B737-300 CREW; DID NOT HAVE INOP PAPI AND MALSR APCH LIGHT SYS NOTED ON THE COMPANY PROVIDED NOTAM PAPERWORK. THE INOP NOTAMS HAD DROPPED OUT PROGRAMMATICALLY. FLT CREW CONDUCTED LNDG AFTER GPWS ALERT AND ABORTED GAR.

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ON ILS RWY 35 APCH TO MHT AT DECISION ALT; I BEGAN TO INITIATE A GAR AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE CAPT CALLED 'RWY IN SIGHT.' STILL IN THE LNDG CONFIGN WITH THE RWY ACQUIRED VISUALLY; I ABORTED THE GAR AND RESUMED THE APCH TO LAND. APCHING THE TRANSITION TO FLARE; WE RECEIVED A GPWS MODE 1 ALERT (SINK RATE). I CORRECTED THE MOMENTARY DEV AND THE CAPT DEEMED IT SAFE TO CONTINUE. ACFT LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL. RWY 35 AT MHT IS SLOPED AND RESULTS IN MISLEADING CLUES AT NIGHT AND IN LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS (1 MI AT THE TIME OF THE APCH). ALSO; THE MALSR AND PAPI WERE NOT OPERATING AT THE TIME OF LNDG; EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT NOTAMED OTS. THE CAPT AND I DEBRIEFED AT LENGTH AND AGREED THAT EVEN THOUGH THE MANEUVER TO LAND WAS NOT AT ANY TIME IN DOUBT; CONTINUING THE GAR WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CREW CALLED THE DUTY DISPATCHER SUPVR. AFTER INVESTIGATION; HE INDICATED THE NOTAMS HAD AUTOMATICALLY DROPPED OUT OF THE NOTAMS ON THE LIST FOR MHT. THE ACR WAS CHANGED. THE AUTO DROPOUT FEATURE TO INSURE THAT THIS DOES NOT OCCUR AGAIN. RPTR INDICATED THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER ACR FLTS WERE NOT ABLE TO GET IN. HE SUSPECTS THAT THEY ALSO DID NOT KNOW OF THE INOP PAPI OR APCH LIGHTS. THE TWR CTLR MADE NO MENTION OF THE INOP LIGHTS AT ANY TIME THEY WERE ON THE FREQ; AND NO MENTION WAS MADE ON THE ATIS FREQ. THE RPTR INDICATES THE 'HUMP' ON THE RWY IS AT MIDFIELD; AND IS NOTED ON THE ACR MHT 10-7 PAGES.