C182RG PLTS HAVE GEAR UP LNDG AT ZZZ.
Synopsis
C182RG PLTS HAVE GEAR UP LNDG AT ZZZ.
Narrative
AFTER TRAINING FOR ABOUT 2 HRS AND HAVING DONE 5 TOUCH-AND-GO LNDGS AT ZZZ ARPT; WE DECIDED TO DO ONE MORE LNDG BEFORE RETURNING TO BASE. AS I TURNED TO DOWNWIND; I BEGAN THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' AND PULLED CARB HEAT AND CLOSED THE COWL FLAPS. AT THIS TIME; I INTERRUPTED THE CHKLIST TO CALL A POS RPT MIDFIELD DOWNWIND; AND MY INSTRUCTOR PULLED BACK THE THROTTLE AND TOLD ME TO BEGIN SETTING UP FOR AN EMER LNDG ON THE RWY. I DID NOT RETURN TO THE CHKLIST; BUT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CALCULATING DISTANCE TO RWY AND BEST AIRSPD. WHILE MY INSTRUCTOR GUIDED ME; I SET UP ON FINAL APCH AND FEARED ONLY TO HEAR AND FEEL THE TAIL STRIKE THE GND; FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY THE REST OF THE AIRPLANE. THE PROP STRUCK SEVERAL TIMES; AND THE ENG STOPPED. MY INSTRUCTOR PULLED THE MIXTURE; AND I SHUT OFF THE MAGNETO SWITCH AND MASTER SWITCH. WE SAW SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND EVACED THE ACFT. I BELIEVE THIS SIT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF COMPLACENCY. MY PREVIOUS LNDGS THAT DAY HAD GONE WELL; AND I WAS IN AN OVER CONFIDENT FRAME OF MIND. I INTERRUPTED MY PRELNDG CHKLIST TO GIVE A POS RPT; BECAUSE I WANTED THIS APCH AND LNDG TO BE PERFECT. I MISSED ELEMENTS OF THE PRELNDG CHKLIST AND DID NOT RECHK THE GEAR ON FINAL AS I HAD BEEN TAUGHT. THERE WAS A LOT TO DO IN A SHORT TIME; AND INSTEAD OF RELYING ON CHKLISTS; I TRIED TO AVIATE; NAV; AND COM ALL AT ONCE; WHICH LED TO ITEMS BEING MISSED. I WAS COMPLACENT; BECAUSE I WAS IN THE ROLE OF THE STUDENT; AND IN THE PAST; WHEN I HAD MADE MISTAKES; MY INSTRUCTOR CORRECTED THEM BEFORE THEY COULD DEVELOP INTO PROBS. THE LESSONS I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT ARE THAT EVERY LNDG IS CRUCIAL; AND NOT ONE IS INHERENTLY ROUTINE. CHKLISTS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE SURE NOTHING HAS BEEN MISSED; AND; ONCE BEGUN; EACH ONE MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE NEXT PHASE OF FLT CAN PROCEED. ALTHOUGH I WAS THE STUDENT FLYING WITH MY INSTRUCTOR; THAT DOES NOT ABSOLVE ME OF THE DUTY I HAVE TO BE AWARE OF MY SIT AT ALL TIMES. IT IS POSSIBLE FOR 2 PLTS TO BECOME DISTR AT THE SAME TIME; AND I WILL NOT FORGET THIS. SUPPLEMENTAL FROM ACN 571730: AS MY STUDENT REACHED THE LNDG GEAR PORTION OF THE CHKLIST; HE NOTICED THAT THERE WAS AN ABNORMAL SIT (THE GEAR DID NOT EXTEND) AND BEGAN TO TROUBLE-SHOOT THE SIT. MY STUDENT REPOSITIONED THE LNDG GEAR LEVER; WHICH DID NOT FIX THE PROB; AND THEN NOTICED THE LNDG GEAR CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS NOT 'IN' AS IT SHOULD BE AND PUSHED IT BACK IN; WHICH ACTIVATED THE LNDG GEAR HYD. I INFORMED HIM THAT I PLANNED FOR THE SIMULATED GEAR MALFUNCTION; INSTRUCTED HIM TO EXIT THE TFC PATTERN TO MITIGATE THE PROB. AFTER THE GEAR MALFUNCTION WAS MITIGATED; WE RETURNED TO THE TFC PATTERN FOR A NORMAL LNDG. I REQUESTED THAT MY STUDENT EXECUTE THE PROC AGAIN TO PROVE IT WAS NOT JUST A LUCKY LNDG. I PLANNED ON SIMULATING THE ENG FAILURE AFTER MY STUDENT STARTED THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' AT THE POINT HE LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR. MY STUDENT MADE A POS RPT; HOWEVER; AT MID-FIELD DOWNWIND; WHERE I HAD EXPECTED HIM TO LOWER HIS LNDG GEAR; AND WITHOUT THINKING FURTHER; I SIMULATED THE FAILED ENG. WHERE MY STUDENT WOULD NORMALLY BE EXECUTING THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST;' HE THEN HAD TO PERFORM THE EMER CHKLIST IN ADDITION. WHILE SUPERVISING THE EMER PROC; I WAS ALSO CRITIQUING THE FLT PATH MY STUDENT WAS TAKING. HE PLANNED ON MAKING THE NORMAL RECTANGULAR PATTERN. I ADVISED THAT HE TURN THE ACFT DIRECTLY TO THE END OF THE RWY SO WE WOULD NOT RUN OUT OF USABLE ALT. AT THE SAME TIME; I HAD NOT NOTICED THAT MY STUDENT HAD SKIPPED HALF OF THE LNDG CHKLIST; AND I HAD NOT DOUBLECHKED THE GEAR EXTENSION ON BASE AND FINAL AS I HAD MADE A HABIT OF DOING. I ALSO DID NOT NOTICE THE AUDIBLE GEAR WARNING HORN THAT SOUNDS WHEN THE ACFT IS IN THE LNDG CONFIGN WITHOUT THE LNDG GEAR DEPLOYED. IN MY MIND; COMPLACENCY WAS AT THE ROOT OF THE PROB. I HAVE LEARNED THAT COMPLACENCY CAN OCCUR IN ANY SIT; BUT MORE SO IN A NORMAL SIT WHEN THE PLTS ARE IN A SO-CALLED 'COMFORT ZONE.' 2 EXPERIENCED PLTS FAILED TO EXECUTE THE LNDG CHKLIST AND DOUBLE OR TRIPLE CHK THE GEAR EXTENSION. ITONLY TOOK A SLIGHT DISTR FOR ONLY A FEW SECONDS OF 2 COMPETENT PLTS THAT LED TO THE UNFORTUNATE OUTCOME OF THE FLT.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.