MD-80; IN IOE; RECOUNTS THE PROBS THE CREW HAD FLYING ACFT ACQUIRED FROM A DIFFERENT ACR.

Date: 2003-05 · Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model · Phase: takeoff

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|other-crew-differences-training-not-adequate-for-acft-acquired-from-another-acr

Synopsis

MD-80; IN IOE; RECOUNTS THE PROBS THE CREW HAD FLYING ACFT ACQUIRED FROM A DIFFERENT ACR.

Narrative

ABORTED TKOF CREW DUTY DAY. QUICK BACKGROUND; MY IOE. USING THE ACR B FMS AIRPLANES THAT EVEN MY CHECK AIRMAN WASN'T OVERLY FAMILIAR WITH. WE HAD BEEN BATTLING WX AND REASSIGNMENTS THE ENTIRE TRIP ALONG WITH NO ACARS ON ALL THE ACR B ACFT. OUR DAY STARTED WITH A SIGN IN FOR A DEADHEAD TO ZZZ TO PICK UP OUR SEQUENCE ON DAY 2. EVERY LEG ON DAY 2 CONSISTED OF RUSHING TO AN AIRPLANE FULL OF PASSENGERS AND THE AGENT SLAMMING THE DOOR BEHIND US AS WE WOULD BATTLE THE IRS'S AND FMS'S. THINGS DIDN'T QUITE WORK AS THE ACR B DIFFERENCES CLASSES MADE OUT. FLASH FORWARD TO A XA:51L TKOF OUT OF ZZZ WITH WX ENRTE. MY TKOF; AT APPROX 50 KTS I NOTICED A 'NO MODE' LIGHT ON THE THRUST RATING INDICATOR; SHORTLY THEREAFTER; FOLLOWED BY CHECK AIRMAN CAPT CALLING FOR THE ABORT. I CALLED 'NO SPOILERS' AND HE GOT THEM QUICKLY DEPLOYED AND THE AIRPLANE NEVER MADE IT ABOVE 60 KTS. WE CLRED THE RWY AND DISCUSSED THE PROB. CHECK AIRMAN CAPT HAD SEEN FLICKERING ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS ON THE 'NEW' DIGITAL PANEL. THAT WAS WHY HE CALLED THE LOW SPEED REJECTION. AFTER CONSULTING MAINT AND FINDING NOTHING WRONG; WE DECIDED TO PROCEED. ON THE NEXT TKOF; WE ONCE AGAIN HAD THE 'NO MODE LIGHT' ALONG WITH A 'L ENG VALVE' LIGHT AT ABOUT 50 KTS. WE ONCE AGAIN REJECTED THE TKOF AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. AT THE GATE; MAINT TOOK THE AIRPLANE OUT OF SVC. WE PROCEEDED TO ANOTHER AIRPLANE. NOW WE ARE BUTTING UP AGAINST CONTRACTUAL CREW DAY. AFTER CONSULTING WITH A CHIEF PLT; CHECK AIRMAN CAPT MADE THE COMMAND DECISION TO PROCEED SINCE WE WERE NOT VIOLATING ANY FAR'S. THE FLT MADE IT UNEVENTFULLY TO ZZZ2. HOWEVER; WE VIOLATED THE UNION CONTRACT BY 29 MINS; BUT WERE WELL INSIDE THE FAR'S THIS WORKED OUT; DESPITE BEING A NEW FO ON THE AIRPLANE FIGHTING ALL THE PROBS LISTED ABOVE; BUT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. THE ACR B DIFFERENCES CLASS NEEDS TO ADDRESS PROBS WITH THE IRS ALIGNMENTS IN MORE DETAIL AND THE QUIRKS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ACR HAS RECENTLY ACQUIRED THE ASSETS OF ACR B. BOTH ACR'S HAD MD-80 ACFT. ACR B'S MD-80 ACFT ARE CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT THAN ACR A'S. CURRENTLY; RPTR ALLEGES ACR A'S CREWS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO FLY WITH ACR B'S CREWS; AND ACR B'S CREWS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO FLY ACR A'S ACFT. THE RPTR ALLEGES COMPANY HAS GIVEN ACR A'S CREWS A ONE DAY GND SCHOOL. THIS IS SUPPOSED TO COVER THE DIFFERENCES IN THE ACFT; AND ALLOW ACR A'S CREWS TO FLY ACR B'S ACFT. RPTR STATES ACR B'S ACFT HAVE FMC'S AND MOVING MAPS. ACR A ACFT DO NOT. RPTR ALLEGES THESE PLTS ARE BEING ASKED TO FLY THESE ACFT WITH ONLY A SINGLE DAY OF CLASS ROOM GND SCHOOL. THE RPTR NOTES THAT HIS IOE CHECK AIRMAN DID NOT KNOW ACR B'S ACFT. THE RPTR THINKS; PLTS SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST FOUR HRS IN ACR B'S SIMULATOR. IF THE PLT HAS NEVER OPERATED GLASS ACFT; THEN A COMPLETE FMC TRAINING COURSE IN THE SIMULATOR. THE PLT FORESEES THE SAME PROB IN REVERSE WHEN ACR B'S CREWS HAVE TO OPERATE ACR A'S ACFT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.