CFTT DURING DSCNT ON APCH BY A CORPORATE MDT AFTER THE FLT CREW MISINTERPED THE HDG ISSUED BY S56 CTLR FOR A LOC INTERCEPT 15 NM NW OF PVU; UT.

Date: 2003-05 · Aircraft: Medium Transport

Anomalies: deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|inflight-event-encounter-cftt-cfit|inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence

Synopsis

CFTT DURING DSCNT ON APCH BY A CORPORATE MDT AFTER THE FLT CREW MISINTERPED THE HDG ISSUED BY S56 CTLR FOR A LOC INTERCEPT 15 NM NW OF PVU; UT.

Narrative

WE HAD JUST BEEN HANDED OFF FROM ZLC TO SALT LAKE APCH CTL FOR OUR LNDG AT PROVO; UTAH. TSTMS WERE BEING RPTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT TO THE E. WE HAD BRIEFED THE GPS RWY 13 APCH WITH A CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 31. AFTER CONTACTING SALT LAKE APCH CTL; WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE GPS RWY 13 APCH WAS NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO THE RESTR AIRSPACE; R-6412A/B; BEING ACTIVE. IT WAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE ILS FOR RWY 13 AND CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 31. AFTER XING THE FFU VOR; WE WERE ASSIGNED A HDG OF 10 DEGS AND INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 11000 FT. I BEGAN TO TUNE AND IDENT THE RADIOS FOR THE ILS WHEN ATC ADVISED THAT THE VECTOR WAS GOING TO TAKE US THROUGH THE LOC. WHEN I ACKNOWLEDGED ATC; I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED 'EXPECT A L TURN AFTER XING THE LOC.' MY ATTN WAS DIVIDED BTWN SETTING AND TUNING RADIOS AND COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. ALTHOUGH THE WORKLOAD FOR THE PNF WAS ACCEPTABLE; THE MINDSET WAS EXPECTING A TURN BACK TOWARD THE ARPT TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THE APCH CHKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED; AND THE RADIOS WERE SET FOR THE APCH. IT WAS AT THIS TIME I ADVISED THE PF THAT I WAS GOING TO GET A WIND CHK AT THE ARPT. WHILE I WAS LISTENING TO THE ASOS WX; ATC GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN TO A HDG OF 160 DEGS AND TO DSND TO 8000 FT. THE PF ACKNOWLEDGED A HDG OF 60 DEGS. THE 60 DEG HDG WAS A LOGICAL HDG FOR VECTORS BACK TO THE LOC; HOWEVER; AFTER A SHORT TIME; ATC REALIZED WE WERE NOT ON THEIR ASSIGNED HDG OF 160 DEGS AND ADVISED AN IMMEDIATE L TURN AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE CLB TO 11000 FT. WE INITIATED THE L TURN AND A CLB WHEN ATC THEN ADVISED TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN AND TO INCREASE OUR ANGLE OF BANK. A R CLBING TURN WAS INITIATED WITH A BANK ANGLE OF 35 DEGS. AFTER APCHING 11000 FT; ATC THEN INSTRUCTED A L TURN FOR VECTORS TO RWY 13 ILS. THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE PF HAD CONDUCTED A COMPLETE APCH BRIEFING; AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERRAIN HAD BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED. THE RADAR WAS BEING USED ON THE PNF PLT'S NAV DISPLAY UNIT AND THE EGPWS WERE DISPLAYED ON THE PF'S NAV DISPLAY UNIT. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ATC HAD BECOME CONCERNED WITH THE SURROUNDING TERRAIN; HOWEVER; THERE WAS NEVER AN EGPWS TERRAIN WARNING. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; WHICH I BELIEVE RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF TERRAIN SEPARATION; ARE AS FOLLOWS: OPEN LOOP COM. THE CREW DID NOT CONFIRM THE TURNING INSTRUCTIONS TO BE EXPECTED AFTER XING THE LOC AND NO CONFIRMATION OF THOSE TURNING INSTRUCTIONS WERE REQUESTED FROM ATC. WHEN THE INCORRECT HDG OF 60 DEGS WAS REPEATED BACK TO ATC; THERE WAS NO CHALLENGE OR CORRECTION ADVISED AT THAT TIME. WITH THE CHANGE FROM THE EXPECTED GPS APCH TO THE ILS APCH; THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE WORKLOAD THAT CREATED A DIVISION IN ATTN FOR THE PNF. MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF THE TSTM AND THE ASSOCIATED WINDS IN THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT WAS ALSO A FACTOR. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHEN AN AIRPLANE IS BEING VECTORED THROUGH A LOC COURSE; ESPECIALLY IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS; THERE SHOULD BE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS IN THE EVENT THERE IS A LOSS OF COMS. THIS WILL SERVE TO ALERT THE CREW OF IMPENDING RESTRS SUCH AS MINIMUM VECTORING ALTS; TERRAIN; AND RESTR AREAS. IT SHOULD BE LISTED IN THE NOTAMS WHEN RESTRS ARE IN EFFECT THAT WILL PREVENT CERTAIN APCHS TO AN ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 581178: (ACTING PIC AND PF/ACTING FO AND PNF.) THE REASON WE WERE TOLD TO CROSS THE LOC WAS BECAUSE THERE WAS SOMEONE IN FRONT OF US ON AN APCH. WE KNEW THE CELL NEAR THE ARPT WOULD CAUSE THE WINDS TO SHIFT SO THE COPLT ELECTED TO TUNE IN THE ASOS FOR A WIND UPDATE. 2 RADIOS WERE ON AT ONCE; WHICH MADE FOR A NOISY COCKPIT. AT THIS POINT; ATC ISSUED A L TURN TO A HDG OF 160 DEGS. THE PF MOVED THE HDG BUG TO 60 DEGS; AND READ BACK TO ATC '060 DEGS.' THIS WAS VERIFIED BY ATC TAPE PLAYBACK. OUR CONFIGN WAS S+20 FLAP AND GEAR DOWN. ALT WAS 8000 FT. FULL ANTI-ICE PROTECTION WAS EMPLOYED DUE TO CURRENT WX CONDITIONS; AND THE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED FOR THE APCH. IN CONCLUSION; THE FIRST ERROR SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BOTH PLTS NOT HEARING THE 'EXPECT L TURN AFTER THE XINGOF THE LOC.' HOWEVER; I WONDER IF THIS IS SIGNIFICANT; BECAUSE EVEN IF I HAD HEARD IT; AND THEN HEARD ATC ISSUE A 60 DEG HDG; I WOULD BE INCLINED TO TAKE THAT HDG WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE MVA. ALSO; A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT THE RESTR AIRSPACE WAS NOT LISTED IN THE NOTAMS AND; THEREFORE; NOT INCLUDED IN THE PLANNING. LISTEN UP FOR THE 'EXPECT' PART OF THE CLRNC AFTER TOLD TO CROSS THE LOC. CALL AHEAD TO LEARN AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE; WHICH APCH IS IN USE SO DETAILED PLANNING CAN HAPPEN EARLIER. LEARN MORE ABOUT 'REACTIVE' MGMNT PRACTICES.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.