UNSTABILIZED APCH.

Narrative

ON MAY/SAT/02; I WAS THE FO ON A FLT FROM IAH TO SHV. AS WE APCHED THE SHV AREA I TOLD THE CAPT (THE PF) THAT I THOUGHT I HAD THE FIELD. AFTER TALKING ABOUT IT WE DECIDED THAT WE DID NOT THINK THAT WAS THE FIELD AND THAT THERE WAS NUMEROUS ARPTS IN THE AREA. ATC THEN INFORMED US OF THE FIELD LOCATION WHICH MATCHED THE LOCATION OF THE FIELD WE WERE LOOKING AT. AT THAT POINT ATC ASKED IF WE WANTED A VECTOR/TURN TO LOSE ALT. I ASKED THE CAPT/PF AND HE SAID TO TELL THEM WE HAD THE FIELD. UPON INFORMING ATC WE HAD THE FIELD; WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT THAT POINT; I DO NOT RECALL OUR ALT HOWEVER; IT LOOKED HIGH. THE CAPT COMMANDED FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN. AS WE WERE WITHIN THE SPD LIMITATION. I SELECTED FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN. THE CAPT THEN BEGAN WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER AN AGGRESSIVE DSCNT. I DO NOT RECALL THE RATE OF DSCNT AS I WAS WORKING ON THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. AS WE REACHED 2000 FT MSL THE CAPT SLOWED THE RATE OF DSCNT AND BEGAN TURNING TOWARDS THE FIELD. AROUND 4.5 MI DME ON RWY 14 LOC I CALLED SHV TWR AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO LAND ON RWY 14. AS I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE INITIAL HIGH DSCNT RATE I TOLD THE CAPT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE APCH AND THAT 'I DID NOT LIKE THIS.' AS THE CAPT DID NOT WANT TO EXCEED 30 DEGS OF BANK WE OVERSHOT FINAL A LITTLE AND THEN HE CORRECTED BACK TO FINAL. AROUND THIS POINT BOTH THE CAPT'S PFD AND MFD WENT BLANK AND THE AURAL WARNING UNIT BEGAN TO SAY 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN; BANK ANGLE; WINDSHEAR.' AS IT WAS VFR AND THE APCH WAS ON LOC/GS AT THE TIME; WE CONTINUED. THE AURAL WARNING UNIT CONTINUED TO SAY BANK ANGLE ALL THE WAY TO THE GATE DURING THE TAXI IN. WE LANDED ON SPD IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE WITHOUT INCIDENT. HOWEVER; DUE TO THE INITIAL HIGH RATE OF DSCNT AND GOING THROUGH THE LOC; I AS THE FO FELT THE APCH TO BE UNSTABLE. I ALSO FELT WE COULD HAVE USED BETTER CRM AS THE CAPT DID NOT TELL ME WHAT WE WERE DOING AND DID NOT RESPOND TO MY QUESTIONING HIS APCH. BETTER PLANNING SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A TURN TO LOSE ALT.