FLT CREW OF A300; UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND OR INTERP HEAVILY ACCENTED ENGLISH FROM ROME RADAR CTLR BUT ABLE TO DISCERN RWY ENVIRONMENT AND AT LIRA WHEN RPTED RVR WAS BELOW MINIMUMS.

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ON APCH TO LIRA; THE SUN WAS RISING AND A FOG BANK WAS ENCROACHING ONTO THE FIELD. WE COULD SEE THIS AS WELL AS THE RWY FROM OVER 15 MI OUT. WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC AND AWAITING GS INTERCEPT. APCH TOLD US THE LATEST WX (THERE IS NO ATIS); AND IN HIS THICK ACCENTED ITALIAN VOICE; SPEAKING BROKEN ENGLISH (IE; VERY HARD TO UNDERSTAND); HE SAID SOMETHING ABOUT RVR 'A' BEING SOME UNDETERMINABLE NUMBER; RVR 'B' BEING MORE THAN 2000 METERS AND RVR 'C' BEING MORE THAN 2000 METERS. NEITHER I NOR THE FO KNEW WHAT THE 'A-B-C' AREAS OF THEIR RVR SYS WERE; BUT WE ASSUMED THEY MAY BE THE EQUIVALENT TO THE UNITED STATES 'TOUCHDOWN; MIDFIELD AND ROLLOUT' POS. WE CLRLY HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT AND WERE BOTH COMFORTABLE WITH CONTINUING WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS A 'VISUAL APCH BACKED UP BY AN ILS' AND THEREFORE WEREN'T CONCERNED. ATC HAD CLRED US FOR THE APCH; AND CLRED US TO LAND. AS WE APCHED MINIMUMS; WE COULD STILL SEE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE RWY; INCLUDING THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE; END BAR LIGHTS AND RWY MARKINGS AND CTRLINE LIGHTS. I COMMENTED TO THE FO; THAT WE WOULD BE LNDG IN THE SHALLOW FOG; AND ROLLING OUT IN THE CLR. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL ; NEVER LOSING SIGHT OF THE RWY ENVIRONMENT; AND WE ROLLED OUT INTO THE CLR AS WE ANTICIPATED. IT WAS ONLY LATER THE NEXT EVENING; THAT WHEN TALKING WITH OUR COLLEAGUES; WE REALIZED THAT DESPITE HAVING ALL THE CONDITIONS FOR A VISUAL APCH; THE APCH WE DID MIGHT HAVE BEEN AGAINST OUR OP SPECS. THE 'A' RVR WAS PROBABLY BELOW OUR LNDG MINIMUMS; AND EVEN THOUGH WE SAW ALL THE RWY ENVIRONMENTS REQUIRED TO LAND OR LEAVE MINIMUMS; WE DOUBT (AFTER THE FACT) THAT WE HAD THE CORRECT RVR TO START THE APCH. WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE PROB WERE THE LANGUAGE BARRIERS IN CLR COMS; LACK OF TECHNICAL EQUIP SUCH AS DIGITAL ATIS OR AWOS TO BROADCAST CURRENT CONDITIONS; AND LACK OF SPECIFIC 'IN THEATER' TRAINING FROM OUR COMPANY ON ICAO DIFFERENCES IN INTL OPS.