AN ACR CAPT; NOTING THE TENSION CAUSED BY RECENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY; RELATES AN INCIDENT ILLUSTRATING THAT HIS COPLT WAS MORE OF A HINDRANCE TO A SAFE OP THAN A HELP. HE AND ANOTHER CAPT ATTRIBUTE THE PROB TO A POSSIBLE LACK OF QUALIFICATION AS WELL.
Synopsis
AN ACR CAPT; NOTING THE TENSION CAUSED BY RECENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY; RELATES AN INCIDENT ILLUSTRATING THAT HIS COPLT WAS MORE OF A HINDRANCE TO A SAFE OP THAN A HELP. HE AND ANOTHER CAPT ATTRIBUTE THE PROB TO A POSSIBLE LACK OF QUALIFICATION AS WELL.
Narrative
ON SEP/SAT/02; I FLEW FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ATTACKS ON THE WTC AND PENTAGON. THE TENSIONS OF MY FELLOW WORKERS AND PAX WERE HIGH. I WAS THE CAPT FROM DEN TO OMA. MY FO WAS A WOMAN WHO HAD ONLY 40 HRS IN TYPE; AND THE CAPT WHO FLEW IN WITH HER ON THE INBOUND FLT TOLD ME THAT HER COCKPIT ABILITIES WERE LIMITED AND POOR. WITH THIS IN MIND; AND WITH WX ENRTE AND IN OMA; I ELECTED TO FLY. WHEN I ASKED MY FO ABOUT HER FLYING BACKGROUND; SHE TOLD ME THAT SHE HAD WORKED AT ZZZ AIRLINE FOR 15 YRS. THIS LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE WAS BELIED BY HER PERFORMANCE OF EVEN RUDIMENTARY TASKS DURING PREFLT; LIKE OBTAINING A CLRNC. ENRTE; HER RADIO XMISSIONS WERE CONSISTENTLY INACCURATE OR MISSED ALTOGETHER. I FOUND MYSELF IN A POS WORSE THAN IF I WAS SINGLE-PLTING THIS AIRPLANE; AND I AM AN EXPERIENCED CFII MEI WHO IS USED TO COMPENSATING FOR A STUDENT'S INADEQUACIES. ON APCH; I HAD TO TALK HER THROUGH TUNING THE RADIOS; SETTING UP SPD CARDS; ETC. WHILE SHE WAS PERFORMING THESE DUTIES; SHE WOULD MISS ALL RADIO CALLS; WHICH I HAD TO MAKE. SHE ALSO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SOME OF MY INSTRUCTIONS ON SETTING UP THE AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR SUCH THAT I WAS REQUIRED TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT AND HAND-FLY THE APCH. THIS GREATLY INCREASED MY WORKLOAD; AS I WAS NOW RAW DATA AND HAVING TO RE-ESTABLISH MYSELF ON THE APCH. AT THE OM; WE WERE STABILIZED ON THE APCH IN HVY RAIN AND IMC. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS; LNDG CHKLIST BELOW THE LINE; AND HAD TO REPEAT MYSELF WHEN I GOT NO RESPONSE; AS IF SHE WAS FROZEN UP ON ME. I FINALLY GOT A CHALLENGE AND GAVE THE RESPONSE TO THE CHKLIST. WE CONTINUED THE APCH; AND AT 1000 FT ABOVE MINIMUMS SHE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED CALLOUT. I MADE THE CALLOUT AND TOLD HER TO KEEP UP WITH ME. I FELT THAT I HAD NO HELP ON THIS APCH; AND IN RETROSPECT; I COULD HAVE INITIATED A GAR; CLBED TO SAFETY; GOT THINGS SORTED OUT WITH HER; AND ATTEMPTED ANOTHER APCH. DOING THIS; HOWEVER; WOULD HAVE FORCED ME TO HAVE EITHER DIVERTED TO MY ALTERNATE; WHICH WAS NOT MUCH BETTER WX-WISE; OR HAVE BURNED UP SO MUCH FUEL I WOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY 1 MORE APCH WITH VERY LITTLE FUEL OPTIONS. I ELECTED TO REMAIN ON THE APCH; AND I BROKE OUT AT ABOUT 600 FT WITH THE RWY IN SIGHT. AS I CALLED OUT 'LNDG;' I REALIZED THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD NOT BEEN SWITCHED OVER FROM THE APCH CTL FACILITY; MY FO HAD NOT CONTACTED THE TWR. I TOLD HER TO IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE TWR; BUT SHE FUMBLED FOR A FREQ; SAID 'BUT WE WEREN'T SWITCHED OVER' AND DID NOT SUCCESSFULLY SWITCH OVER UNTIL I WAS OVER THE NUMBERS. I SAW THAT I HAD A CLR RWY; THAT IT WAS SAFE AND I FELT THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY TO LAND. I DID SO NORMALLY; AND TWR SIMPLY INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO PARKING. I DEBRIEFED HER EXTENSIVELY AS TO HER DUTIES DURING AN APCH AS THE PNF; AND HOW SHE HAD RELINQUISHED THEM ALL TO ME. I HAVE TRAINED PLTS AT ALL LEVELS OF EXPERIENCE; BUT NEVER HAVE I FELT SO HUNG OUT TO DRY AS FLYING WITH THIS PERSON. IT WAS AS IF I HAD A PERSON IN THE COCKPIT WHO DID NOT JUST DO NOTHING; BUT SEEMED TO BE DOING EVERYTHING TO INCREASE MY WORKLOAD. I HAVE NOTIFIED OUR FLT OPS DEPT ABOUT THIS INDIVIDUAL; AND REVIEW OF HER TRAINING AND BACKGROUND WAS PROMISED.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.