A FALCON 50 ON TOUCHDOWN; THE BRAKING SYS FAILED AND AN EVASIVE MANEUVER WAS EXECUTED STOPPING AND PREVENTING THE ACFT FROM ROLLING DOWN A HILLSIDE.

Narrative

ON JUL/THURS/03; AT APPROX XA30 HRS; I WAS ACTING AS THE CAPT; IN THE POS OF PIC; ON A DASSAULT FALCON 50. THE ACFT WAS BEING OPERATED ON AN IFR FLT PLAN; UNDER 14 CFR PART 91 RULES. DAY VMC CONDITIONS PREVAILED AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT (DUSK). NO OTHER ACFT WERE INVOLVED. DURING THIS FLT I WAS ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF A TRAINING PLT; PROVIDING INFLT INSTRUCTION TO ANOTHER COMPANY PLT; WHO WAS ACTING AS THE SIC. THE SIC WAS OPERATING THE CTLS OF THE ACFT UP UNTIL REACHING THE FINAL APCH FIX AT ZZZ. AT FAF; I BECAME PRIMARY MANIPULATOR OF THE CTLS BUT REQUESTED THAT THE SIC REMAIN ON THE CTLS WITH ME. I TOLD THE SIC THAT I HAD CTL OF THE ACFT; BUT TO 'STAY ON THE CTLS WITH ME' SO THAT HE COULD FEEL THE INPUTS I MADE; ON THE ACFT CTLS; DURING THE FINAL APCH AND LNDG SEQUENCE. THE ACFT ORIGINATED OUT OF ZZZ1 AFTER BEING PICKED UP FROM; AN APPROVED DASSAULT MAINT FACILITY LOCATED THERE. THE ACFT WAS DELIVERED TO MAINT FACILITY; A FEW WEEKS EARLIER; SO THAT MAINT COULD BE PERFORMED ON THE ACFT; INCLUDING TROUBLESHOOTING THE ACFT'S ANTISKID BRAKING SYS. (REGARDING AN INTERMITTENT PROB WITH THE ACFT'S ANTI-SKID SYS.) WHEN THE PROPER LNDG WT WAS ENSURED TO BE ACHIEVED UPON ARR AT ZZZ; AN ARR INTO ZZZ WAS REQUESTED AND ATC APPROVED THE ARR; FOLLOWED BY THE ILS RWY 24 APCH. BOTH THE ARR AND APCH WERE UNEVENTFUL AND ALL NORMAL AND REQUIRED PROCS AND CHKLIST WERE FOLLOWED. UPON TOUCHDOWN AT ZZZ; THE BRAKING SYS FAILED. I HAD NO BRAKE PRESSURE AND SAW THAT THE ACFT'S BRAKING SYS ANNUNCIATOR PANEL LIGHTS WERE FLICKERING INDICATING AN ABNORMALITY. I INITIATED THE EMER PROCS FOR THE BRAKE SYS FAILURE. ALTHOUGH I INITIATED THE EMER PROCS; I WAS UNABLE TO STOP THE ACFT BEFORE THE END OF THE RWY. FEARING THAT EMINENT DANGER EXISTED FOR MY CREW AND PAX (COMPANY EMPLOYEES); I EXECUTED AN EVASIVE MANEUVER AT THE END OF THE RWY TO PREVENT THE ACFT FROM EITHER TUMBLING OR ROLLING DOWN THE HILLSIDE AFTER EXITING. AS SUCH THE ACFT CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP SHORTLY AFTER EXITING THE END AND JUST PRIOR TO STARTING DOWN THE HILLSIDE. THE ACFT SUFFERED DAMAGE TO THE NOSE GEAR AND UNDERCARRIAGE AREA; BUT NO INJURIES WERE RPTED. THIS NASA RPT WAS NOT ORIGINALLY FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THE DATE INCIDENT; BECAUSE I WAS ORIGINALLY INFORMED IT WAS AN ACCIDENT. I WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED THAT A NASA RPT COULD NOT BE FILED ON AN 'ACCIDENT OR CRIMINAL ACT' BY BOTH THE FAA AND THE INFO STATED IN THE NASA RPTING SYS INFO SHEET THAT ACCOMPANIES THE FORM FILED. ON JUL/FRI/03; I WAS ADVISED BY FAA PRINCIPAL OPS INSPECTOR; THE FAA INVESTIGATOR IN CHARGE OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT; THAT THIS WOULD NOW BE CATEGORIZED AS AN INCIDENT AND NOT AN ACCIDENT. AS SUCH I IMMEDIATELY FILED THIS RPT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE FAA FIRST CATEGORIZED THIS EVENT AS AN ACCIDENT AND LATER CHANGED IT TO AN INCIDENT. THE RPTR SAID THIS AIRPLANE HAD A MAINT HISTORY OF BRAKE ANTI-SKID FAILURES AND HAD JUST COME FROM A MANUFACTURER'S AUTH REPAIR STATION FOR A POSITIVE FIX. THE RPTR STATED THE BRAKE MANUFACTURER REPRESENTATIVE WAS CONTACTED AND AGREED TO HELP CORRECT THE PROB; WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE A GRIP AND TUBE SUBASSEMBLY OF THE BRAKE ASSEMBLY. THE RPTR SAID THE BRAKE TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE DETERMINED THE PROB WAS A SWEDGE BREAKING ON THE GRIP AND TUBE SUBASSEMBLY AND SUPPLIED US WITH TEST BRAKES THAT FAILED ON TESTING. THE RPTR STATED 19 BRAKES WERE TESTED UNTIL A MODIFIED BRAKE SET WAS INSTALLED AND TESTED SATISFACTORY. THE RPTR SAID THE MODIFIED BRAKE ASSEMBLIES CAN ONLY BE USED ON THIS AIRPLANE WITH AN AUTH ENGINEERING DEV AND SPECIAL MAINT MANUAL PROCS ARE TO BE USED FOR THESE BRAKE ASSEMBLIES.