PLT OF SMA; UNABLE TO CONTACT PCT BY RADIO AND HAVING RECEIVED NO DIRECTION FROM THE FSS BRIEFER REGARDING THE ADIZ OR PROCS NECESSARY THEREIN; TOOK OFF FROM W29 AND ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN ADIZ CLRNC WHILE AIRBORNE -- WITH PREDICTABLE RESULTS.

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DEPARTING W29 EBOUND WITH FLT PLAN OPEN; 3 ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT BALTIMORE BY RADIO ON THE GND FAILED. NEXT STEP; TKOF AND STAY IN W29 WAS PATTERN WITH 1200 ON THE XPONDER. AT 400 FT AGL; CONTACT WAS MADE AND XPONDER NUMBER CHANGE AS CALLED FOR AFTER 3 MI. FREQ CHANGE APPROVED AND XPONDER SET BACK TO 1200 AND LANDED AT TTN. I TALKED TO 6 FAA PERSONNEL THAT DAY AND NONE OF THEM INFORMED ME THAT I HAD TO CALL DEP CTL BY PHONE FOR A XPONDER NUMBER BEFORE LEAVING THE GND. IF I HAD BEEN SO INFORMED; I HAD A CELL PHONE WITH ME THAT DAY AND INDEED WOULD HAVE USED IT TO CONFORM TO ANY REQUEST. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT UPON LNDG AT TTN THE TWR ADVISED HIM TO CONTACT AUTHS REGARDING HIS DEP FROM W29 WITHOUT REQUIRED CODE AND COM. RPTR EXPANDED ON HIS ATTEMPTS TO PREPARE HIMSELF THROUGH CONTACTS WITH FAA PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH COURTEOUS; THE FSS BRIEFERS FOR NEITHER THE INBOUND NOR OUTBOUND FLT MADE AN ATTEMPT TO EITHER ASK OR UNILATERALLY ATTEMPT TO BRIEF HIM REGARDING THE ADIZ. 2 OTHER PHONE CALLS RESULTED IN A HANG UP WHEN HE ADVISED HE WAS PLANNING A VFR OP AND ANOTHER PASS OFF TO DIFFERENT NUMBER WHICH RESULTED IN NO ANSWER. FINALLY; HE ADVISED THAT THE AFD PROVIDED NO GUIDANCE REGARDING OPS FROM W29 REF THE ADIZ. WHAT'S MORE; HE ASKED RHETORICALLY -- WHAT WAS HE SUPPOSED TO DO? ANALYST REPLIED HE THOUGHT THAT WAS A GOOD QUESTION.