GEAR UP LNDG PERFORMED BY THE PLT OF A BE35 WHEN MAKING A TIGHT APCH TO RWY 34 AT CLW; FL.

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AFTER AIRBORNE CLOSING OF IFR FLT PLAN FROM EYW TO PIE FOR DIVERSION TO CLW; ATC (PIE TWR) KEPT MY ACFT ON FREQ AND UNDER RADAR CTL AT 2100 FT MSL (2050+ FT AGL) UNTIL WITHIN 2 NM OF CLW (GLASS G AIRSPACE) ON A HDG OF 350 DEGS. WINDS FAVORED RWY 34 AT CLW AND; UPON RECEIVING FREQ CHANGE APPROVAL (FOR WHICH I HAD TO MAKE 2 REQUESTS; THE FIRST DENIED); CHANGED TO ADVISORY FREQ (123.0); RPTED POS AND ALT; AND ASKED FOR ARPT ADVISORY AND TFC. ACTIONS OF PLT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AND SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT: DURING THIS TIME; I TURNED E OF THE FIELD FOR POS TO ENTER INTO EITHER R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 34 (EXPECTED AND MOST LIKELY) OR L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16 (TFC ADVISORY DEPENDENT) AND BEGAN MY DSCNT. AFTER NO RESPONSE ON CTAF REGARDING FAVORED RWY; I CHOSE TO CONTINUE MY R TFC APCH TO RWY 34 (R TFC IS THE CORRECT TFC PATTERN FOR CLW RWY 34 FROM CURRENT AFM). IN A COMPLETE PWR OFF DOWNWIND BASE AND FINAL; I CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR LNDG (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GEAR DOWN). THE ACFT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED APPROX 1100 FT DOWN RWY 34; 2 FT L OF CTRLINE AND IN A CTLED DSCNT. IMPACT OF PROP AND FUSELAGE OCCURRED NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE FUSELAGE SETTLED GENTLY ONTO THE RWY AND DIRECTIONAL CTL WAS EASILY MAINTAINED WITH RUDDER AUTH. THE ACFT CAME TO REST 3 FT L OF CTRLINE AFTER TRAVELING APPROX 800 FT. I IMMEDIATELY MADE A RADIO CALL TO ANOTHER ACFT (WHICH RPTED INBOUND FOR LNDG AS I WAS ON FINAL) TO INFORM THEM THAT CLEARWATER AIRPARK WAS CLOSED; REPEATING THAT RWY 16/34 WAS CLOSED. I THEN PERFORMED A STANDARD EMER SHUTDOWN (FROM LEAR TRAINING) -- ALL ELECTRICAL OFF AND FUEL OFF; CABIN SECURED; NO FIRE; EXIT ACFT. AFTER ALERTING GND PERSONNEL THAT THERE WERE NO INJURIES; I LOCATED A HANDHELD VHF RADIO TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE ACFT ELT HAD NOT GONE OFF (IT HAD NOT). THERE WERE NO INJURIES; THE ACFT DAMAGE WAS MINOR (INCLUDING PROP AND SUDDEN ENG STOPPAGE) AND NOT SUFFICIENT TO BE CATEGORIZED AS 'ACCIDENT.' CAUSATION: 1) FAILURE TO GAIN ENOUGH TIME TO ADEQUATELY PERFORM A BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST RESULTING IN B) FAILURE TO SELECT GEAR DOWN AND C) TO VERIFY GEAR DOWN. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: WHILE NOT DIRECTLY PLACING THE BLAME ON PIE TWR; THE DELAYED HDOF PLACED ME IN A POS WHICH MADE IT IMPROBABLE THAT I WOULD HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO RUN A THOROUGH BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST AND FROM WHICH I NEEDED TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION (COMPLETELY DEPARTING AND RE-ENTERING THE CLW TFC AREA AT LOWER ALT AND AIRSPD). FURTHER; IF OTHER TFC HAD BEEN IN THE PATTERN; THE LATE FREQ CHANGE WOULD HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A PLT WHO WAS NOT MONITORING CTAF ON A SECOND RADIO (AS I WAS) TO HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF ARPT TFC PRIOR TO ENTERING AIRSPACE. AS A SOMEWHAT RELATED ISSUE FROM MY GEAR UP LNDG: I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR CTLRS TO UNDERSTAND THAT TIME AND SPACE ARE NEEDED TO TRANSITION INTO A CLASS G AIRFIELD. THE PROX OF CLW TO PIE DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A STANDARD 5 SM MINIMUM TRANSITION FROM THE S AFTER CLRING PIE AIRSPACE.