AN MD80 FLT CREW LANDS AT DFW WITHOUT A CLRNC.

Narrative

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I HAVE MADE THIS MISTAKE. AFTER READING ALL OF THE PREVIOUS RPTS ABOUT THIS; I THOUGHT IT COULDN'T HAPPEN TO ME. I WAS WRONG. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36L BY DFW APCH CTL AFTER THE CTLR REFED TFC WE WERE FOLLOWING AS 'A SAAB 4 MI AHEAD' (WHICH WE DID NOT HAVE IN SIGHT; ALTHOUGH WE HAD RPTED THE ARPT IN SIGHT). HE THEN TOLD US TO SLOW TO 170 KTS TO THE MARKER. THE CAPT CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 11 DEGS' AND THEN 'FLAPS 15 DEGS' IN ORDER TO SLOW DOWN. AT THE SAME TIME; THE CTLR STARTED TALKING TO AN 'ACR Y FLT' WHICH IT SOUNDED LIKE WAS ON A L BASE FOR RWY 36L. SINCE WE DIDN'T HAVE OUR TFC IN SIGHT; I DELIBERATELY DELAYED SWITCHING TO TWR FREQ BECAUSE I THOUGHT THE ACR Y FLT WAS THE SAAB THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING; AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO TURN BASE TO FINAL IN FRONT OF US. I WAS TRYING TO GATHER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TO GET THE TFC IN SIGHT. NEXT; AT LEAST 5 THINGS HAPPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY. FIRST; WE REACHED THE MARKER. SECOND; WE INTERCEPTED THE GS. THIRD; I REALIZED THAT THE ACR FLT WAS NOT THE SAAB WE WERE FOLLOWING AND THAT THE ACR Y FLT WAS ON A BASE LEG TO FOLLOW US. FOURTH; THE CAPT CALLED FOR 'GEAR DOWN' AND I FOCUSED MY ATTN ON FINISHING THE LNDG CHKLIST AND MAKING REQUIRED CALLOUTS. FIFTH; I SAW THE SAAB INSIDE THE AIRFIELD BOUNDARY JUST SHORT OF THE RWY. I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SAAB MIGHT NOT CLR THE RWY BEFORE WE LANDED; SO I WAS MONITORING HIM (HE WAS HARD TO SEE) AS WELL AS SCANNING THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE RWY FOR XING TFC. THE FIRST TIME WE REALIZED WE HAD NOT SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ WAS AFTER WE CLRED THE RWY. WE WERE MONITORING 121.5 ON VHF #2. AT NO TIME DID WE HEAR ANY XMISSIONS ON THAT FREQ; IF THAT IS RELEVANT. I WAS THE PNF AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WORKING THE RADIOS; THEREFORE THE FAILURE TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ WAS ENTIRELY MY FAULT. THE APCH CTLR DID HIS JOB IN A PERFECTLY PROFESSIONAL MANNER; AS DID THE CAPT. THEY WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR MY MISTAKE IN ANY WAY. IT WAS SIMPLY MY FAULT; PERIOD. HAVING SAID THAT; I FEEL THAT A FEW WORDS OF EXPLANATION WOULD BE PRUDENT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY. I REMEMBER A PRESENTATION AT MY ACR'S GND SCHOOL THAT DEPICTED THE MULTIPLE 'LAYERS OF PROTECTION' IN OUR FLYING PROCS AS SLICES OF SWISS CHEESE. THE PHILOSOPHY WAS THAT WITH ENOUGH LAYERS IN PLACE; HOPEFULLY THE HOLES COULD NOT LINE UP AND ALLOW SOMETHING TO FALL ALL THE WAY THROUGH. GREAT PHILOSOPHY. THE POINT HERE IS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ENOUGH OCCURRENCES OF THIS SAME PROB TO CLRLY INDICATE THAT THIS IS AN AREA WHERE SOMETHING IS CONTINUALLY FALLING ALL THE WAY THROUGH. IT IS APPARENT THAT THERE SIMPLY ARE NOT ENOUGH LAYERS OF PROTECTION TO PREVENT PEOPLE FROM INADVERTENTLY LNDG WITHOUT CLRNC FOLLOWING A VISUAL APCH. UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; THAT COULD CERTAINLY BE DISASTROUS. UNDER CURRENT PROCS; THE APCH CTLR IS NOT REQUIRED TO TELL US TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ AFTER CLRING US FOR A VISUAL APCH. SWITCHING FREQS WHILE AIRBORNE WITHOUT BEING HANDED OFF IS CERTAINLY AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE IN THE IFR FLYING ENVIRONMENT THAT WE EXPERIENCE IN PART 121 OPS. I WOULD SAY THAT; WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NORMAL ENVIRONMENT; THAT QUALIFIES AS A VERY NON-STANDARD PROC. AS I DESCRIBED ABOVE; ALL OF THIS TAKES PLACE DURING A VERY CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT; WITHIN 1500 FT OF THE GND WHEN NUMEROUS CRITICAL TASKS ARE BEING PERFORMED SIMULTANEOUSLY. WHAT WOULD BE SO DIFFICULT ABOUT CHANGING THE CTLR'S PROCS TO REQUIRE THEM TO SAY 'CONTACT THE TWR;' IE; USE THE STANDARD HDOF PROC TO REMIND US; WHEN THEY ARE FINISHED TALKING TO US? THAT WOULD PROVIDE A FINAL LAYER OF PROTECTION WHILE WE ARE DOING OTHER THINGS LIKE INTERCEPTING THE LOC; INTERCEPTING THE GS; CHANGING CONFIGNS; CHANGING AIRSPDS; CHANGING RADIO FREQS; MONITORING XING ALTS; LOOKING FOR TFC; MAKING CALLOUTS; VISUALLY CLRING THE RWY; CORRECTING FOR XWINDS; WATCHING FOR WINDSHEAR; AND LNDG AN AIRPLANE. I AM NOT A CTLR AND I REALIZE THAT THEY MAY HAVE VALID REASONS FOR THE CURRENT PROC; BUT WE SURE COULD USE THEIR HELP IF IT IS AVAILABLE.