFTER THAT MOMENT; I WAS FOCUSING MY ATTN ON THE FREQ CHANGE; DATA; AND THE APPROPRIATE APCH PLATE FOR LNDG WHEN I FOUND MYSELF DISTR FROM WATCHING THE CAPT AND ENSURING WE WOULD REACH FL270 AT 85 DME. I REALIZED WE WERE PASSING FL300 AND AT APPROX 87 DME W OF VHP AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED IT TO THE ATTN OF THE CAPT AND ASKED HIM IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE IT. HIS RESPONSE WAS JUST BARELY AND WE LEVELED AT FL270 AT APPROX 83 DME W OF VHP. ATC MADE NO COMMENT AND WE PROCEEDED TO INDIANAPOLIS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED AN INCREASED TAILWIND COMPONENT DURING DSCNT; LACK OF COM WITH CAPT DURING DSCNT; AND TRUSTING HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS RATE OF DSCNT I LAST OBSERVED BEFORE BECOMING DISTR WITH OTHER DUTIES. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE COM BTWN THE CAPT AND MYSELF AND ATC; AND STAYING SITUATIONALLY AWARE AT ALL TIMES WITHOUT BECOMING DISTR TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FLT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.