WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A TA; A POTENTIAL CONFLICT OCCURS BTWN A DEP MOONEY AND A DEP B737-700 1 MI S OF BUR; CA.

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WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 15. A MOONEY WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 8. THE MOONEY WAS ADVISED OF WORSENING WX TO THE E OF THE FIELD. HE ROLLED AND AFTER HE CLRED THE INTXN OF RWY 8/15 WE WERE ALSO CLRED. I WAS FLYING. THE MOONEY RPTED BAD WX AND THE TWR ASKED HIS INTENTIONS AND HE REPLIED; 'I GUESS I'LL COME BACK.' THE MOONEY WAS ISSUED A R TURN TO DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8. THIS CALL I DID NOT HEAR BUT WAS TOLD THESE WERE HIS INSTRUCTION WHEN LATER I SPOKE WITH THE TWR MGR AT BUR. WE TOOK OFF AND AFTER 500 FT BEGAN THE TURN TO HDG 210 DEGS. WE ENTERED IMC SOMEWHERE BTWN 500-1500 FT AGL; AND I TRANSITIONED TO INSTS. WHEN I DID; I NOTICED ON TCASII; AN ACFT VERY CLOSE (MUCH LESS THAN 1 MI?) IN APPROX THE 10 O'CLOCK POS AND 500 FT ABOVE MY ACFT. ITS CLOSE PROX AND ALT MADE ME BELIEVE WE MIGHT IMPACT THE ACFT. AS I WAS ALREADY IN THE TURN TO THE R AND CLBING VERY RAPIDLY; I ELECTED TO TAKE NO DIFFERENT EVASIVE MANEUVER. WE CLRED THE TFC AND WERE SWITCHED TO SOCAL. WE HAD FURTHER TFC S OF US BY ABOUT 3 MI AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE; BUT AS WE WERE CLBING QUICKLY AND SOON ABOVE ITS ALT I WAS NOT CONCERNED. SOCAL MENTIONED THE SECOND ACFT AND WE RESPONDED. I ASKED SOCAL MYSELF IF THEY WERE TALKING TO THE ACFT WE HAD COME SO CLOSE TO AFTER TKOF AND HE REPLIED THEY WERE TALKING TO THEM; BUT I BELIEVE THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE SECOND ACFT. WE FLEW TO OAK AND I CALLED BUR TWR. THE CTLRS THAT WORKED US HAD GONE HOME FOR THE NIGHT. THE NEXT DAY; I CALLED THE TWR AGAIN AND SPOKE TO THE MGR. SHE HAD REVIEWED THE TAPES AND DISCOVERED THE TWR CTLR HAD INDEED ISSUED A R TURN TO DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8 FOR THAT TFC. I HAVE HAD A FEW CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TWR MGR ABOUT THIS INCIDENT; THE LAST ONE BEING TODAY. SHE HAS LISTENED TO THE TAPES AND INTERVIEWED THE CTLRS. HER CONCLUSION IS THAT THE TWR CTLR DID NOT ISSUE THE MOONEY TFC TO US; AS HE DID NOT THINK HE WAS A FACTOR. THE TWR CTLR BELIEVED THE ACFT WOULD 'BE BEHIND US THE WHOLE TIME.' THE MOONEY WAS TOLD ABOUT US AND WARNED FOR WAKE TURB. THE VERSION OF WHAT THE MGR DESCRIBED TO ME (WHAT SHE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE CTLR) IS DIFFERENT THAN WHAT I RECALL AND AS NO ONE HAS SEEN RADAR TAPES AND MEMORIES GET FUZZY; I DID NOT ARGUE WITH HER. I LET THE MGR KNOW THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ENG FAILURE WE WOULD BE FLYING STRAIGHT TO 1000 FT AGL THEN TURNING L TO ABOUT A 110 DEG HDG AND THIS COURSE WOULD HAVE MADE THE MOONEY AN EVEN GREATER FACTOR. SHE WAS NOT AWARE OF OUR PROC BUT THOUGHT THAT THE CTLRS WERE AWARE AND IN ANY EVENT THEY WOULD HAVE DONE WHAT WAS NEEDED TO KEEP THE ACFT SEPARATED. ALL IN ALL; THE MGR SEEMED TO FEEL THAT HER CTLR HAD DONE NOTHING WRONG IN GIVING THE MOONEY THE R TURN AND THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO TELL US ABOUT HIS LOCATION. I BEG TO DIFFER. THE TWR CTLRS DO NOT SEEM TO APPRECIATE OUR NEED TO KNOW OF TFC IN THE DEP CORRIDOR NOR EVEN KNOW/CARE WHAT OUR SINGLE ENG PROCS ARE. IT SEEMS WE HAVE A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REQUIRED AT THIS FACILITY. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST ISSUE I HAVE HAD WITH BURBANK AND HAVE LEARNED OF ANOTHER SIMILAR ISSUE WITH TFC SEPARATION AND WILL ENCOURAGE THOSE PLTS TO CONSIDER AN ASAP RPT ALSO. THIS INCIDENT BRINGS UP AN IMPORTANT ISSUE. ARE TWR FACILITIES AWARE OF OUR SINGLE ENG PROCS? IF SO; HAVE THEY BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE US WITH TA'S THAT WOULD IMPACT SUCH A DEP CORRIDOR?