GLF2 FLC HAS ALTDEV.

Narrative

ON CLBOUT FROM FTY; WHILE COMMUNICATING WITH ATLANTA APCH CTL; WE WERE CLRED TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 FT. THE CAPT (THE PNF) READ BACK AND SET THE ALT IN THE ALT ALERTER. HOWEVER; THE ALT ALERTER WAS NOT SET TO MANUAL MODE AS REQUIRED WITH THE AUTOPLT OFF. AS A RESULT THERE WAS NO ALERT WHEN PASSING THROUGH 1000 FT TO LEVELOFF. ALSO BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE DISTRACTED DUE TO A NEED TO BAL THE FUEL BTWN THE WING TANKS. THE FUEL GAUGES IN THE AIRPLANE HAVE BEEN REVERSED BY MAINT AS A TROUBLESHOOTING MEASURE AND HAVE BEEN PLACARDED AS SUCH. STILL; THIS REQUIRES SOME THINKING WHEN TRYING TO DECIDE WHICH TANK IS HVY AS THE R TANK GAUGE IS ON THE L AND VICE-VERSA. THIS DISTR RESULTED IN A FAILURE OF BOTH CREWMEMBERS TO GIVE THE STANDARD CALLOUT WHEN REACHING 1000 FT TO LEVELOFF. THE CTLR ASKED US TO SAY ALT AND WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE AT 5800 FT AND CLBING. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US TO MAINTAIN 6000 FT AND GAVE US A VERBAL TA. WE LEVELED OFF AT 6000 FT AND DETERMINED THAT THE TFC WAS NO FACTOR (1000 FT AND SEVERAL MI SEPARATION). THE ALT ALERTER GAVE NO WARNING OF THE DEV AND THERE WERE NO CALLOUTS AS A RESULT OF THE 2 EVENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE. THERE WERE SEVERAL AREAS THAT WE COULD HAVE IMPROVED UPON ON THIS FLT. FIRST; PROPER ALT AWARENESS PROCS SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED (CALLOUTS; ALT ALERTER OP; ETC). SECOND; WE SHOULD HAVE DELAYED THE TASK OF BALANCING THE FUEL UNTIL A LESS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT AND POSSIBLY UNTIL THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. THIRD; THE PRACTICE OF SWAPPING THE FUEL GAUGES AS A TROUBLESHOOTING PROC RESULTS IN WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AN EASY TASK BEING SOMEWHAT CONFUSING. THE CTLR HANDED US OFF AND TOLD US NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE ALTDEV. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT AND THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. IN THE FUTURE I WILL TRY TO BE MORE DISCIPLINED IN ALT AWARENESS PROCS AND WILL DELAY NON-CRITICAL FLYING TASKS UNTIL A NON-CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT.