A FALCON 900 FLC IS ADVISED BY ATC TO NOT RESPOND TO THEIR TCASII RA REGARDING DSNDING; XING TFC; AN F15 UNDER AWACS CTL; ON AN AIRWAY XING DURING AN AIR INTERCEPT MANEUVER ON THE WESTMINSTER STAR ARR.

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THIS WAS OUR FIRST FLT AFTER THE WTC TERRORIST ATTACK. BEFORE DEPARTURE I REVIEWED WITH THE CAPT ABOUT MONITORING 121.5 AND TOLD HIM I HAD REVIEWED INTERCEPT PROCS. HE INDICATED HE HAD NOT DONE SO. I WAS FLYING THE LEG FROM CHICAGO AREA TO BWI. WE WERE ASSIGNED THE WESTMINSTER ARR. WE WERE LEVEL AT 11000 FT MSL AND HAD SLOWED TO 250 KTS. THE CTLR WARNED US ABOUT F15 TFC AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS; 7 MILES; DSNDING TO CROSS UNDER US AT 10000 FT MSL. WE HAD TFC ON OUR TCASII AT THAT POS SHOWING 6500 FT ABOVE US AND DSNDING. THE CTLR TOLD US IT MIGHT BE A FLT OF TWO; AND THAT THEY WERE GOING TO INVESTIGATE AN INTRUDER TO THE NORTH OF US. WE ASKED THE CTLR IF THEY WERE AWARE OF US AND HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO GO ASK. HE WAS NOT TALKING TO THE F15. WE WERE MAINLY IN CLOUDS; BUT OCCASIONALLY BROKE OUT INTO 5 MILES PLUS VISIBILITY IN SCATTERED LAYERS ON A GRAY DAY. AS THE TCASII TARGETS GOT CLOSER AND RAPIDLY APCHED OUR ALT; THE TCASII RA TOLD ME TO DSND. I HAD NOT SWITCHED TO TA BECAUSE I DID NOT BELIEVE WE WERE BEING INTERCEPTED. THE CTLR TOLD US TO NOT FOLLOW ANY RA. HE SAID WE WERE IN THE VICINITY OF CAMP DAVID AND UNUSUAL MOVES MADE THE MILITARY NERVOUS. DURING THE RA WE ACQUIRED THE F15 VISUALLY AND COULD SEE HE WOULD PASS BEHIND US. THE TCASII READ 300 FT BELOW US AND 2 MILES BEHIND US WHEN HE DID SO. WE TALKED TO THE CTLRS BY PHONE AFTER LNDG. THE CTLR'S SUPERVISOR TOLD HIM IT WAS WRONG TO TELL US TO IGNORE THE RA. THE MILITARY F15 IS BEING GUIDED BY AN AWACS CTLR. HE WAS NOT INTERCEPTING US. LEGALLY I SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THE RA. I HESITATED BECAUSE I WASN'T SURE IF WE WERE BEING INTERCEPTED AND BECAUSE OF A REAL CONCERN ABOUT THE REACTION OF A FIGHTER DURING A TIME SO CLOSE TO THE TERRORIST ATTACK (AND SO CLOSE TO CAMP DAVID). HAVING THE MILITARY BLOW THROUGH THE WESTMINSTER ARR ROUTE IS NOT A GOOD IDEA. THE ARR SHOULD NOT BE USED IF IT GOES THAT CLOSE TO CAMP DAVID. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THERE WERE 5 BASIC PROBLEMS WITH THIS EVENT. 1) ROUTES - AIRWAYS - AND ARRIVAL PROCS WITHIN THIS AREA REMAIN THE SAME AS BEFORE THE 911 ATTACKS. 2) THE WESTMINSTER ARRIVAL; ON V-3 AIRWAY; TAKES THE TFC WITHIN 9 NM OF THE DEPICTED PROHIBITED RESTR AREA (CAMP DAVID). 3) SOME TFR'S TEMPORARILY ENLARGE THE PROHIBITED AREAS PAST THE ORIGINAL RESTR; INCORPORATED A MUCH LARGER RADIUS AND CIRCUMFERENCE THAN DEPICTED. 4) THE FALCON 900 WAS IN AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS - NO VISUAL ON THE F-15'S UNTIL AFTER THE TCAS R/A WAS RECEIVED. (THE F-15'S WERE ON TCASII THROUGHOUT THE EVENT) PERHAPS THE F-15'S HAD NO VISUAL ON THE F-900. REGARDLESS; ATC HAD ADVISED THE CREW TO TAKE NO EVASIVE ACTION BASED UPON THE TCAS RA. (INTERCEPT PROCS MAY INCORPORATE A TA POSITION FOR THE TCASII SELECTOR; BUT THIS FLT WAS NOT UNDER THAT MANDATE. 5) THIS WAS A SPLIT FREQ OP WITH THE TWO SUBJECT FLTS UNDER SEPARATE ATC JURISDICTION; THE F-900 ON ATC - VHF AND THE MIL ON UHF WITH THE AWAC. WHAT LEVEL OF INTER FACILITY COORD EXISTED? ATC WOULD HAVE A GENERAL TACTICAL UHF FREQ AVAILABLE WITHIN THE FACILITY; BUT DOES IT HAVE A DESIGNATED UHF TACTICAL FREQ TO CONTACT THE AWAC? EVENT HAD THE POTENTIAL FOR DEGRADING INTO A VERY UNSTABLE SIT.