AN MD80 CREW; UPON ARR AT DEST; MCI; ENCOUNTERED SEVERE WX; SPAWNING A DIVERSION TO THEIR ALTERNATE.

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UPON HIS RETURN TO THE ACFT; THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE TSTMS AT OUR DEST AND THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TERRIBLE BRIEFING FROM THE DISPATCHER THAT AMOUNTED TO 'TSTMS IN THE AREA...I GAVE YOU LOTS OF GAS...EXPECT TO HOLD.' WHILE ENRTE; RADAR STARTED PICKING UP A LARGE AREA OF TSTM ACTIVITY SWEEPING W TO E THROUGH THE DEST. SINCE ATIS MENTIONED THAT THE SBOUND RWYS WERE IN USE; I SUGGESTED THAT WE ENTER A HOLD TO THE N OF THE STORM AREA TO ASSESS THE SIT AND TO BE PREPARED FOR A SBOUND APCH. ALTHOUGH VERY SATURATED FROM THE CONTINUOUS STREAM OF DEVIATING TFC IN THE TERMINAL AREA; ATC APPROVED OUR REQUESTED HOLDING POINT AND I ENTERED HOLDING; USING EACH INBOUND LEG TO PAINT THE STORM ACTIVITY WITH OUR ONBOARD WX RADAR; WHILE THE CAPT CONTACTED OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER FOR A 'BIG PICTURE RPT' ON THE STORM ACTIVITY. THE AIRFIELD WAS INTERMITTENTLY CLOSED AND MICROBURSTS WERE PERIODICALLY BEING ANNOUNCED ON THE FIELD. WHENEVER TFC WAS ALLOWED TO ARRIVE; A TRICKLE WOULD GET IN AND SOME WOULD GO AROUND; THEN THE FIELD WOULD CLOSE AGAIN. THIS PROCESS CONTINUED AS WE HELD. AT THAT TIME; THE AIRFIELD SWITCHED RWYS AND COMMENCED LNDG THE MANY ACFT THAT WERE HOLDING TO THE NBOUND RWYS. IN ORDER TO LAND; WE THUS CONCLUDED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO FLY TO THE S OF THE AIRFIELD AND JOIN THE APCH FLOW. AFTER CONFERRING WITH ATC AND EXAMINING OUR RADAR; WE DECIDED TO FLY S THROUGH AN OPEN CORRIDOR BTWN CELLS; TO A STORM-FREE AREA ON THE S SIDE OF THE ARPT. WHILE PERFORMING THIS TRANSITION AND WHILE CLR OF ANY RADAR RETURNS; WE FLEW THROUGH WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BRIEF BUT INTENSE RAIN SHOWER IN MODERATE TURB FOR APPROX 5 SECONDS (WE NOW SUSPECT IT WAS HAIL). AS WE WERE COMPLETING OUR COURSE REVERSAL; THE ARPT SWITCHED ITS APCH FLOW ONCE AGAIN AND COMMENCED LNDG BACK TO THE S. WE WERE NOW POINTING TOWARDS THE AIRFIELD; APPROX 40-60 MI AWAY. AS WE WERE APCHING THE STORM LINE AND THE AIRFIELD; WE DEBATED HOW TO MOVE BACK TO THE N OF THE AIRFIELD WHEN; SUDDENLY; THE RADAR WENT HAYWIRE. WE KNEW THE RADAR WAS NOW WORTHLESS AND THAT WE WERE IN QUITE A PREDICAMENT; SINCE WE WERE FLYING IN AN AREA OF MANY STORMS AT NIGHT AND MOSTLY IN IMC. ALTHOUGH WE HAD SEEN 'OUTS' IN THE AREA; WE NOW HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHERE THOSE 'OUTS' WERE! WE EXPLAINED OUR PREDICAMENT TO ATC AND REQUESTED A VECTOR OUT OF THE ENTIRE AREA AND INTO CLR AIR ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE AREA OF STORMS. THE CTLR'S REPLY WAS NOT REASSURING. HE SAID; 'ALL I SEE ARE AREAS OF HVY PRECIP ALL AROUND YOU...I SUGGEST THAT YOU HOLD YOUR PRESENT