A BEECH 200 WAS OPERATED WITH AN UNAPPROVED SHEET METAL FUSELAGE REPAIR. LCL FSDO NOTIFIED RPTR OF POSSIBLE VIOLATION DUE TO REPAIR NOT APPROVED.
Synopsis
A BEECH 200 WAS OPERATED WITH AN UNAPPROVED SHEET METAL FUSELAGE REPAIR. LCL FSDO NOTIFIED RPTR OF POSSIBLE VIOLATION DUE TO REPAIR NOT APPROVED.
Narrative
A FORM 337 WAS FILED AND RECEIVED BY THE LCL FSDO OFFICE ON MAR/MON/04. THE MAJOR REPAIRS LISTED ON THE FORM WERE FLUSH FUSELAGE REPAIRS AT F.S. 334.25; F.S. 342.25; AND RH GEAR WELL AT AFT GEAR SPROCKET. THE DATA USED WAS ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13-1B. THE LCL FSDO NOTIFIED ME ON MAR/MON/04 OF A POSSIBLE VIOLATION DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE REPAIRS WERE DONE IN THE PRESSURIZED AREA OF THE ACFT AND THAT ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13.-1B WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO REPAIRS IN THESE AREAS. SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT AFFECTED MY JUDGEMENT AND THE DECISION THAT WAS MADE ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE REPAIRS WERE MADE BY AN A&P MECH WITH EXTENSIVE SHEET METAL EXPERIENCE. HE ELECTED TO USE ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13-1B AND I QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT IT. HE SAID IT WAS APPLICABLE AT THE TIME AND I ACCEPTED IT AT THAT TIME. I HAD A VAGUE MEMORY OF ITS EXCLUSION FROM PRESSURIZED AREAS OF THE ACFT. I DID NOT FIND ANYTHING THAT EXCLUDED THESE AREAS AND SO APPROVED THE REPAIR. 2) FAILURE TO NOTICE AND READ THE VERY FIRST PAGE OF ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43.13-1B THAT EXCLUDED ITS USE FOR PRESSURIZED AREAS OF THE ACFT. 3) THE A&P MECH WAS A SHEET METAL INSTRUCTOR ON THE FIELD; THOUGH DID NOT OFFER FAA APPROVED INSTRUCTION. 4) NO SRM AVAILABLE AT THE TIME. 5) THE ACFT WAS UNDER EXTENSIVE REPAIR AND WAS NOT IN SVC.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.