A FAIRCHILD METRO 111 ON APCH AT 1500 FT SHUT DOWN THE L ENG DUE TO LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE. FO CONCERNED CAPT DID NOT DECLARE EMER.

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WE WERE ON A STRAIGHT IN VISUAL APCH TO THE RWY AT 1500 FT WHEN THE L ENG OIL PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND WAS VERIFIED BY ZERO OIL PRESSURE INDICATION ON THE RESPECTIVE GAUGE. WE DECIDED TO LEVEL OFF AND REQUESTED A L-HAND TFC PATTERN TO ALLOW FOR ADEQUATE TIME TO ADDRESS OUR SIT. WE COMPLETED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS; SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND HAD A POSITIVE EXCHANGE OF CTLS SWITCHING ME TO THE PNF. I DECLARED AN EMER WITH THE TWR AND INFORMED THEM OF OUR SIT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY KEYED THE MIKE CANCELING OUR EMER STATUS AND SAID WE SIMPLY HAD TO DO A PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN. I QUESTIONED HIS STATEMENT AND HE REITERATED HIS DESIRE NOT TO DECLARE AN EMER. DUE TO OUR CRITICAL SIT AND CLOSE PROX TO THE ARPT; I CHOSE NOT TO ARGUE WITH HIM AND WE PROCEEDED WITH A SAFE AND UNEVENTFUL LNDG. ONCE WE WERE ON THE GND AND HAD SHUT DOWN THE ACFT; WE DISCUSSED THE ENTIRE SIT INCLUDING OUR NEED TO DECLARE AN EMER. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT INCLUDE FATIGUE; HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES; AND A BREAKDOWN IN CRM. FATIGUE PLAYED A ROLE BECAUSE WE WERE RETURNING HOME FROM A LONG DUTY DAY WHICH GREATLY INFLUENCED OUR JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING SKILLS. FATIGUE ALSO LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES SUCH AS IMPULSIVITY AND MACHOISM. THE CAPT MADE AN IMPULSIVE DECISION WITHOUT STOPPING TO THINK OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. HE ALSO MAY HAVE FELT MACHO BECAUSE HE HAD EXPERIENCED A SIMILAR EMER THE DAY BEFORE AND FELT THAT HE COULD SAFELY HANDLE THE SIT WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER. FINALLY; THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN CRM WHICH LED TO THE CAPT'S DESIRE TO NOT DECLARE AN EMER WHILE I KNEW IT WAS REQUIRED. I COULD HAVE FURTHER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DECLARING THE EMER BY STATING THE MANY DIFFERENT WAYS THAT IT BENEFITS US SUCH AS BRINGING ATC AND GND PERSONNEL INTO THE LOOP OF OUR SIT. IF TIME PERMITTED; I ALSO COULD HAVE SHOWN HIM THE REG IN OUR OPS MANUAL WHICH I HAD WITH ME.