B777-200 CREW FOUND THE MELED FORTIFIED COCKPIT DOOR COULD BE OPENED FROM OUTSIDE WITH EXTRA FORCE. THE DOOR HAD BEEN SIGNED OFF BY MAINT AS REPAIRED.

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WE; THE FLT CREW; ARRIVED TO THE ACFT 1 HR BEFORE DEP. THE MECHANICS INFORMED US THAT THE APU COULD NOT BE STARTED DUE TO A FAULTY TRANSFORMER RECTIFIER UNIT. AS THE REAR CARGO DOOR WAS AFFECTED BY THIS PROB WE HAD TO WAIT TILL THE CARGO DOOR WAS CLOSED TO VERIFY THAT THE APU WAS NOT FUNCTIONING CORRECTLY. DISPATCH WAS NOTIFIED ABOUT THE SIT. THE ORIGINAL FLT PLAN HAS A 180 ETOPS. AS THIS WAS NOT A LEGAL RTE (INOP APU); DISPATCH SENT US A NEW RELEASE WITH 120 ETOPS. THIS WHOLE PROCESS TOOK APPROX 2 HRS. CONSIDERING GOOD WX AND DAYLIGHT WE FOUND IT SAFE AND ACCEPTABLE TO PROCEED TO ZZZ. LATER; ACFT WAS USED ON FLT TO LHR. THE COCKPIT DOOR WAS DEFERRED AFTER WE WERE ABLE TO OPEN THE DOOR WITH 'EXTRA' FORCE. THE DEADBOLT LOCK WAS USED IN FLT TO REASSURE THE DOOR COULD NOT BE OPENED. THE ITEM WAS CLRED IN ZZZ1 AFTER FOLLOWING FLT. DURING PREFLT ON THE NEXT FLT WE 'TESTED' THE DOOR AGAIN. IT OPENED. THE DOOR WAS DEFERRED ONCE MORE. THIS IS VERY CONCERNING. HOW MANY COCKPIT DOORS IN THE SYSTEM ARE FAULTY? I HOPE COMPANY WILL ACT PROMPTLY TO CORRECT THE PROB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 597074: FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL EXCEPT FOR THE DEFERRAL OF THE COCKPIT DOOR; AUTO OPEN FUNCTION. THE DEADBOLT PROCS WERE USED THROUGHOUT THE FLT. FLT WAS THE RETURN FLT TO ZZZ. THE FIRST THING I NOTICED WAS THAT IT WAS THE SAME AIRPLANE WE HAD TWO DAYS PRIOR. MECHANICS WERE WORKING ON WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS A TRANSFORMER RECTIFIER UNIT PROB. I WAS A BIT SUSPICIOUS OF THE DOOR; SO I ASKED THE OTHER FO TO STAY IN THE COCKPIT WHILE I TRIED TO FORCE IT OPEN. I OPENED IT ON THE FIRST TRY. THE MECHANICS DEFERRED THE APU AS INOP FOR THE FLT; BUT NEVER SAID THE INLET DOOR WOULD BE OPEN FOR THE FLT. WE COORDINATED WITH DISPATCH A NEW ETOPS RTE TO COMPLY WITH APU INOP. FINALLY; THEY ALSO DEFERRED THE COCKPIT DOOR JUST PRIOR TO DEP. SINCE WE WERE RECENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE DEFERRAL; WE KNEW WHAT TO DO WITH THE PROCS. MY CONCERN WAS THAT THIS DOOR PROB WAS UNDETECTABLE; SINCE THE DOOR APPEARED TO BE NORMAL WHEN LATCHED CLOSED. IT WASN'T UNTIL YOU FORCED IT OPEN THAT ITS FAILURE BECAME OBVIOUS. A SUGGESTION FOR THE FLT MANUAL CHANGE WOULD BE TO ENSURE SOMEONE IS IN THE COCKPIT AND CLR OF THE DOORWAY PRIOR TO THE COCKPIT DOOR CHECK OUT. THE EMERGENCY ACCESS SHOULD NOT BE RELIED ON TO ENTER. I DON'T THINK THE DEADBOLT USE SHOULD BE PROHIBITED IN FLT (EXCEPT FOR MEL). THIS SHOULD BE AT CAPT'S DISCRETION. THE ODDS OF A DOUBLE PLT INCAPACITATION OR TRIPLE IF AUGMENTED SEEM REMOTE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 597386: WHILE ENRTE; I REALIZED THE MEL CARD DID NOT CORRECTLY REFLECT THE PROB WE HAD WITH THE DOOR SINCE IT DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT BEING ABLE TO EASILY FORCE OPEN THE CLOSED DOOR. A MECH COULD EASILY CHK THE DOOR AND FIND THAT THE AUTO LOCKING SYS APPEARED TO WORK NORMALLY AND SIGN OFF THE DOOR. THEREFORE; WE WROTE UP THE DOOR ON A MAINT COUPON EXPLAINING EXACTLY WHAT THE PROB WAS WITH THE DOOR. I BELIEVE THE MEL CARD SHOULD SAY SOMETHING ABOUT CHKING THE COCKPIT DOOR TO MAKE SURE IT CANNOT BE FORCED OPEN.