BE95 INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT. STUDENT RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR INSTEAD OF THE FLAPS DURING LNDG ROLLOUT.

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MY COMMERCIAL MULTI-ENG STUDENT WITH APPROX 9 HRS OF TRAINING BY ME IN THE BEECHCRAFT D95A TRAVEL AIR WAS EXECUTING A SHORT FIELD LNDG. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED PROFICIENCY WITH THIS MANEUVER IN PRIOR FLTS. WE TOUCHED DOWN ON THE DESIRED POINT (1000 FT RWY MARKER) AND DURING THE ROLLOUT THE STUDENT RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR INSTEAD OF THE FLAPS. I WAS UNABLE TO STOP HIS ACTIONS AS IT HAPPENED SO QUICKLY. THIS OCCURRED APPROX 500 FT INTO THE LNDG ROLL AT A SPD BELOW VSO. THE ACFT SKIDDED TO A STOP WHERE WE SECURED ALL ELECTRICAL AND FUEL AND EVACED THE ACFT. DURING OUR SECURING/EVAC OF THE ACFT; THE STUDENT ASKED ME WHAT HAPPENED AND I INFORMED HIM THAT HE RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR INSTEAD OF THE FLAPS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE ME UNTIL I POINTED OUT TO HIM THE RETRACTED GEAR SWITCH. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS EVENT WERE: 1) UNCONVENTIONAL LOCATION OF THE LNDG GEAR SWITCH. THIS MAKE/MODEL OF ACFT HAS THE THROTTLES; PROPS; FLAPS AND GEAR SWITCHES/CTLS LOCATED UNCONVENTIONALLY AS COMPARED TO A CESSNA. MOST OF THIS STUDENT'S EXPERIENCE IS IN A CESSNA. 2) FAILURE TO IDENT AND VERIFY THE PROPER SWITCH. THE STUDENT RETRACTED THE GEAR SWITCH OUT OF HABIT THINKING IT WAS THE FLAPS. 3) CFI PHYSICALLY NOT GUARDING THE GEAR SWITCH. HOWEVER; I WAS GUARDING THE PWR QUADRANT AND YOKE AS WELL AS DIVIDING MY ATTN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT. 4) STUDENT'S LIMITED EXPERIENCE WITH COMPLEX ACFT. 5) LNDG GEAR 'SQUAT' SWITCH -- DID IT FUNCTION PROPERLY? POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) CONSIDER PHYSICALLY GUARDING THE GEAR SWITCH FROM RETRACTION AT THE RISK OF A STUDENT MAKING AN INCORRECT PWR OR YOKE APPLICATION. DUE TO THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE GEAR SWITCH IN THIS ACFT; ONE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO REACT QUICKLY ENOUGH FROM THE GEAR SWITCH TO THE PWR QUADRANT OR TO THE YOKE IF ONE'S HAND IS COMMITTED TO GUARDING THE GEAR SWITCH. 2) BREAK OLD AND FORM NEW STUDENT HABITS THROUGH GND AND FLT TRAINING. PERSONALLY; I BELIEVE I AM VERY THOROUGH IN THIS AREA. SPECIFICALLY; WHEN TRAINING FOR AND IN THIS ACFT; I CONSTANTLY REMIND STUDENTS TO IDENT/VERIFY ALL SWITCHES; LEVERS; AND CTLS BEFORE ENGAGING DUE TO THEIR UNCONVENTIONAL LOCATION. HOWEVER; THIS EVENT PROVES HOW STRONG THE LAW OF PRIMACY IS AND THAT ONE CAN NEVER BE ABSOLUTELY SURE OF A STUDENT'S ACTION/REACTION. 3) MODIFY THE POH'S LNDG PROC. IT STATES 'ON ANY LNDG; RETRACT THE WING FLAPS NEAR THE END OF THE LNDG ROLL. SET ELEVATOR TRIM TO '0' READING AND OPEN THE COWL FLAPS.' THESE ACTIONS CREATE A BUSY COCKPIT AND COULD BE DEFERRED TO THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST BEING PERFORMED AFTER THE ACFT HAS COME TO A COMPLETE STOP; CLR OF THE ACTIVE RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 559198: MY INSTRUCTOR ASKED ME TO DO A SHORT FIELD LNDG. THE ARPT WAS A LITTLE BUSY SO WE HELD N AND W FOR A WHILE. AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC WE STARTED INBOUND. MY INSTRUCTOR BRIEFED ME ON WHERE HE WANTED ME TO TOUCH DOWN AND SHORT FIELD PROCS. I TOUCHED DOWN ON THE 1000 FT MARK AT FULL STALL (APPROX 70 MPH) HELD THE NOSE OFF UNTIL IT DROPPED AND APPLIED BRAKES. I THEN WENT TO RAISE THE FLAPS. INSTEAD I INADVERTENTLY RAISED THE GEAR LEVER. I NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT WE HAD A PROB. MY INSTRUCTOR SAID WE SHOULD EXIT THE ACFT NOW AND HE GOT OUT. I SHUT DOWN THE MAGNETOS; MAIN PWR AND CLOSED THE FUEL SELECTORS BEFORE EXITING THE ACFT. THE EMER CREWS SHOWED UP MOMENTS LATER. THEY CHKED US FOR INJURIES AND TALKED TO US BRIEFLY.