BAE146 FLC COMPLIES WITH TCASII RA INSTRUCTION TO CLB AND OUTCLBS NON TCASII EQUIPPED TFC.

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ON 04/FRI/02; WE OPERATED FROM MEM TO SDF. WHILE LEVEL AT 17000 FT; S OF PXV VOR; MIL ACFT WAS LEVEL AT 16000 FT. THEIR POS TO US WAS 90 DEGS TO OUR R. THEY WERE TOLD OF OUR POS AND PROMPTLY ACKNOWLEDGED OUR POS AND WERE TOLD TO CLB AND MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. AS ATC WAS TELLING US OF THEIR POS; WE SPOTTED THE TFC AND IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM OUR TCASII TO CLB. CAPT IMMEDIATELY COMPLIED WITH THE RA AND STARTED A VERY AGGRESSIVE CLB. AS WE WERE EXECUTING OUR EVASIVE CLB MANEUVER; WE RECEIVED YET ANOTHER 'INCREASE CLB; INCREASE CLB.' AT THIS POINT; THE LAST VSI INDICATION I SAW WAS 5300 FPM. AS THE FO; I THEN FOCUSED MY ATTN AGAIN ON THE DC9. BOTH ACFT CONTINUED TO CLB; WHICH COMPLICATED ISSUES FURTHER. WHO WAS GOING TO OUTCLB THE OTHER WAS THE FEELING. NEVER HAVE I EVER FELT AS THREATENED AS I DID AT THIS MOMENT. THERE WAS SUCH A LEVEL OF UNCERTAINTY. CLOSURE RATES WERE VERY FAST AND BOTH OF US WERE CLBING AT THIS POINT. CHAIN OF EVENTS: ANOTHER 30-45 SECONDS WOULD HAVE ALLOWED BOTH ACFT TO SUCCESSFULLY AND LEGALLY PASS ONE ANOTHER. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I QUESTION WHETHER DC9 DID INDEED HAVE VISUAL CONTACT WITH US. DC9 ACTED IN A VERY IMPATIENT MANNER. OBVIOUSLY; THEY DON'T HAVE TCASII EQUIP ACFT. HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM OUR ACFT. IT WAS THEN AND ONLY THEN I SAW THE DC9 PENETRATING OUR AIRSPACE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: THE ONLY CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS CAPT X PROMPTLY COMPLYING WITH AND VERY SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTING OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO CLB VERY AGGRESSIVELY. DC9 PERCEPTION OF OUR POS; THEIR LACK OF JUDGEMENT TO ACCEPT THEIR CLRNC (THAT COULD NOT BE COMPLIED WITH) AND THEIR DECISION TO EXECUTE THEIR CLB WERE POOR AND RESULTED IN US DEVIATING FROM OUR CLRNC TO FLY J29 SAFELY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 544780 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT THE DC9 TFC WAS ON HIS (FO'S) SIDE AND THAT HE DID NOT HAVE IT IN SIGHT UNTIL THE RA SOUNDED. RPTR ALSO STATES THAT THE CAPT ADVISED ATC 'CLBING OUT OF ONE SEVEN THOUSAND COMPLYING WITH RA.' RPTR STATES THAT VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE DC9 WAS LOST DUE TO THE CLB ANGLE AND THAT THE TCASII 'CLR OF TFC' ANNOUNCEMENT WAS THE ONLY WAY THAT THEY KNEW THEY WERE CLR. RPTR STATES THAT ALTHOUGH A TURN MAY HAVE BEEN A BETTER AVOIDANCE MANEUVER DUE TO THE DC9'S CLB; BOTH HE AND THE CAPT DID NOT CONSIDER A TURN BECAUSE THEY FELT THEY SHOULD 'TRUST IN THE EQUIP.' RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE TFC SEPARATION MAY HAVE DECREASED TO CLOSE TO 500 FT. RPTR STATES THAT WHEN THEY QUESTIONED ATC ABOUT THE INCIDENT; THEIR REPLY WAS 'WHAT HAPPENED THERE?' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 543630: THERE WAS NO WAY HE COULD START A CLB FROM THAT POINT AND MISS US. WE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD WAIT 30 SECONDS UNTIL HE PASSED UNDER US. THAT UNFORTUNATELY IS NOT WHAT HE DID. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 543630 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE ATC FACILITY QUALITY ASSURANCE PERSON HAS NOT CALLED HIM BACK; OVER A MONTH OF WAITING FOR A RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST FOR AN NMAC/TAPE REVIEW. HE HAD ALSO CONTACTED HIS CHIEF PLT; THE COMPANY AND UNION SAFETY DEPT. NO RESPONSE FROM ANY OF THEM AS YET. HE FELT THAT THE MIL PLT WAS ATTEMPTING TO 'PULL' HIS DC9 OVER THE ARJ BUT WASN'T AWARE OF THE RESPONSE THAT THE FLC ON THE BAE-146 WOULD MAKE IN VIEW OF HAVING TCASII SYS ON BOARD. HE FELT THAT THE DC9 WAS NOT EQUIPPED WITH TCASII AT ALL. THE CTLR ERRED IN USING THIS PROC. THE RADAR CTLR PERFORMING THE ENRTE CTL FUNCTION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEPARATION OF RADAR IDENTED ACFT. CTLR CAN ONLY USE THIS VISUAL SEPARATION WHEN PLTS OF ACFT IN DIRECT RADIO COM WITH EACH OTHER DURING CLB OR DSCNT CONCUR. IF THE ACFT ARE ON CONVERGING COURSES; HE MUST INFORM THE OTHER ACFT X OF THE TFC AND THAT VISUAL SEPARATION IS BEING APPLIED. THE FLC IN ACFT X WAS NEVER ADVISED AND HAD NOT CONCURRED TO THE VISUAL SEPARATION. VERT SEPARATION BTWN ACFT MAY BE DISCONTINUED WHEN ONE PLT RPTS HAVING SEEN THE OTHER ACFT AND THAT THE ACFT HAVE PASSED EACH OTHER. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.