C750 CREW WAS NOT USING ACCEPTED FMC OPERATING PROTOCOL WHICH RESULTED IN AN INCORRECT HOLDING PATTERN ENTRY AND A XING RESTR NOT MET.

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WE WERE TRAVELING FROM GARY; IN; TO MORRISTOWN; NJ; IN A NEW ACFT WHICH WE HAD APPROX 50 HRS IN TYPE. ON OUR ARR THE (LVZ3) INTO MORRISTOWN; WE WERE ISSUED A HOLD WITHIN 5 MI OF MUGZY INTXN. I WAS PIC/PNF FOR THE TRIP. I HAD PROGRAMMED THE LONG-RANGE NAVS EARLIER IN THE FLT; AND HAD RETURNED THE CHART TO ITS HOLDER. AS I REACHED FOR THE CHART TO SEE HOW THE HOLD WAS DEPICTED; MY FO/PF INFORMED ME ALL PUBLISHED HOLDS ARE STORED WITHIN THE FMS. BASED ON HIS PREVIOUS AND EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE USING THESE FMS UNITS FROM PREVIOUS ACFT HE HAD FLOWN; I TOOK HIM AT HIS WORD. WHEN WE REACHED MUGZY INTXN HE WAS HIGH AND FAST BUT WAS WORKING ON SLOWING THE ACFT TO HOLDING SPD. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND THE ACFT STARTED A R TURN. I INFORMED THE CTLR WE WERE ENTERING THE HOLD. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE CTLR SAID THAT IT APPEARED WE WERE TURNING R; WHEN THE PUBLISHED HOLD WAS L TURNS. WE CONTINUED AROUND TO THE R TO PROCEED BACK TO MUGZY INTXN AND STARTED THE L TURN FOR THE PUBLISHED HOLD. AS WE DID THIS THE CTLR CLRED US TO CONTINUE WITH THE STAR. THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS WITH OTHER TFC THAT WE WERE AWARE OF. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE AS FOLLOWS: 1) I SHOULD HAVE KEPT THE ARR CHART IN FRONT OF ME; 2) VERIFY EVERYTHING; PLTS ARE HUMAN AND WE MAKE MISTAKES; 3) START THE DSCNT SOONER AND AT A SLOWER SPD WHILE ON THE ARR; 4) LATE CLRNC ISSUANCE; AND 5) UNFAMILIAR WITH THE COMPLETE USE OF THE FMS UNITS. IN THE FUTURE I WILL REQUIRE THAT ALL CHARTS ARE OUT FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT; AND NOT ALLOW COMPLACENCY TO FACTOR INTO OUR FLYING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 531599: WHILE ON A VPATH DSCNT WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED ON THE LVZ3 ARR INTO MMU DSNDING TO CROSS MUGZY INTXN AT 6000 FT WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED AT MUGZY WHILE ONLY 7 MI FROM THE FIX. THE CAPT/PNF REACHED FOR THE CHART (STAR) WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN PUT AWAY AFTER PROGRAMMING THE FMS. I TOLD HIM NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT AS THE HOLD WOULD BE IN THE 'BOX.' AS HE WAS SETTING UP THE HOLD I RECEIVED A 'MAX SPD' ALERT ON MY PFD AND THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS AUTOMATICALLY PULLED UP PUTTING US ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH. WE WERE NOT EXCEEDING 250 KTS BUT WE ARE NEW IN TYPE AND THE PLANE IS NEW ALSO; LESS THAN 70 HRS TOTAL TIME AIRFRAME. ONE OF THE SQUAWKS IS THAT THE OVERSPD PROTECTION KICKS IN TOO EARLY SOMETIMES AS SLOW AS 235 KIAS. BY THE TIME I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT WE WERE XING THE FIX ALMOST 1000 FT HIGH AND STARTING A R TURN IN THE HOLD. AT THIS POINT THE CTLR TOLD US THE HOLD WAS L TURNS. AS FAR AS WE COULD TELL THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH EITHER OTHER ACFT OR AIRSPACE. PRIMARY CAUSE: COMPLACENCY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) LATE CLRNC ISSUANCE BY ATC; AND 2) LOW TIME IN TYPE IN AN ACFT WITH A SOFTWARE PROB THAT PULLS THE NOSE OF THE ACFT UP TOO EARLY. CONCLUSION: IF THE CHARTS HAD BEEN LEFT OUT AND WE HAD FLOWN A MORE CONSERVATIVE DSCNT (IE; STARTED DOWN SOONER AND PLANNED A XING A FEW MI PRIOR TO MUGZY) THEN EVEN THE LATE CLRNC ISSUANCE AND THE 'TEETHING PROBS' AND LEARNING CURVE WE WERE EXPERIENCING IN THE NEW ACFT WOULD NOT HAVE RESULTED IN A BLOWN CLRNC.