AN EMB145 FLT CREW HAVE A WINDSHIELD HEAT PROB INFLT. AFTER TOUCHDOWN; THEY DECIDE TO FOLLOW THE REST OF THE QRH PROCS WHICH HAS THEM SHUT DOWN AN ENG WHICH THEY DID ON THE RWY.
Synopsis
AN EMB145 FLT CREW HAVE A WINDSHIELD HEAT PROB INFLT. AFTER TOUCHDOWN; THEY DECIDE TO FOLLOW THE REST OF THE QRH PROCS WHICH HAS THEM SHUT DOWN AN ENG WHICH THEY DID ON THE RWY.
Narrative
CLBING THROUGH FL180 THE CLB CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. AS PER THE CHKLIST AND MANUAL; THIS LED TO DESELECTING THE WINDSHIELD HEAT. FO OBSERVED THAT IMMINENT ENTRY TO ICING CONDITIONS WAS LIKELY AND DECIDED TO LEAVE THE WINDSHIELD APPLIED FOR THIS POSSIBILITY. THE WINDSHIELD HEAT WAS NEAR INSTANTLY REAPPLIED; PERHAPS 1 SECOND LATER; WHICH WAS APPARENTLY TOO SOON FOR THE WINDSHIELD HEAT LOGIC; AND AN EICAS MESSAGE WAS DISPLAYED INDICATING WINDSHIELD HEAT #1 FAILURE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT ONLY WINDSHIELD HEAT #1 FAILED DUE TO WINDSHIELD HEAT #2 WAS LIKELY NOT EVER DESELECTED. ALL OF THESE EVENTS OCCURRED IN LESS THAN 2 SECONDS. NOW; WITH A FAILURE MESSAGE DISPLAYED; THE CREW GAVE THE SYS A FEW SECONDS TO POSSIBLY RESET ITSELF; THEN COMPLIED WITH THE MANUAL ICE PROC. THE FAILURE MESSAGE REMAINED ILLUMINATED THROUGHOUT APCH AND LNDG; REQUIRING THAT THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT OPS MANUAL PROC BE COMPLETED AFTER LNDG. THIS REQUIRES THAT THE BUSES BE UNTIED AND GENERATORS #1 AND #3 BE TURNED OFF; UN-POWERING THE ASSOCIATED MAIN BUS. THERE IS EVEN AN ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE NOTE TO EXPECT LOSS OF SVCS ASSOCIATED WITH THAT UNPOWERED BUS. SO FAR; SO GOOD. WHILE ON DOWNWIND TO CVG AND WHILE DSNDING INTO THE ARR FLOW FROM THE W FOR RWY 36R; THE FLT WAS REASSIGNED RWY 36L AND ASKED TO EXPEDITE DSCNT; MAKE A FEW TURNS; SLOW RAPIDLY; ETC. ALL WHILE RECONFIGURING FMS; NAVAIDS; AND REBRIEFING THE APCH. WX WAS DAYLIGHT VFR AFTER LNDG; FLT WAS ASSIGNED A RAPID SERIES OF RWY EXIT POINT; GND FREQ; THEN RAMP FREQ AND GND MANEUVERING INSTRUCTIONS; ALL IN THE SPAN OF LESS THAN 1 MIN. AT THE ELAPSE OF 1 MIN; ABOUT THAT TIME; THE CAPT REMEMBERED THE REMAINING WINDSHIELD HEAT FAILURE PROC. THE BUS TIE SELECTOR WAS THEN SELECTED OFF AND GENERATOR #1 AND #3 WERE DESELECTED. TOTAL ELAPSED TIME FROM TOUCHDOWN WAS LESS THAN 1 MIN 15 SECONDS. NOW; AFTER ALL THE DINGING QUIETED DOWN AND THE EICAS MESSAGES HAD QUIT OCCURRING; THE CREW QUICKLY REALIZED THEIR PROB. THE ACFT WAS BROUGHT TO A STOP ON THE RAMP AND THE R ENG WAS RESTARTED. THE ACFT THEN CONTINUED SOMEWHAT MORE NORMALLY TO THE RAMP. LESSON LEARNED: THE WINDSHIELD HEAT FAILED PROC NEEDS TO BE COMPLETED AFTER CLRING THE RWY AND BEFORE; 'BEFORE' SHUTTING DOWN ANY ENGS/GENERATORS. THIS OCCURRED IN CASE BECAUSE OF THE HIGH CREW WORKLOAD WITH RWY CHANGE AT THE LAST MIN AND NUMEROUS QUICK FREQ CHANGES AT CVG. NO EXCUSES HERE; WE WILL DO IT BETTER NEXT TIME.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.