HDG....' WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ISSUED A TA FOR TFC AHEAD AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS AND THOUGHT THAT; SINCE OUR HDG ORIGINALLY SEEMED THE SAFEST PRIOR TO OUR RADAR FAILURE; COMBINED WITH THE FACT THAT THE TFC AHEAD WAS PROBABLY IN A SAFE AREA; PLUS THE FACT THAT ATC RECOMMENDED OUR CURRENT COURSE; HOLDING OUR PRESENT HDG WAS THE BEST OPTION IN THE SCANT MOMENTS WE HAD AVAILABLE TO THINK. SURE ENOUGH; THE NEXT 10 MINS WERE ABSOLUTE MAYHEM AS WE BLINDLY FLEW OUR WAY THROUGH THE STORM SYS AND INTO CLR AIR ON THE OTHER SIDE. WE ENCOUNTERED CONTINUOUS MODERATE TURB AND A FEW 10 SECOND INTERVALS OF SEVERE TURB. DURING OUR FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH THE SEVERE TURB; THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES DISCONNECTED AND I COULD DO NO MORE THAN TO HOLD THE YOKE AND YELL BACK AND FORTH TO THE CAPT WHILE TRYING TO GET MY EYEBALLS TO READ THE INSTS IN FRONT OF ME. AFTER THE FIRST BATCH OF SEVERE TURB SUBSIDED; I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOMATIC SYS AND SELECTED 'TURB MODE;' WHICH HOLDS A SET ATTITUDE AND PWR SETTING. THE NEXT FEW ENCOUNTERS OF SEVERE TURB HAD US DSND UP TO 400 FT AND I HAD TO TAKE BACK MANUAL CTL OF THE ACFT AND GENTLY PITCH UP; SINCE WE WERE UNAWARE IF WE HAD ALREADY CLRED THE PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TFC AHEAD OF US. WE WERE QUITE TOUCHY ABOUT HITTING OTHER ACFT SINCE WE HAD ACTED ON AN RA WHILE IN OUR HOLDING PATTERN. ONCE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SYS; WE ELECTED TO DIVERT TO OUR ALTERNATE AIRFIELD. DURING THIS DIVERSION; WE ENCOUNTERED SMOOTH AIR AND THE RADAR RETURNED TO NORMAL OP. AFTER LNDG; WE FOUND A COUPLE OF 1/2 INCH HOLES AND SCRATCHES TO OUR RADOME. WE NOW SUSPECT THAT HAIL CAUSED THE DAMAGE. IN RETROSPECT; I HAVE LEARNED A FEW VALUABLE INSIGHTS. I HAVE ALWAYS HEARD THAT WX RADAR IS A STORM AVOIDANCE TOOL AND NOT A PENETRATION TOOL. ALTHOUGH WE DIDN'T INTENTIONALLY ATTEMPT TO PENETRATE ANY STORM 'SOFT SPOTS;' WE DID PICK UP HAIL DAMAGE AND HORRIBLE TURB; ATTESTING TO OUR INADEQUATE DISTANCE FROM THE CELLS. IN THE FUTURE; UNLESS I HAVE A VERY AMPLE HOLE FOR SHOOTING AN APCH; I'LL JUST HOLD WELL CLR OF ANY STORM AREA UNTIL THE SIT AMELIORATES AND IF IT DOESN'T; I'LL JUST WAIT UNTIL BINGO FUEL AND DIVERT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS ACCOUNT ARE THE APATHY AND LACK OF INITIATIVE FROM OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER. HIS INITIAL BRIEFING WAS COMPLETELY INADEQUATE. THE TSTMS BLOSSOMED DURING OUR TIME ENRTE AND THE DISPATCHER MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CALL US; AS THEIR 'FLT FOLLOWING DUTIES' REQUIRE. FURTHERMORE; THE CTLRS WE DEALT WITH HAD 'WX-WORTHLESS' RADARS (AS WE ALL KNOW) AND WERE COMPLETELY TASK SATURATED WITH OTHER ACFT. FINALLY; THIS ALL HAPPENED AT THE END OF A LONG DAY AND AROUND XA00; FATIGUING BOTH THE CAPT AND ME.