F900 CREW CLBED ACFT TOO HIGH FOR THE ACFT GROSS WT AND CONDITIONS.

Date: 2001-11 · Aircraft: Falcon 900 · Phase: cruise

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe|deviation-altitude-excursion-from-assigned-altitude|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence|other-acft-performance-back-side-of-power-curve

Synopsis

F900 CREW CLBED ACFT TOO HIGH FOR THE ACFT GROSS WT AND CONDITIONS.

Narrative

WE DEPARTED DURANGO; CO; AT XA30 ON NOV/MON/01 FOR TVL FOR A PICKUP. OUR GROSS TKOF WT WAS APPROX 42000 LBS. (OUR MAX TKOF WT IS 49000 LBS.) WE WERE CLRED TO OUR FILED CRUISE ALT OF FL390. ALL ALTS ABOVE ABOUT FL250 WERE VERY TURBULENT WITH MOSTLY LIGHT TURB INITIALLY AT FL390. AFTER APPROX 45 MINS; THE RIDE BECAME WORSE AND FL410 WAS REQUESTED. IT WAS DENIED; AS THERE WAS TFC AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS. AFTER A CHK OF THE PERFORMANCE PAGE OF OUR FMS; A CLB WAS REQUESTED TO FL430. THE CTLR ASKED WHEN WE COULD BE LEVEL. WE RESPONDED '3 OR 4 MINS' AT WHICH POINT A CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO CLB TO FL430 WITH A CLB RATE OF NO LESS THAN 1000 FPM. OUR CRUISE AT THAT TIME WAS .82 MACH. A CLB WAS INITIATED AT 1000 FPM AND HELD TO FL430. OUR SPD DECAYED RAPIDLY IN THE CLB UNTIL AT LEVELOFF WE WERE AT .70 MACH. OUR CONCERN WAS ON THE INCREASE. WE FELT THAT THE RAPID CLB RATE THAT WAS REQUESTED OF US TO SUSTAIN; AND THE STILL TURBULENT AIR; WAS TAKING US OFF OF THE BACK SIDE OF THE PWR CURVE. AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT WAS REQUESTED AND DENIED. OUR SPD SLOWED AT THIS POINT TO .68 MACH. AGAIN A REQUEST FOR LOWER WAS MADE WITH AN OFF COURSE VECTOR -- AGAIN DENIED. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT AND NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. THIS WAS ONCE AGAIN DENIED WITH 'MAINTAIN FL430.' I STRESSED THAT WE WERE IN A VERY CRITICAL SIT AND WE WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ANYTHING AT THIS POINT AS OUR SPD HAD DROPPED TO APPROX .64 MACH. WE WERE GIVEN A TURN OF 50 DEGS IN A FIRM TONE OF VOICE; WHICH WE REFUSED. WE FELT THAT A TURN COULD PUT US AT RISK OF A STALL; AS AN ALREADY OMINOUS BURBLE WAS BEGINNING TO DEVELOP. DURING THIS LAST CONVERSATION WITH THE CTLR; MY PARTNER HAD STARTED A VERY SLOW DRIFT DOWN FROM ALT; AS OUR SPD WAS STILL DECAYING AT A RAPID RATE. WE SHOWED NOTHING ON TCASII AT THIS POINT FOR AT LEAST 10-15 MI. (APPARENTLY; THIS WAS THE TFC THAT THE CTLR WAS WORRIED ABOUT.) OUR ALT DETERIORATED TO BTWN FL426 AND FL423 (NOT SURE) WHEN I THINK I HEARD THE CTLR TURN OUR TFC. AT THIS POINT; A CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO US TO DSND TO FL350. SOME TIME LATER; APPROX 5 MINS; THE CTLR ASKED WHAT THE PROB HAD BEEN AND I EXPLAINED THAT THE RAPID RATE OF CLB REQUESTED OF US TO FL430; AND THE TURB HAD CAUSED US TO SLOW TO A POINT WHERE WE COULD NO LONGER MAINTAIN ALT. I ASKED FOR A PHONE NUMBER TO EXPLAIN FURTHER AND WAS TOLD THAT WAS NOT NECESSARY. THIS ACFT IS NEW TO OUR FLT DEPT. BOTH OF US ARE EXPERIENCED AIRMEN AND WELL TRAINED IN THIS ACFT. HOWEVER; THIS WAS A SIT WHERE I FEEL THAT POOR JUDGEMENT ALL THE WAY AROUND WAS EXERCISED BY EVERYONE; MYSELF INCLUDED. A CLRNC TO 'MAINTAIN A CLB RATE OF 1000 FPM TO FL430;' AT OUR WT AND IN OUR FLYING CONDITIONS (TURB); SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED. WE ALSO FEEL THAT THE CTLR; AFTER BEING ADVISED OF OUR PROB; COULD HAVE BEEN A BIT MORE ACCOMMODATING AND TURNED THE CONFLICTING TFC WHILE THERE WAS STILL A GOOD SEPARATION BTWN US. GRANTED; WE DID NOT HAVE THE PICTURE OF OTHER TFC AS HE DID; HE WAS; HOWEVER; ADVISED EARLY ON THAT A PROB EXISTED AND THAT OUR SIT WAS RAPIDLY 'HEADING S.' OUR PERFORMANCE FMS STATED THAT AT THIS WT AND TEMP; WE COULD SAFELY CLB TO AND MAINTAIN FL430. WHAT IT DID NOT SAY IS THAT AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF CLB COULD BE SUSTAINED TO THIS ALT AT OUR WT. I FEEL THAT WE ALL HAVE COME TO RELY ON OUR 'BELLS AND WHISTLES' WAY TOO MUCH. THE PLT IS STILL THE ONLY RESOURCE WHO MUST; WITH EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING; BE RELIED UPON TO HANDLE SITS THAT MAY ARISE OUTSIDE THE BOX; LITERALLY; BUT FIRST; MUST WAKE UP AND RESORT TO GOOD COMMON SENSE. WE SURVIVED; WE LEARNED. THANK GOD THAT THE LESSON WASN'T ANY MORE EXPENSIVE THAN THAT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.