LEAR 35 FLC FAILED TO TURN AT THE ALT OR REQUIRED DME SID LIMIT. IN ADDITION; THEY TURNED IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION WHEN THEY DID TURN; CAUSING AN ATC MSA ALERT DUE TO GETTING CLOSE TO MOUNTAINOUS HIGH RISING TERRAIN. ALSO TUNING IN THE WRONG DEP FREQ.

Narrative

I (PIC) WAS CALLED INTO WORK ABOUT XB15 FOR A MEDEVAC FROM ANCHORAGE; AK; TO DILLINGHAM; AK. AFTER PRE-FLTING A LEARJET 35; I FILLED OUT AND FILED THE APPROPRIATE PAPERWORK. I HEADED OUT TO THE ACFT TO STRAP IN AND GOT THE ATIS AND CLRNC WHILE WAITING FOR THE REST OF THE CREW TO LOAD UP. JUST AS I FINISHED COPYING THE ATIS AND CLRNC; THE SIC CLBED IN; I HANDED HIM BOTH. SIC PROCEEDED TO TUNE THE XPONDER; SET ALTIMETER; ETC...WHILE I INITIATED THE START. WE PROCEEDED WITH THE AFTER START; TAXI AND FIRST HALF OF THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AS SOON AS WE ARRIVED AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I TAXIED INTO POS ON RWY 6L AND WE COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. I PWRED UP AND PROCEEDED TO TAKE OFF. SIC CALLED 'POSITIVE RATE OF CLB' AND I CALLED FOR THE GEAR UP AND THE YAW DAMPER ON. THE 2 MAIN GEAR DOOR LIGHTS STAYED RED. I REDUCED PWR NOT TO EXCEED THE 200 KIAS LIMIT ON THE GEAR AND BROUGHT THE NOSE UP TO SLOW DOWN AND ALLOW THE GEAR DOORS TO COMPLETELY CLOSE. WHILE PASSING THROUGH APPROX 1000 FT; TWR TOLD US TO SWITCH DEP. SIC SWITCHED UP 118.6 AND CHKED IN ONLY TO FIND HE HAD DIALED UP THE WRONG DEP FREQ. ATC TOLD HIM TO SWITCH TO 123.8. AT APPROX 1500 FT; WHILE SIC WAS SWITCHING FREQS; I SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'OK; R TURN TO 190 DEG HDG AT 2000 FT.' SIC SAID 'NO; L TURN TO 330 DEGS.' I QUESTIONED THAT AND SIC LOOKED AT THE SID WHICH DELAYED HIS CALL TO ATC. HE AGAIN SAID 'L TURN TO 330 DEGS.' I THOUGHT I MUST HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN AND I BEGAN A TURN TO 330 DEGS. I STARTED THIS TURN AT APPROX 2300 FT. SIC CHKED IN WITH CORRECT DEP AND WE WERE TOLD TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO 190 DEGS. I STARTED THE R TURN IMMEDIATELY; WE WERE AGAIN TOLD TO TURN TO 190 DEGS (I COMPLETED 20-30 DEGS OF HEADING CHANGE TO THE L BEFORE DEP TOLD US TO MAKE THE IMMEDIATE R TURN). I DO NOT REMEMBER THE EXACT VERBIAGE BUT THE CTLR TOLD US WE EXCEEDED THE 9 DME DEP LIMIT; WE WERE OVER CAMPBELL AIRSTRIP AND WERE GETTING TOO CLOSE TO THE MOUNTAINS. WE CONTINUED OUR CLB; HEADING 190 DEGS. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO CTR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 556742: WHEN WE TOOK OFF AND I RAISED THE GEAR; THE MAIN GEAR DOORS WOULD NOT COME UP; A COMMON PROB IN THIS PARTICULAR AIRPLANE. THE CAPT DID WHAT HE USUALLY DID AND REDUCED THE PWR ON THE THRUST LEVERS TO SLOW THE SPD FROM THE 200 KTS WE HAD ALMOST REACHED (AND; INCIDENTALLY; THIS IS VLO FOR THIS ACFT) TO APPROX 160 KTS; AT WHICH TIME THE GEAR DOORS CAME UP. AT ABOUT 2400 FT; I HAD FOUND THE ANCHORAGE THREE SID IN THE BOOK BUT WITHOUT REALIZING I HAD LOOKED DOWN TO THE NEXT PAGE; WHICH IS THE KNIK SIX; AND READ MY