A DEP TRACK DEV ON A PUBLISHED DEP. A NON ACFT QUALIFIED PLT FLYING WITH THE SAFETY PLT INSTRUCTOR ON HIS FIRST FLT IN THAT CAPACITY.

Date: 2002-02 · Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Anomalies: deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

A DEP TRACK DEV ON A PUBLISHED DEP. A NON ACFT QUALIFIED PLT FLYING WITH THE SAFETY PLT INSTRUCTOR ON HIS FIRST FLT IN THAT CAPACITY.

Narrative

THIS WAS A MISSED TURN ON A DEP PROC. I WAS SAFETY PLT; IN R SEAT; WITH AN FAA CERTIFICATION TEST PLT IN L SEAT. FIRST TKOF OF THE DAY FROM SEA ENRTE TO TEST AIRFIELD. CLRED; VIA PDC; FOR MOUNTAIN DEP. INADVERTENTLY READ AND EXECUTED SEA DEP. MISSED R TURN TO 070 DEGS. DEP CTL CALLED; ASKING WHICH DEP PROC WE WERE CLRED TO FLY; AND GAVE US A TURN TO 130 DEGS. I CONFIRMED MOUNTAIN DEP PROC; CONFESSED MY ERROR; AND WE TURNED AS DIRECTED. NO APPARENT TFC CONFLICT. MANY FACTORS LED TO THIS MISTAKE; MOSTLY CONCERNING NEW SITS; DISTRS; AND INTERRUPTIONS. 1) FAA PLT IN L SEAT WAS NOT QUALIFIED ON ACFT. I WAS TAKING GREAT PAINS TO EXPLAIN EVERYTHING AS WELL AS MONITOR HIS FLYING PERFORMANCE. NOTE THAT I BRIEFED HIM; INCORRECTLY; TO FLY RWY HDG AFTER TKOF. HE ALSO DIDN'T CATCH MY ERROR. 2) THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME AS SAFETY PLT. I FELT COMPETENT; BUT CHALLENGED; BY THE TASK. 3) NONSTANDARD FUELING; DEICING; FLT PLANNING PROCS PRIOR TO FLT VERY INTENSIVE. 4) NUMEROUS INTERRUPTIONS DURING PREFLT PHASE DUE DEICING; TEST PROCS; ETC. 5) AT PUSHBACK; GND CREW NOTICED A LEAK; WHICH WE STOPPED TO CHK. THE MOUNTAIN AND SEATTLE DEP PROCS ARE ON OPPOSING PAGES IN MY MANUAL. I THINK I MUST HAVE OPENED TO THE CORRECT PAGE; THEN READ THE WRONG SIDE. PERHAPS THERE WAS A DISTR DURING THIS PROCESS; BUT I CAN'T SAY FOR SURE. FOR THE FUTURE; WHENEVER WE HAVE A NON QUALIFIED (OR EVEN NON COMPANY) PLT IN EITHER SEAT; I WILL SUGGEST WE APPOINT ANOTHER QUALIFIED COMPANY PLT TO MONITOR ALL COCKPIT SET-UPS; BRIEFINGS; ETC -- JUST TO TRY TO PROVIDE THE NORMAL 'DUAL ERROR TRAP' WE USUALLY HAVE DURING REGULAR LINE OPS.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.