FLT CREW OF MD80 ACCEPTED CLB CLRNC BEYOND CAPABILITIES OF THEIR ACFT. ZTL RADAR CTLR ADVISED OF ALTDEV WHEN TFC CONFLICT OCCURRED AT FL330 AND RPTR ACFT SLOWED UNTIL UNABLE TO CLB FURTHER AT FL315.
Synopsis
FLT CREW OF MD80 ACCEPTED CLB CLRNC BEYOND CAPABILITIES OF THEIR ACFT. ZTL RADAR CTLR ADVISED OF ALTDEV WHEN TFC CONFLICT OCCURRED AT FL330 AND RPTR ACFT SLOWED UNTIL UNABLE TO CLB FURTHER AT FL315.
Narrative
THE FO; WAS THE PF. ATC ASKED US TO STATE OUR PRESENT RATE OF CLB. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NEARLY 2000 FPM. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 2000 FPM UNTIL REACHING FL330. AT THE TIME THE INSTRUCTION WAS ISSUED WE WERE CLBING THROUGH APPROX FL230 AT A NORMAL CLB SPD OF APPROX 330 KIAS. WE WERE ABLE TO COMPLY FOR MOST OF THE CLB; BUT APCHING FL290 OUR AIRSPD STARTED TO DECAY. AT APPROX FL310; IT WAS NECESSARY TO DECREASE OUR RATE OF CLB TO APPROX 500 FPM DUE TO THE AIRSPD LOSS. AT APPROX FL320 I INFORMED THE ATC CTLR THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR CLB DUE TO THE LOSS OF AIRSPD. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN 45 DEGS TO THE R TO AVOID TFC. WE BEGAN A TURN BUT AT LESS THAN STANDARD RATE BECAUSE OF THE HIGH ALT AND LOW AIRSPD. I INFORMED THE ATC CTLR THAT A TURN WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND ASKED IF THE APCHING ACFT COULD MAKE A LARGER TURN TO COMPENSATE. WE WERE ABLE TO SEE THE APCHING ACFT FROM ABOUT 5 MI IN FRONT OF THE ACFT. THE VERT SEPARATION WAS NEVER LESS THAN 1000 FT AND THE HORIZ SEPARATION APPEARED SUFFICIENT TO ME FROM THE TIME I FIRST SAW THE APCHING ACFT UNTIL WE PASSED. WE DID NOT RECEIVE AN RA FROM THE TCASII COMPUTER. WHEN I ACCEPTED THE RESTR; THE FO MADE A COMMENT SOMETHING LIKE; 'OH; THANKS.' I DON'T THINK EITHER OF US EXPECTED THE RESTR TO REMAIN THROUGH FL330 OR THAT WE WOULDN'T HAVE TO AMEND OUR CLB AT SOME POINT. WE WERE ALMOST ABLE TO COMPLY BUT I WAITED UNTIL WE WERE OUT OF OPTIONS BEFORE INFORMING THE CTLR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 589777: TO MAINTAIN SAFE AIRSPD WE HAD TO REDUCE THE RATE OF CLB UNTIL WE HAD TO LEVELOFF DUE TO AIRSPD BLEED OFF. WE WERE ADVISED THAT DUE TO NOT ATTAINING FL330; LEVELOFF WAS AROUND FL315 -- THAT AN ALTDEV HAD OCCURRED. CONTINUATION OF ACN 590291: WE ALSO HAD A DEADHEAD CAPT IN THE JUMPSEAT. NONE OF US COMMENTED ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF US COMPLYING WITH THE RESTR DURING THE CLB. I WAS WAITING FOR THE FO TO TELL ME WHAT HE WANTED RELAYED TO THE CTLR AND I THINK HE WAS ALSO WAITING FOR ME TO STEP IN AND CHANGE OUR RESTR. AS THE CAPT; I CERTAINLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROACTIVE. ODDLY ENOUGH; I THINK HAVING THE JUMPSEAT RIDER AFFECTED THE DYNAMICS OF THE SIT. AS THE CAPT; I LET THE SIT DEGRADE FURTHER THAN I EVER HAVE IN THE PAST. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BECAUSE I VIEWED THE FO'S BACKGROUND WITH A GREAT DEAL OF RESPECT AND FELT SURE HE WOULD SPEAK UP WHEN HE FELT IT WAS PRUDENT TO DO SO. IT WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LESSON I LEARNED WAS NOT TO EVER ASSUME SO MUCH WITHOUT SOME TYPE OF VERBAL COM. I LET MYSELF BE PASSIVE AND IN DOING SO DID NOT FULFILL MY DUTIES AS THE CAPT.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.