B737-300 CREW WAS UNABLE TO RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR AFTER TKOF.

Narrative

RETURN FOR LNDG AT DEP ARPT AFTER LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. FLT DEPARTED ZZZ1 ON TIME. ON DEP; THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE WOULD NOT RAISE PAST THE 'OFF POS.' I WAS THE PF AND GRADUALLY LEVELED THE ACFT IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLY RETURNING TO THE DEP ARPT. THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE ZZZ1 TWR THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO RETURN. HE THEN RECYCLED THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE; AND THE GEAR RAISED NORMALLY. THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT ALL WAS WELL; AND WE CONTINUED TO ZZZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ENRTE; WE DISCUSSED THE PROB; AND I SUGGESTED THAT A CALL TO DISPATCH WOULD BE IN ORDER. THE CAPT THOUGHT A PHONE CALL TO MAINT CTL; ONCE ON THE GND IN ZZZ; WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. UPON LNDG IN ZZZ; THE CAPT DID; INDEED; CALL MAINT CTL AND DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH THEM. ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE CONVERSATION; THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT WE WERE GOOD TO GO. OF COURSE; ON TKOF OUT OF ZZZ; THE GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. THIS TIME; I WAS THE PNF. THE CAPT LEVELED THE ACFT AND NOTIFIED THE TWR OF OUR PROB. I PULLED THE QRH AND STARTED TO READ THROUGH IT. I TOLD THE CAPT WE WOULD HAVE TO RAISE THE FLAPS AND DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF SENSOR FAILURE WE HAD. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RATHER NOT TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB AND JUST RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT AND LAND; BECAUSE WE WERE NOW IN ICING CONDITIONS. HE ALSO TRIED TO CONTACT DISPATCH/MAINT THROUGH ZZZ OPS TO BRING THEM INTO THE LOOP. AN APCH DSCNT CHK WAS CALLED FOR BY THE CAPT; AND THE QRH WAS PUT AWAY. THE SUBSEQUENT APCH AND LNDG TO ZZZ WAS UNEVENTFUL. DISPATCH TRIED CALLING US BACK ON VHF #2 ON SHORT FINAL (500 FT AGL); AND I TOLD THEM WE'D CALL THEM ON THE GND. THE REASON FOR THIS RPT IS THE VERY UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING I'M HAVING FOR NOT INSISTING THAT THE QRH BE COMPLETED IN IT'S ENTIRETY. IF THE MALFUNCTION TURNED OUT TO BE A LNDG GEAR LEVER LOCK PROB; WE COULD HAVE OVERRIDDEN THE LOCK AND CONTINUED TO ZZZ3. I UNDERSTAND THE CAPT'S DESIRE TO 'JUST GET IT ON THE GND;' BUT I STILL HAD THAT 'PIT' IN MY STOMACH AS WE TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE; THAT WE HAD DONE SOMETHING VERY WRONG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR MY DECISION TO ALLOW THIS SIT TO DEVELOP TO UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS ARE A SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS QRH (AT LEAST IN THE HEAT OF THE BATTLE). IN FACT; IT WASN'T UNTIL THE NEXT DAY THAT I WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE CAPT THAT WE COULD HAVE HANDLED THE SIT BETTER. ALSO; WAS THE THOUGHT IN THE BACK OF MY MIND THAT -- IT WAS COMPANY POLICY NOT TO OVERRIDE THE LEVER LOCK AND TO RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT. I THINK THIS 'STEERED' ME INTO ACCEPTING THE CAPT'S DECISION TO RETURN WITHOUT COMPLETING THE QRH. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE OVERRIDE WAS NOT TO BE USED UNLESS PERFORMANCE (TERRAIN) WAS AN ISSUE. THE FACT WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS ALSO HAD AN INFLUENCE ON ME. AS I UNDERSTAND IT; THE ACFT WAS WORKED ON BY MAINT THAT NIGHT AND DEPARTED THE NEXT DAY AS A REVENUE FLT ONLY TO RETURN TO ZZZ WITH THE SAME PROB. THIS TIME THE CREW COMPLETED THE QRH AND DETERMINED THAT THE PROB WAS THE AIR/GND SAFETY SENSOR. ON THE OUTSIDE; THIS SORT OF JUSTIFIED OUR DECISION TO RETURN TO ZZZ; BUT; OBVIOUSLY; DID NOT JUSTIFY OUR ACTIONS IN ARRIVING AT THE SAME CONCLUSION.