A B777 DISPATCHER RPTED THAT A FIX WAS MISSPELLED IN THE FMC DATABASE.

Narrative

THE FLT SENT AN ACARS RPT THAT THE FIX 'WINDL' ON THEIR FLT PLAN WAS NOT IN THE FMC DATABASE. AFTER LOOKING AT THE HIGH LEVEL CHART IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE CORRECT SPELLING OF THE FIX WAS ACTUALLY 'WNDEL.' OBVIOUSLY THE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD LOADED THE FIX INTO UNIMATIC HAD MADE A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR. I TOLD THE CREW TO INPUT THE CORRECT SPELLING OF THE FIX INTO THEIR FMC AND THEY WERE HAPPY. I ADVISED DISPATCH SVCS AND THEY CORRECTED THE DATABASE AND THEN PROCEEDED WITH THE TEDIOUS PROCESS OF UPDATING EVERY RTE THAT WENT VIA THIS FIX. SINCE THE SYS HAS NO EFFECTIVE MECHANISM IN PLACE TO PREVENT SUCH AN ERROR IN THE FIRST PLACE; EVERY FLT PLAN ISSUED VIA THIS FIX WAS CORRUPT AND HAD PRESENTED THE CREWS OF THOSE FLTS WITH THE SAME PROB (REJECTION OF THE FMC UPLINK; MANUAL ENTRY; ETC). THIS CREW JUST HAPPENED TO FEEL IT WAS WORTH MENTIONING AND THAT'S THE ONLY WAY A REMEDY WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. THIS TYPE OF PROB IS ALL TOO COMMON AND IS THE DIRECT RESULT OF A SYS THAT REQUIRES MANUAL MAINT OF ITS DATABASE. TO ENSURE A SAFE OP PLTS NEED TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE SUPPORT THEY ARE RECEIVING IS RELIABLE. IF WE CANNOT FULFILL THAT ROLE THEN WE WILL CEASE TO BE OF VALUE AS A RESOURCE.