C172 PLT CONCERNED WITH APPARENT LACK OF SPACING WITH A PA28 IN THE TFC PATTERN AT OSU.
Synopsis
C172 PLT CONCERNED WITH APPARENT LACK OF SPACING WITH A PA28 IN THE TFC PATTERN AT OSU.
Narrative
ACFT #1 DSNDING OUT OF 6000 FT FOR 3000 FT MSL ON A XCOUNTRY IFR FLT PLAN. ACFT #1 WAS ISSUED A VISUAL APCH BY COLUMBUS; OH; APCH AT CMH. (NOTE: THE CMH CTLR WAS APPARENTLY NEW TO THE AREA AND WAS BEHIND HIS WORKLOAD. HE ASKED A TRANSIENT FOR THE ARPT IDENT OF BOLTON FIELD; TZR; HIS CHANGED DEST. TZR IS 1 OF THE 4 TWR OPS IN CENTRAL OH. CMH CTLR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THIS INFO.) UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH OSU TWR; ACFT #1 WAS INSTRUCTED TO RPT HIGH STREET; WHICH IS 2 NM FROM THE RWY 27L THRESHOLD. ACFT #2 RPTED DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27L AND WAS CLRED TO LAND. ACFT #1 RPTED HIGH STREET SECONDS EARLIER. OSU TWR INSTRUCTED ACFT #1 'CLRED TO LAND BEHIND TFC.' ACFT #1 WAS ABOUT 135 KTS IN THE DSCNT AT THE 2 MI MARK. ACFT #2 WAS AT PATTERN AIRSPD. ACFT #1 DID NOT HAVE ACFT #2 IN SIGHT AND RPTED SAME. NO SUBSEQUENT INSTRUCTION TO EITHER ACFT FROM TWR. ACFT #2 APPEARED AT 11 O'CLOCK POS; AT ABOUT 1/4 MI AND 100-200 FT BELOW ACFT #1 XING L TO R. ACFT #2 MADE A COMMENT ABOUT ACFT PROX TO WHICH TWR INSTRUCTED 'CLRED FOR THE OPTION.' ACFT #2 WISELY SIDESTEPPED TO THE R OF RWY 27L AND INITIATED A CLB. ACFT #1 LANDED NORMALLY. TWR APPARENTLY DID NOT CORRECTLY JUDGE ACFT SPDS AND POS. TWR SHOULD HAVE EITHER RETRACTED ACFT #2 LNDG CLRNC AND EXTENDED DOWNWIND; OR ENSURED THAT ACFT #1 HAD ACFT #2 IN SIGHT BEFORE ISSUING LNDG CLRNC FOR ACFT #1. ACFT #1 SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE LNDG CLRNC AND SPACING. ACFT #1 SHOULD THEN HAVE OFFERED AN EVASIVE MANEUVER SUCH AS A 360 DEG TURN ON FINAL. ACFT #1 HAD BEEN IN AN IFR ENVIRONMENT ALL DAY AND HAD TO MIX IN WITH CTLED VFR DURING THE LAST MINS. ACFT #1 EXPECTED TWR TO CORRECTLY JUDGE THE GND SPDS OF THE 2 ACFT WHICH APPARENTLY DID NOT HAPPEN. ACFT #2 SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE LNDG CLRNC AND SPACING KNOWING THAT ACFT #1 WAS WITHIN 2 NM OF LNDG. ACFT #2 SHOULD THEN HAVE OFFERED TO EXTEND DOWNWIND AND BECOME 2ND IN LINE FOR LNDG.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.