EMB120 CREW MADE A VISUAL APCH TO HTS WITHOUT CLRNC.

Date: 2001-11 · Aircraft: Brasilia EMB-120 All Series · Phase: approach

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|other-company-radio-rpt-at-inappropriate-time

Synopsis

EMB120 CREW MADE A VISUAL APCH TO HTS WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative

THE FOLLOWING EVENT OCCURRED WHILE ON VECTORS FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 30 AT HTS. I; THE CAPT; WAS FLYING THE VISUAL APCH WITH THE ARPT VISIBLE OFF MY SIDE OF THE ACFT. APCH CTL HAD US LEVEL AT 3000 FT; ON A 030 DEG HDG; A MODIFIED L BASE TO FINAL. AFTER THE PREVIOUS INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS BY APCH; THE FO INFORMED ME HE WAS GOING TO SWITCH TO RADIO #2 TO CALL 'IN RANGE' TO OUR COMPANY OPS. I TOOK THE #1 RADIO WHILE HE WAS OFF FREQ. 1 MIN LATER; HE CHKED BACK ON STATING 'I'M BACK AND HAVE THE #1 RADIO.' I ACKNOWLEDGED AND SOON AFTER; FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM APCH WERE RECEIVED. WE WERE TOLD TO TURN R HDG 060 DEGS. THE FO REPLIED AND THE TURN WAS COMMENCED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; APCH STATED AGAIN; 'TURN R 060 DEGS' AND ALSO TO CONTACT THE TWR. THE FO REPLIED AND THEN SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. IT WAS AT THIS MOMENT THAT I LOOKED AT HIS RADIO PANEL AND NOTICED THAT HIS LAST 2 REPLIES TO APCH HAD BEEN MADE TO THE #2 RADIO; NOT #1. I INFORMED HIM OF HIS RADIO SET-UP AND HE SWITCHED TO #1. WHEN THE FO CHKED IN WITH THE TWR; WE WERE TOLD TO LOOK FOR TFC ON A 3-4 MI FINAL FOR RWY 30. I TOLD THE FO I HAD THE TFC AND THE FIELD IN SIGHT. TWR REPLIED; 'TURN A 5 MI FINAL AND FOLLOW THE TFC.' I SET UP ON A 5 MI FINAL BEHIND THE TFC TO BE FOLLOWED AND SOON AFTER RECEIVED A LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 30. A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WERE MADE; THE ACFT ARRIVED AT THE GATE AND PREPARED FOR OUR NEXT DEP. WHILE AT THE GATE; I WAS ADVISED BY OUR GND PERSONNEL THAT I NEEDED TO GO INTO THE TERMINAL AND SPEAK TO ONE OF THE CTLRS. I DID; AND HE WAS VERY NICE AND CORDIAL; BUT WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WE THOUGHT ABOUT OUR APCH. COME TO FIND OUT; I HAD NEVER ACTUALLY RECEIVED 'CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH' BY THE APCH CTLR. DUE TO THE SELECTION OF THE WRONG RADIO; WE INITIATED A VISUAL APCH WITHOUT PROPER CLRNC. THE TWR CTLR HAD CLRED US TO LAND AND SEPARATION WITH THE ACFT AHEAD WAS NEVER BROKEN. I LEFT MY CONVERSATION WITH THE CTLR POSITIVELY AND HE SAID IT WAS NOT AN ISSUE; THEY JUST WANTED TO WORK OUT THE CONFUSION FOR BOTH PARTIES INVOLVED. LOOKING BACK ON THIS INCIDENT; I SEE A NUMBER OF ERRORS I MADE. AS THE ACFT PIC; IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE ALL INFO RELATING TO THE ACFT OP. MY FIRST MISTAKE WAS NOT VERIFYING MY FO'S RADIO POS. I WAS HAND FLYING THIS VISUAL. HAD I USED THE AUTOPLT; I MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LOOK OVER AT HIS AUDIO PANEL AND VERIFY THE CORRECT POS. SECONDLY; I BECAME SO FOCUSED ON LOOKING FOR VFR TFC AND FLYING A VISUAL APCH THAT I FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE ABSENCE OF A VISUAL APCH CLRNC. MY EXPERIENCE TELLS ME I SHOULD HAVE HEARD THAT STATEMENT PRIOR TO COMMENCING THE APCH AND SURELY BEFORE THE LNDG CLRNC. TO CORRECT THESE ERRORS IN THE FUTURE; I WILL DO SEVERAL THINGS. I WILL USE MY ACFT SYS TO AID ME AND REDUCE MY WORKLOAD; IE; AUTOPLT. I WILL ALSO SEEK TO CONCENTRATE ON MAKING SURE I HEAR THE APPROPRIATE CLRNC IS ISSUED BEFORE ASSUMING IT HAS. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS OF A HUMAN NATURE I FEEL HAD AN IMPACT HERE. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED ON THE 5TH DAY OF FLYING IN A ROW. THIS WAS ALSO OUR SECOND TO LAST LEG BEFORE BEING OFF. FOR MYSELF; THIS WAS THE 10TH DAY OUT OF 11 I HAD WORKED. I HAD BEEN SCHEDULED CLOSE TO THE LIMITS OF FLT TIME. (5 DAYS ON; 1 DAY OFF; 5 DAYS ON -- INCIDENT ON VERY LAST DAY.) THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MY FO AND MYSELF WERE FATIGUED. ALTHOUGH WE HAD ONLY BEEN ON DUTY APPROX 9 HRS; THE DAY WAS DRAWING TO AN END. ALSO; THIS PARTICULAR FO WAS NEW TO ME. THESE 5 DAYS WE HAD FLOWN TOGETHER WERE OUR ONLY FLT EXPERIENCE WITH EACH OTHER. I'M SURE I TRUSTED HIM TOO MUCH. WHILE HE IS A SENIOR FO; I SHOULD HAVE WATCHED HIM CLOSER TO OBSERVE HIS PERFORMANCE BEFORE TRUSTING HIM SO MUCH. FINALLY; AND SAD TO SAY; THIS FO DOES NOT HAVE THE BEST REPUTATION. HE IS KNOWN FOR HIS ATTITUDE AND NEGATIVE DEMEANOR TOWARDS YOUNGER CAPTS. IT IS MY JOB TO FOSTER THE SAFEST WORKING ENVIRONMENT I CAN. I NEED TO BE A TRUE LEADER WITH THIS FO TO ENSURE HIS CONTRIBUTION TO OUR CREW CONCEPT IS ACCURATE AND HELPFUL. IN CLOSING; I MADE SEVERAL ERRORS. ABOVE ALL; I FEEL THAT I WAS COMPLACENT. I LET TOO MANY ITEMS; RANGING FROM ATC TO MY FATIGUE TO INTERPERSONAL ISSUES WITH MY FO; GET IN THE WAY OF CORRECTLY FLYING AN APCH. LEARNING IS THE ONLY WAY THE AVIATION INDUSTRY EVER IMPROVES OR GROWS. PLTS ARE PART OF A LONG EQUATION; AND I KNOW I LEARNED VOLUMES FROM THIS SIT. I NOW KNOW SEVERAL MISTAKES TO WATCH FOR SO THAT I CAN REMAIN A VALID PART OF THE AVIATION EQUATION.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.