B747-400 IOE CAPT AND LINE CHK AIRMAN DEMONSTRATE MARGINAL PROFICIENCY ON VECTORED APCH TO VHHH RESULTING IN UNINTENTIONAL FLT TOWARD TERRAIN.

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NEW CAPT ON IOE IN L SEAT. FIRST LEG ON B747-400. LINE CHK AIRMAN (LCA) IN R SEAT. I WAS IN R-HAND OBSERVER'S SEAT. WHILE ON RADAR VECTORS TO LAND ON RWY 7L AT HKG; WE WERE CLRED TO 1500 FT WHILE ON R BASE TO RWY 7L. LCA SET 1300 FT BY MISTAKE AND WE DSNDED TO 1300 FT. I NOTICED ERROR AND ANNOUNCED AT THE SAME TIME APCH INSTRUCTED US TO CLB TO 1500 FT; WE WERE GIVEN TURN TO 45 DEGS. NO CLRNC TO INTERCEPT LOC. AS WE PASSED THROUGH LOC; LCA ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION. WE WERE CLRED FOR APCH; AND CAPT ARMED THE LOC FEATURE. ACFT TURNED HARD R ON ABOUT A 110 DEG HDG AND ACFT PASSED WELL THROUGH LOC. AUTOPLT C WAS ENGAGED. AIRPLANE STARTED TO TURN L BACK TO LOC. WX WAS 7 NM VISIBILITY. WE SAW RWY 7L WELL TO OUR L AND IN NO POS TO LAND. APCH TOLD US TO CLB TO 6000 FT. CAPT SELECTED FLCH 6000 FT AND THE ACFT STARTED TO CLB AT ABOUT 200 FPM. I COULD NOW SEE HILLS ABOVE US IMMEDIATELY TO OUR R AND VERY CLOSE. WE WERE WELL S OF THE RWYS 7L AND 7R CTRLINES NOW. I CALLED 3 TIMES LOUDER FOR TOGA. APCH CALLED TO EXPEDITE CLB TO 6000 FT AND MAINTAIN 070 DEG HDG. WE WERE ON 080 DEG HDG AS TOGA WAS ENGAGED AND HDG HELD AT 080 DEGS. 2ND RELIEF PLT CALLED OUT HDG DEV; BUT WAS IGNORED BY BOTH UP FRONT PLTS. ACFT DID START TO CLB AND WE CLBED OVER THE HILLS THAT WERE SIGHTED AS WE REENTERED THE CLOUD BASE. FLAPS 1 DEG WERE SELECTED AND I NOTICED THAT WE WERE 13 KTS BELOW THE FLAP 1 DEG SPD (23 KTS BELOW FLAP 1 DEG MANUAL SPD). I CALLED OUT THE LOW AIRSPD AND THE LCA PUSHED THE THROTTLES FORWARD AND ASKED IF THE CAPT WANTED FLAPS 5 DEGS TO WHICH HE SAID YES. REST OF CLBOUT AND NEXT APCH TO LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. WE LANDED WITH 19600 LBS OF FUEL. THIS WAS A CASE OF THE CAPT NEVER HAVING BEEN TO HKG; AND ALTHOUGH LCA DID INDICATE THAT HE HAD BEEN THERE BEFORE; HE SEEMED VERY UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT AND OP. IT WAS A VERY TYPICAL CASE OF OVERLOAD OF NEW CAPT (FIRST LEG ON B747) AND AN ERROR STREAM THAT BUILT AND BUILT. WE DID AVOID THE HILLS JUST S OF THE ARPT; BUT THERE WERE NUMEROUS ATC DEVS; LESS THAN SAFE TERRAIN SEPARATION IN 2 CASES; AND CRM WAS WORKING BUT VERY SLOWLY. IT WAS ALSO APPARENT THAT THE LCA WAS EITHER NOT AWARE OF THE DANGER; OR WAS WAITING FOR THE CAPT TO MAKE THE ASSESSMENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTION. IT TOOK NUMEROUS PROMPTS FROM THE RELIEF PLTS TO GET THE ACFT ON THE PROPER FLT PATH. WE WERE ON DUTY FOR 17+ HRS; IT WAS NIGHT; AND WX WAS MARGINAL VFR TO IFR. I WAS GREATLY CONCERNED AS TO THE FLT PATH OF THE ACFT. WE WERE ADVISED TO CALL THE HKG TWR UPON ARR AT OPS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 605245: DURING BRIEFING SEEMS NEITHER CAPT HAD BEEN TO HKG OR ON A POLAR RTE.