CAPT THE WRONG PROC. I SAID; 'NO; L TO 330 DEGS.' HE SAID; SURPRISED; 'REALLY? OK...' AND TURNED THE HEADING BUG THAT HE ALREADY HAD ON THE CORRECT HEADING ALL THE WAY AROUND TO THE ERRONEOUS HEADING I GAVE HIM BY READING THE WRONG SID. HE BEGAN A L TURN AND HAD TURNED ABOUT 30 DEGS TO THE L WHEN I SWITCHED THE XMITTER SELECTOR TO THE NEW DEP FREQ AND FINALLY CALLED THEM. WHEN THE CTLR RESPONDED HE SAID; '...TURN R NOW; HEADING 190 DEGS. BEGIN YOUR TURN NOW.' THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY REVERSED HIS TURN TO THE R. ATC CONTINUED; '...TERRAIN ALERT; CONTINUE YOUR R TURN; HEADING 190 DEGS.' THE CAPT INCREASED OUR BANK OF ANGLE FROM 30 DEGS TO 60 DEGS IN PURSUIT OF THE NEW HEADING. ATC SAID AGAIN; '...TERRAIN ALERT; YOU'RE OVER CAMPBELL AIRSTRIP (A LANDMARK CLOSE TO THE MOUNTAINS) YOU'RE 4 MI FROM TERRAIN 4400 FT (I THINK THAT'S THE NUMBER HE GAVE US) HIGH; YOU'RE CURRENTLY AT 3800 FT.' WITHIN A FEW SECONDS WE WERE AT THE HEADING WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT; 190 DEGS. THE CAPT ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN AND WE CONTINUED OUR CLB. ATC WAS POLITE; BUT MADE A FEW MORE COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT OF 'REMEMBER YOUR TURN IS SUPPOSED TO BE MADE BY 9 (MI) DME;' AND 'CHK YOUR SID.' I BELIEVE THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS EVENT WAS THE LACK OF CREW TKOF BRIEFING; WHICH I SHORTED US OUT OF BY SIMPLY READING THE ITEM ON THE CHKLIST AND RESPONDING 'NO QUESTIONS.' I DID NOT KNOW UNTIL 500 FT BEFORE OUR TURN WAS TOBE MADE THAT I HAD NO IDEA WHICH SID WE WERE DOING. I'M SURE THE CAPT ASSUMED I HAD READ THE CLRNC AND UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS GOING ON. ALSO; TO THIS DAY; I DO NOT KNOW WHY I SWITCHED THE DEP FREQ TO 118.6 ON CLBOUT. HABIT; I GUESS. I BELIEVE I REMEMBER; HOWEVER; THAT THE FREQ THAT I SWITCHED FROM WAS A FREQ I KNEW WAS NOT DEP; MAYBE IT WAS CLRNC OR ATIS. HAD I READ THE CLRNC THAT THE CAPT WROTE DOWN; HOWEVER; I WOULD HAVE SEEN THAT THE FREQ THEY GAVE US IN CLRNC; AND THE ONE HE WROTE DOWN; WAS 126.4; THE CORRECT FREQ FOR DEP FOR THE ANCHORAGE THREE SID USING THE RWY FROM WHICH WE TOOK OFF. WE SHOULD HAVE HAD THAT READY TO GO IN STANDBY MODE BEFORE WE TOOK OFF. THE GEAR DOORS HANGING UP AND THE SUBSEQUENT PWR BACK TO SLOW THE ACFT HURT OUR CLB PERFORMANCE. WE WERE IMC AND HAD NO OTHER DATA DIALED IN TO CHK OUR GEOGRAPHICAL POS ON THE CLBOUT. WE OBVIOUSLY PASSED THE 9 DME LIMIT BEFORE REACHING 2000 FT; OR; AT LEAST BY THE TIME WE STARTED OUR TURN IN THE WRONG DIRECTION (AT 2500 FT). BY THE TIME ATC HAD GIVEN US THE NEW DEP FREQ (123.8; EVEN THOUGH IT WASN'T THE ONE ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED; 126.4) I CONTACTED THEM AFTER A FURTHER DELAY. WHILE LOOKING UP THE SID; WE HAD FLOWN DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO THE MOUNTAINS. THE INTXN DEP; I AM SURE; DID NOT HELP; BUT I BELIEVE THIS TO BE MUCH FURTHER DOWN THE LIST OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; WAY BEHIND THE LACK OF PREPAREDNESS; PRIMARILY ON MY PART.