FLC OF AN MDT TURBO PROP OPERATED ACFT IN PAX SCHEDULED SVC WHEN ONE OF THE ENGS EXCEEDED ITT TEMP DURING START. HOWEVER; THE CAPT DID NOT TELL THE FO OF THE INCIDENT AND PROCEEDED TO FLY THE ACFT WHEN THE ENG NEEDED INSPECTION.

Date: 2001-11 · Aircraft: Ultralight · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

FLC OF AN MDT TURBO PROP OPERATED ACFT IN PAX SCHEDULED SVC WHEN ONE OF THE ENGS EXCEEDED ITT TEMP DURING START. HOWEVER; THE CAPT DID NOT TELL THE FO OF THE INCIDENT AND PROCEEDED TO FLY THE ACFT WHEN THE ENG NEEDED INSPECTION.

Narrative

ON NOV/SAT/2001 I WAS FO ON A PART 121 FLIGHT. AFTER THE PAX WERE LOADED I WAS HEADS DOWN CALCULATING THE LOAD MANIFESTS WHILE THE CAPT STARTED ENG #2. THIS IS NORMAL PRACTICE AS SPELLED OUT IN THE COMPANY PROCS AND THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR THE FO TO MONITOR THE ENG STARTS. UNKNOWN TO ME; THE GPU HAD FAILED DURING THE START SEQUENCE. WHILE STILL HEADS DOWN; I HEARD THE CAPT SAY SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT; 'IT'S GOING TO GO HOT;' FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY; 'THERE IT IS.' HE ABORTED THE START SEQUENCE AND TOLD ME THAT THE GPU HAD FAILED. HE CALLED FOR A SECOND GPU WHILE I FINISHED THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE. WE GOT THE SECOND GPU; STARTED UP; AND TAXIED OFF THE GATE. WE FLEW THE ACFT IN FOUR SUBSEQUENT PART 121 REVENUE FLIGHTS THAT DAY. TEN DAYS LATER; I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE COMPANY ASKING ME ABOUT THE HOT START. I TOLD OUR PROGRAM MGR THAT THE CAPT WAS 'ON TOP OF IT.' BY 'ON TOP OF IT' I MEANT THAT IT SOUNDED LIKE AFTER THE GPU FAILURE HE WAS ANTICIPATING THE HOT START; AND I BELIEVED HE HAD SHUT IT DOWN IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE PROGRAM MGR TOLD ME THAT WHEN THE CAPT SUBMITTED HIS WRITTEN INCIDENT REPORT; HE CLAIMED THAT DURING THE HOT START THE ITT EXCEEDED 950 DEGS C; A PWR PLANT LIMITATION. THUS; THE ACFT WAS NOT LEGAL FOR FURTHER PART 121 FLIGHTS UNTIL IT HAD BEEN INSPECTED BY MAINT. THIS WAS THE FIRST MOMENT THAT I BECAME AWARE THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED A LIMITATION. I HAVE FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT ON MANY OCCASIONS AND FOUND HIM TO BE VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND CONSCIENTIOUS OF THE REGULATIONS; ACFT SYS; AND COMPANY PROCS. I AM AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN WHY THE CAPT DID NOT INFORM ME THAT THE ITT LIMITATION HAD BEEN EXCEEDED. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE? REQUIRE THAT BOTH CREWMEMBERS MONITOR ENG STARTS. ALSO; IN THE EVENT OF A HOT START; HUNG START; OR OTHER ABNORMAL; REQUIRE THAT BOTH CREWMEMBERS DISCUSS ANY AND ALL APPLICABLE LIMITATIONS AND CONFIRM THAT NONE HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.