B737-300 CREW WAS ISSUED A CLRNC NOT TO EXCEED 1 PT 5 MI WHEN ISSUED A GAR AT OAK RWY 29.
Synopsis
B737-300 CREW WAS ISSUED A CLRNC NOT TO EXCEED 1 PT 5 MI WHEN ISSUED A GAR AT OAK RWY 29.
Narrative
DUE TO PRIOR ACFT LNDG AND SLOWLY ROLLING TO THE END OF THE RWY; TWR INSTRUCTED US TO 'GAR' OVER THE APCH END OF THE RWY. WHILE WE WERE EXECUTING THE GAR PROCS; SHE WAS BARKING ORDERS AT A TIME WHEN WE DIDN'T HAVE A CHANCE TO FULLY COMPREHEND OR REPLY. THE ORDERS (WHICH FILTERED INTO MY THOUGHTS AFTER A WHILE WHEN THE GAR WAS STABILIZED) INCLUDED A TURN 'WITHIN 1.5 MI' AND LEVELOFF AT 'NOT ABOVE' 1500 FT FOR THE VISUAL L DOWNWIND. (WE HAD 2000 FT SET IN THE WINDOW FOR ILS GA.) I DID NOT COMPREHEND AT THE TIME HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO REMAIN WITHIN 1.5 MI; AND 1.5 MI OF WHAT? SHORELINE; RWY; TWR; VOR? I EITHER DIDN'T HEAR OR SHE NEVER SPECIFIED THE REF. IN THE SCRAMBLE OF THE GAR; WE DIDN'T HAVE A CHANCE TO RETUNE THE VOR'S FROM THE ILS; SO WE HAD NO DME. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOM PROCS; THE FO WAS FLYING THE GA; BUT SEEMED OBLIVIOUS TO THE 1.5 MI REQUIREMENT AND HOW TO DO IT. HE WAS 'HARD-WIRED' INTO THE PROC AND WHEN HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 'ONE;' I TOLD HIM WE NEEDED TO REMAIN WITH '5 DEGS' AND AROUND 170-180 KTS. HIS ANGLE OF BANK WAS ONLY 20 DEGS AND I DIRECTED HIM TO USE 30 DEGS OR WE WOULD ENCROACH ON SFO'S AIRSPACE. HE DIDN'T SEEM TO IMMEDIATELY GRASP THE REASON I WAS DIRECTING THIS AND WAS SLOW TO RESPOND; ALLOWING THE SPD TO BUILD UP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BOOK GAR PROCS TO 210-220 KTS. I WAS ABOUT TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE FROM HIM WHEN THE TWR CTLR STARTING YELLING AT US THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED OUR 1.5 MI LIMIT AND 'TURN L IMMEDIATELY.' I INFORMED HER THAT WE WERE ALREADY IN A 30 DEG TURN TO THE L. SHE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ELSE EXCEPT 'CLRED TO LAND.' I DID NOT TAKE THE AIRPLANE BECAUSE THE FO WAS AT 30 DEGS AND SLOWING HIS SPD; AND SINCE THE DAMAGE WAS ALREADY DONE; THERE REALLY WASN'T ANY POINT IN HUMILIATING HIM FURTHER. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT EXCEEDING THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE CTLR: 1) SHE GAVE US A FAIRLY COMPLEX CLRNC IN THE MIDDLE OF A GAR PROC AND WE WERE MORE INTENT ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. 2) A 1.5 MI RADIUS TURN IS VERY TIGHT FOR A B737 WHEN YOU ARE NOT PREPARED FOR IT; OR INEXPERIENCED. THE FO HAS ABOUT 1 YR WITH THE COMPANY; AND ALTHOUGH HIS SKILLS AND PROCS ARE VERY GOOD; HE HAD NO EXPERIENCE IN THIS TYPE OF MANEUVER IN LINE FLYING. 3) THE FOM PROCS; AND ALL TRAINING EVOLUTIONS; ARE DONE AS A STRAIGHT OUT GAR TO 210 KTS CLEAN TO THE MISSED APCH ALT. IN 16 YRS WITH THE COMPANY AND THE PREVIOUS 9 YRS WITH ANOTHER CARRIER; I NEVER ONCE DID A VFR GAR IN THE SIMULATOR WITH A TIGHT TURN AND SHORT CLB NECESSITATING SLOW SPDS AND FLAPS 5 DEGS TO MEET A 1.5 MI RADIUS LIMITATION. PERHAPS THE TRAINING DEPT CAN ADD THIS TO THE SYLLABUS INSTEAD OF ONE OF THE INST MISSED APCHS. I'VE PROBABLY DONE 80% OF MY GAR IN VMC CONDITIONS OVER MY 25+ YRS OF AIRLINE FLYING; YET ONLY IMC PROCS ARE PRACTICED IN TRAINING. 4) SINCE I WAS FOCUSED ON MAKING SURE THE FO MADE A SAFE GAR; I HEARD THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS; BUT WASN'T ABLE TO THINK ABOUT THEM UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. WE MADE THE L TURN; BUT DIDN'T COMPREHEND HOW TIGHT WE NEEDED TO BE UNTIL LATER WHEN I INTERRUPTED THE GAR PROC TO KEEP THE FLAPS AT '5 DEGS.' THIS UNDOUBTEDLY CONFUSED THE FO BECAUSE HE HAD NOT HEARD OR COMPREHENDED THAT WE NEEDED TO MAKE A SLOW AND TIGHT TURN TO STAY WITHIN THE 1.5 MI LIMIT. HE WAS ALSO IN CONFLICT BECAUSE I WAS DIRECTING SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE 'CANNED' GAR IN THE FOM. 5) I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE POSITIVE CTL AND THE ACFT WHEN IT WAS OBVIOUS THE FO DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY OF THE TIGHT; SLOW TURN. IT WAS A COMPLEX SIT AND HE WAS CLRLY WAY BEHIND THE PWR CURVE AND NOT CATCHING ON FAST ENOUGH. 6) THE TWR CTLR COULD HAVE HELPED US OUT BY GIVING US INSTRUCTIONS A LITTLE LATER IN THE GAR AND CALLING SFO FOR SOME RELIEF ON THAT VERY TIGHT 1.5 MI RADIUS.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.