A B737-500 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A TCASII RA. WHEN COMPLYING WITH INSTRUCTIONS; THEY INADVERTENTLY EXCEEDED 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. THIS WAS DUE TO THE AUTOTHROTTLE NOT BEING TURNED OFF.

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AFTER DEP MIA DEP GAVE A HEADING OF 340 DEGS TO JOIN THE MIA7 (320 DEG RADIAL FROM DOLPHIN VOR) AND CLRED US TO 7000 FT. MIAMI CALLED TFC AHEAD AT 11 O'CLOCK POS AND 7000 FT. I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE TFC. THERE WAS A BROKEN LAYER THAT OBSCURED THE TFC. I LOOKED DOWN AT THE INSTS AND NOTICED OUR HEADING WAS 310 DEGS INSTEAD OF THE 340 DEG ASSIGNED AND BROUGHT THIS TO THE CAPT'S ATTN. AT THAT TIME WE RECEIVED A TCASII TFC ALERT WHICH PROCEEDED TO AN RA: MONITOR VERT SPD. MIAMI THEN GAVE US A HEADING OF 280 DEGS TO AVOID THE TFC. HAD THE CAPT NOT INITIALLY DEVIATED TO THE L; THE OTHER ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE OF A FACTOR. WE NEXT DISCOVERED THAT OUR AIRSPD WAS APCHING 300 KTS. THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE LOWERED THE NOSE TO COMPLY WITH THE RA WHILE STILL IN THE 'N1' MODE WHICH WAS REQUIRED BY THE SPECIAL NOISE ABATEMENT PROFILE. BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE SURPRISED THAT WE WERE STILL IN THE N1 MODE SINCE WE HAD SELECTED VNAV CLB. TO PROPERLY COMPLY WITH THE RA WE FOUND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE DESELECTED BOTH THE AUTOPLT AND THE AUTOTHROTTLE AND MONITORED OUR OWN SPD. OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE N1 AND VNAV COMBINATION IS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE LACK OF TRAINING RECEIVED DURING OUR TRANSITION FROM THE A320 TO THE B737-300. THE TRAINING SYLLABUS CONSIDERED BOTH THE CAPT AND I PRIOR GLASS PLTS THOUGH NEITHER OF US HAD HAD ANY BOEING GLASS EXPERIENCE. ON THE JOB TRAINING HAS GOTTEN ME UP TO SPD; BUT OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE SMALL GAPS. THIS GAP WAS WORTH ABOUT AN EXTRA 50 KTS BELOW 10000 FT.