B737 CAPT RPTS SHORT CUTS AND SOP VIOLATIONS BY FO'S HE FLIES WITH. HE INDICATES THIS IS AN INCREASING PROB.

Date: 2003-09

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

B737 CAPT RPTS SHORT CUTS AND SOP VIOLATIONS BY FO'S HE FLIES WITH. HE INDICATES THIS IS AN INCREASING PROB.

Narrative

THIS IS A GENERAL; NON-SPECIFIC RPT. I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS 2 AREAS THAT I HAVE OBSERVED OVER THE LAST 1-2 YRS; AND I FEEL THERE A IS TREND DEVELOPING HERE. THE FIRST AREA I FEEL IS A POTENTIAL PROB IS FO'S PROGRAMMING AND TYPING AWAY ON THE FMC CDU ON TAXI-IN. WITH ALL THE CURRENT EMPHASIS ON PREVENTING RWY INCURSIONS; I FEEL THAT THIS ACTIVITY CAN INCREASE THE CHANCE OF A RWY INCURSION. I NEED THE FO 'HEADS UP; EYES OUT' DURING TAXI-IN TO BACK ME UP. I AM TO THE POINT NOW THAT THIS IS PART OF MY BRIEFING. THE CHANCE ON AN INCURSION IS JUST AS GREAT ON TAXI-IN AS IT IS ON TAXI-OUT. THE SECOND AREA I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS IS IMPROPER (OR NO) CHKLIST USAGE. I HAVE OBSERVED THIS TO BE MORE PREVALENT AMONG MORE SENIOR FO'S. COMPLACENCY; PERHAPS? PARTICULARLY BEFORE START/ORIGINATING; AFTER-START; AND MOST CRITICALLY; THE PRE-TKOF CHKLIST. IN MANY CASES THESE ARE READ FROM MEMORY; WITH THE CHKLIST CARD STILL IN ITS HOLDER ON THE GLARE SHIELD; OR LAYING FLAT IN FRONT OF THE FO ON THE GLARE SHIELD. THE READER NOT EVEN READING IT. AFTER ALL; ISN'T THE PURPOSE OF A CHKLIST TO PREVENT RELIANCE ON MEMORY FOR CRITICAL ITEMS?

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.