NMAC AT MIA; FL BTWN AN ACR ON GAR FROM RWY 30 AND A DEPARTURE FROM RWY 27R.

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WE WERE FLYING AN A-300 FROM MIA-JFK; FLT YYY. WE WERE USING RWYS 27L; 27R AND 30. OUR SCHEDULED DEPARTURE TIME WAS XA30. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE RWY WE DECIDED TO USE MAX POWER; DUE TO A FEW KNOTS OF TAILWIND. UPON TAKING THE RWY FOR DEPARTURE; THE WINDS SHIFTED AND WE HAD A HEADWIND; BUT DECIDED TO REMAIN AT MAX POWER BECAUSE WE WERE HEAVY. IT HAD RAINED A LITTLE EARLIER AND WE HAD IT ALREADY SET UP. IT WAS MY TKOF AND; UPON ROLLING DOWN THE RWY FOR DEPARTURE OUT OF MIA; WE HEARD THE TWR TELL ACR Y TO GAR AND TO TURN LEFT TO HEADING 180. I ASSUMED THE MISSED APCH WAS TO RWY 27L; HOWEVER; IT WAS ACTUALLY ON THE INTERSECTING RWY 30. WHEN WE BROKE GND AND WERE CLBING THROUGH 200 FT; CAPT X FOCUSED ON ACR Y CLIMBING RIGHT TOWARD US. CAPT TOLD ME TO TURN AND KEEP TURNING. I STARTED A TURN N WITH A 35-40 DEG BANK AND I CLIMBED. THE TWR WAS QUIET FOR A MOMENT AND THEN GAVE US; WE THINK; A CLRNC TO 360 DEG HEADING. WE THINK THAT WAS FOR US BUT THEY DIDN'T USE OUR CORRECT CALL SIGN. THEN THE TWR SAID 'WELL; WE GAVE ACR Y A TURN TO 180 DEG; CONTACT DEPARTURE. THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT WX IN THE AREA AND WE STARTED GETTING VECTORS AROUND OTHER TFC AND WX. I BELIEVE THREE IMPORTANT FACTORS ENABLED US TO EXECUTE A SUCCESSFUL NEAR MISS. FIRST; CAPT X'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND HEAD'S UP SKILL ENABLED US TO VIEW A HAZARD EARLY ENOUGH TO AVOID AN ACCIDENT. SECOND; THE FACT THAT I WAS FLYING ENABLED THE CAPT TO VIEW THE DC9 OFF HIS SIDE OF THE ACFT. AND FINALLY; THE FACT THAT CAPT X ELECTED TO CONTINUE A MAX POWER TKOF GAVE US THE POWER WHEN WE NEEDED IT. I BELIEVE THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE SPECIFIC CHAINS OF EVENTS THAT ENABLED THIS INCIDENT TO COME ABOUT. FIRST; THE FACT THAT WE CONDUCT APCHES TO INTERSECTING RWYS CAUSES POSSIBLE SEVERE RISKS. WE HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THE WHOLE APCH; LANDING AND MISSED APCH AIRSPACE. WE CERTAINLY GIVE ROOM FOR APCHES AND LANDING DISTANCES; BUT MISSED APCH PROCS ARE SEVERELY COMPROMISED. SECONDLY; ACR Y WAS FLYING THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH AND I'M GUESSING; BUT THE LANGUAGE ISSUE HAS TO BE CONSIDERED. I'M SURE WE GOT THEIR ATTENTION AS THEY GOT OURS. AND FINALLY; WE WERE NOT GIVEN ANY INFO FROM THE TWR AS WE WERE TAKING OFF; ON CLB OUT OR AT ANYTIME. I WOULD LOVE TO SAY THAT THIS SIT IS UNIQUE AND WOULD NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN; BUT UNFORTUNATELY I CANNOT. IF SAFETY IS TRULY OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE; THEN SERIOUS THOUGHT NEEDS TO BE GIVEN IN USING CONFLICTING RWYS OR LAND AND HOLD SHORT PROCS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK REVEALED THAT THE GAR FROM RWY 30 WAS THE RESULT OF A PRECEDING ACFT NOT CLEARING THE RWY IN TIME FOR A LNDG BY THE FOLLOWING ACFT. THE GAR WAS ISSUED WITH A CHANGE TO THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH INSTRUCTION. IT WAS NOT EXECUTED IN A TIMELY MANNER. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DELAY WAS DUE TO A LANGUAGE PROB. THE MISS DISTANCE WAS ESTIMATED BY THE RPTR; AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE CAPT SINCE THE RPT WAS MADE; AT 200 FT.