B737 FLC ALERTED BY ZLA ABOUT RTE DEV; WHO DISCOVER PREFLT COORD AND RTE UPLOAD ERROR.

Date: 2001-10 · Aircraft: B737-700 · Phase: cruise

Anomalies: deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

B737 FLC ALERTED BY ZLA ABOUT RTE DEV; WHO DISCOVER PREFLT COORD AND RTE UPLOAD ERROR.

Narrative

ENRTE FROM TPA TO LAS; WE WERE GIVEN DIRECT PGS. I THEN ENTERED WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE THE ARR; THE PGS 1 ARR TO LAS. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE; THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE ARR WHEN GIVEN DIRECT PGS. AS WE FLEW OUT THE 282 DEG RADIAL(?); ATC ASKED US IF WE WERE GOING TO LYNSY INTXN OR THE 282 DEG RADIAL. NEITHER INFORMED US THAT WE HAD FILED THE MIROK 1 ARR AND I PROCEEDED DIRECT TO LYNSY INTXN. WE TURNED AND NEVER WERE MORE THAN 3.5 MI N OF COURSE. AFTER INVESTIGATING WHAT WENT WRONG; I DISCOVERED THAT THE RELEASE DID IN FACT HAVE THE MIROK 1 ARR AND I DID NOT NOTICE THE CHANGE. THE NOTAMS DID HAVE A NOTE THAT THE PGS 1 ARR WAS DISCONTINUED ON OCT/XA/01. THIS NOTE DID TAKE SOME TIME TO FIND AS IT WAS INCLUDED WITH MANY OTHER NOTAMS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THERE WAS NOT ANY COMPANY NOTAMS ABOUT ARR AND DEP CHANGES IN LAS. IN FACT; THE LAST INFO I HAD WAS THE CHANGES WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL NOVEMBER AND THAT IS WHY WE WERE FILED AS /I. THE FMC DID NOT HAVE THE NEW ARRS PROGRAMMED TO KEY US OF THE CHANGES. BOTTOM LINE: I ASSUMED THE ARR WITHOUT XCHKING THE RELEASE; I DID NOT CATCH THE NOTAM CHANGE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 527959: ASSUMED WE WERE ON THE PGS 1 ARR. OVER THE VOR; I VIEWED THE CLRNC AND NOTICED WE WERE FILED FOR THE MIROK 1. I QUICKLY FOUND THE MIROK 1 ARR AND DIALED IN 257 DEGS(?). SINCE WE WERE OVER THE VOR; I WASN'T SURPRISED TO SEE WE WEREN'T ON THE RADIAL YET. AT THIS POINT I WAS DISTR BY MY SIMULTANEOUS COMPUTATIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER. ATC POINTED OUT OUR COURSE DEV; AT WHICH POINT I REALIZED THE CAPT THOUGHT WE WERE ON THE PGS 1 AS WELL. CLRLY; WE BOTH MADE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT OUR CLRNC WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN BACKED UP WITH COM. FURTHERMORE; I SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED THE CLRNC WITH THE CAPT UPON MY FIRST REALIZATION INSTEAD OF MY COMPUTATIONS.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.