A B733 CREW; TAXIING FOR TKOF AT BUR; TAXIED PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE.

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ON TAXI OUT FOR TKOF ON RWY 33 AT BUR I CROSSED OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE WITHOUT CLRNC. AS WE APCHED THE ACTUAL RWY; TWR TOLD US TO HOLD OUR POS. WE WERE ALREADY STOPPING SHORT OF WHAT APPEARED AT FIRST TO BE THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR THE RWY. TWR STARTED TO SEND A SMALL ACFT ON FINAL AROUND; BUT THEN SAW THAT WE WERE ACTUALLY SHORT OF THE RWY; AND CLRED THEM TO CONTINUE FOR THE LNDG. TWR THEN INFORMED US THAT WHAT WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF WAS IN FACT THE RWY EDGE LINE FOR RWY 33 (A SOLID YELLOW LINE FOLLOWED BY A DASHED YELLOW LINE INSTEAD OF DOUBLE LINES). THE HOLD SHORT LINE WAS ACTUALLY BEHIND US. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 541607: I WAS READING THE PRE-TKOF CHKLIST AND SETTING UP THE AIR CONDITION/BLEEDS FOR A 'NO BLEED TKOF.' AS WE APCHED RWY 33; TWR CTL INSTRUCTED US TO 'STOP.' A SINGLE ENG ACFT WAS ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 33. TWR TOLD THE SINGLE ENG ACFT TO GO AROUND. AFTER WE STOPPED (WITHIN SECONDS) TWR INSTRUCTED THE ACFT TO LAND ON RWY 33. THE ACFT LANDED ON RWY 33. I BELIEVE THAT THE CAPT WAS GOING TO STOP SHORT OF THE RWY; HOWEVER WE DID TAXI PAST THE RWY HOLD LINES FOR RWY 33/15. THE RWY HOLD LINES FOR RWY 33/15 ARE NEXT TO THE HOLD LINES FOR RWY 8/26. WE ACTUALLY STOPPED SHORT OF THE RWY EDGE LINES. SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT PREVENTED ME FROM INFORMING THE CAPT OF THE INCURSION ARE: 1) MY ATTN WITH THE PRE-TKOF CHKLIST AND 'NO BLEED TKOF;' 2) MY CONCERN WITH THE WIND SPD AND DIRECTION FOR TKOF PERFORMANCE; 3) SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED THE TWR SOONER; 4) LONG DUTY DAY (12 HRS AT THAT TIME) AND THE LAST LEG OF 6; 5) FIRST TIME FOR ME USING RWY IN BUR; AND 6) SUN GLARE IN OUR EYES AS WE TAXI W.