FLT CREW OF B733 BECAME DISORIENTED DURING TURN TO VISUAL FINAL RWY 25R (OR RWY 24R; DEPENDING ON WHICH RPT IS CORRECT) AT LAX WHEN VISIBILITY WAS COMPROMISED BY HAZE AND AFTERNOON SUN. PNF WAS OCCUPIED WITH NUMEROUS DUTIES; AND BOTH PLTS WERE FATIGUED.

Narrative

I WAS CAPT AND PNF ON FLT ZZZ-LAX. THIS WAS THE 4TH FLT OF THE DAY; 4TH ACFT OF THE DAY; 4TH SET OF FLT ATTENDANTS OF THE DAY; THIRD DAY OF FLYING FOR MYSELF AND THE 4TH DAY OF FLYING FOR THE FO. WE WERE 1 HR LATE OUT OF ZZZ DUE TO AIRPLANE CHANGE/CONNECT. ACFT WAS SPD LIMITED DUE TO FLAP/SLAT INDICATION PROB. NORMAL FLT AND RTEING TO LAX. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO FOLLOW A COMMUTER ACFT 3 NM AHEAD; TURNING A 5 NM FINAL TO RWY 24R LAX. A FEW CLOUDS WERE IN THE AREA OF THE APCH END OF RWY 24. WE TURNED A NORMAL BASE AT APPROX 6 NM; 180 KTS; RWY 24R; AND TFC AHEAD WAS IN SIGHT. THE FO SAID HE WOULD SQUARE THE TURN TO FINAL SOMEWHAT TO INCREASE THE SPACING ON THE ACFT AHEAD. THE ILS FREQ WAS TUNED FOR RWY 24R AND VOR/LOC SELECTED ON THE MCP. I OBSERVED THE FO BEGIN THE TURN TO FINAL. DURING THE TURN TO FINAL; THE FO CALLED FOR FLAPS 15; GEAR DOWN FINAL DSCNT CHK; SLOWED TO 160 KTS. AS I SET FLAPS; GEAR; MADE 2500 FT CALL; CHKED ALTIMETERS; RECEIVED THE CALL TO SWITCH TO TWR; FINISHED CHKLIST; I WAS HEAD INSIDE THE COCKPIT. WHEN I LOOKED UP; I SAW WE HAD OVERSHOT FINAL FOR RWY 24R. I CALLED FOR THE FO TO IMMEDIATELY CORRECT TO THE R. AS WE WERE TURNING TO CORRECT; APCH CTL CALLED AND GAVE US A HDG OF 270 DEGS TO THE R. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL; AND SAID WE WERE CORRECTING. THE FO MADE AN APPROPRIATE CORRECTION TO RWY 24R. NORMAL; STABILIZED APCH AND LNDG FOLLOWED. IN DEBRIEFING THE INCIDENT; THE FO SAID THAT THE FEW CLOUDS IN THE AREA OF RWY 24R WERE A FACTOR IN LEADING TO DISORIENTATION; AND A SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN BANK ANGLE DURING THE TURN TO FINAL. ADDITIONAL FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT: 1) DISTR BY MYSELF DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT DURING THE TURN TO FINAL. 2) FAILURE BY THE PF TO RECOGNIZE DISORIENTATION DURING THE TURN TO FINAL. 3) FAILURE TO USE ALL TOOLS AVAILABLE; (LOC; FLT DIRECTOR; MAP DISPLAY) TO VERIFY OUR POS. 4) FAILURE TO PRIORITIZE TASKS AND BACKUP THE PF DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. 5) WX IN THE AREA OF THE RWY AS WELL AS LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS AT DUSK; AND HAZE. 6) APCH/RWY LIGHTING NOT IN USE. 7) NO PAPI/VASI INSTALLED AT LAX. 8) FATIGUE BY THE PLTS DUE TO MULTIPLE 4-LEG DAYS; ACFT CHANGES; CREW CHANGES; DELAY ON LAST LEG OF LAST DAY. NOTE: AS AN LAX-BASED PLT; I HAVE FLOWN HUNDREDS OF THESE SAME APCHS UNDER THE SAME OR SIMILAR CONDITIONS WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE HAZE; FLYING INTO THE SUN AND MARINE LAYER ARE CONSTANT COMPANIONS TO PLTS FLYING INTO LAX. HIGH TFC COUNTS AND THE CONGESTED VISUAL APCH ENVIRONMENT MAKE LAX A CHALLENGING LOCATION. I STRONGLY ADVOCATE FOR LAX TO USE THEIR APCH LIGHTING SYS ON A HIGH VISIBILITY SETTING; EVEN DURING VFR CONDITIONS; TO HELP PLTS MAINTAIN A STRONG SENSE OF ORIENTATION TO THE RWY IN USE DURING ALL PHASES OF OPERATION. I ALSO STRONGLY ADVOCATE FOR THE INSTALLATION OF A PAPI/VASI SYS AT LAX FOR THE PREVIOUS REASONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 586115: DURING MY INTERCEPT OF THE ILS COURSE; I BECAME TASK SATURATED AND OVERSHOT THE FINAL APCH COURSE. AS I GLANCED IN THE COCKPIT TO CHK FLAP SPDS; LOWER THE GEAR; AND LEVEL OFF THE ALT; I SAW THAT I WAS ALIGNED WITH THE RWY 25L APCH COURSE. I QUICKLY APPLIED BANK TO CORRECT MY ALIGNMENT. AT NO TIME DID I FEEL THAT ANY ACFT WAS IN DANGER; NOR WAS ANY ACFT TOLD TO BREAK OUT.