B737-200 ACFT MECH NEGLECTS TO REATTACH THE PITOT STATIC LINES TO THE AIR DATA COMPUTERS AND RELEASES THE ACFT FOR FLT.

Narrative

WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING THE FO'S FLT DIRECTOR; THE #1 AND #2 AIR DATA COMPUTERS WERE SWAPPED. AFTER RUNNING TEST AND DETERMINING THE AIR DATA COMPUTER WAS NOT THE PROB; THEY WERE SWAPPED BACK TO ORIGINAL POS. #1 AIR DATA COMPUTER WAS SECURED IN RACK AND ATTN TURNED TO #2 AIR DATA COMPUTER RACK CANNON PLUGS. AFTER EXAMINING PLUGS; #2 AIR DATA COMPUTER WAS INSTALLED AND THE ELECTRONIC EQUIP DOOR CLOSED. TROUBLESHOOTING CONTINUED FOR ABOUT 1 HR AND THEN PROB (FLT DIRECTOR) WAS CONTINUED ON MEL. ACFT WAS RELEASED AND FLT ATTEMPTED. AFTER TKOF; THE CAPT'S AIR DATA INSTS WERE INOP WITH NO FAILURE FLAGS AND FO'S AIR DATA INSTS WERE INOP WITH FAILURE FLAGS. ACFT MADE AIR TURN BACK. AFTER RETURNING TO GATE MAINT FOUND THAT PITOT AND STATIC HOSES TO #1 AIR DATA COMPUTER WERE NOT INSTALLED. #2 AIR DATA COMPUTER HAD FAILURE FLAGS ON PREVIOUS 2 LEGS WITH THE AIR DATA COMPUTERS REPLACED ON BOTH OCCASIONS. THE PITOT AND STATIC LINES FOR #1 AIR DATA COMPUTER WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT DISCONNECTED DURING TROUBLESHOOTING. LINES WOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED BEFORE ELECTRIC DOOR CLOSED IF TIME WAS TAKEN TO RECHK AIR DATA COMPUTER INSTALLATION. PERSONAL PROBS AT HOME WERE A FACTOR DURING TROUBLESHOOTING AND MAINT. MIND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON WORK AND NOT ON OTHER PROBS.