VFR PA28 DEP FROM 9D9 EXPERIENCED NMAC WITH B737 ON TURNING FINAL FOR GRR AT 3500 FT.

Narrative

THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT BEGAN WHEN DEPARTING HASTINGS ARPT. I NOTED AN ACFT TAKING OFF FROM RWY 30; WHICH THE NORTHERLY WIND FAVORED; SO I TAXIED TO THE END OF RWY 30. AS I ENTERED THE RUN-UP AREA; I NOTED A SECOND ACFT USING RWY 12 FOR TOUCH AND GOES. THIS SECOND ACFT WAS NOW THE ONLY ACFT IN THE PATTERN AS FAR AS I WAS AWARE (THE FIRST ACFT ANNOUNCED LEAVING THE ARPT AREA TO THE E). RATHER THAN TAXI TO THE OTHER END (RWY 12); I NOTIFIED THE OTHER PLT THAT THE WINDS FAVORED RWY 30 AND THUS I WAS GOING TO DEPART FROM RWY 30 AFTER HIS NEXT TOUCH AND GO IF THAT DIDN'T POSE ANY PROBS WITH HIM. HE REPLIED THAT WOULD BE FIND AND I BEGAN MY PREFLT CHKS. BASED ON HIS RADIOS CALLS; HE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE USING RWY 12 AND WAS WELL INTO THE DOWNWIND LEG WHEN I COMPLETED THE PREFLT CHK WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 2 ITEMS: THE XPONDER AND THE STROBES. I PLACED THE CHKLIST BACK IN THE POUCH AND MADE A MENTAL NOTE TO ACTIVATE THE XPONDER AND STROBE ONCE THE OTHER ACFT WAS CLR AND I WAS READY TO ROLL. 3 OR 4 MINS LATER; THE OTHER ACFT COMPLETED HIS TOUCH AND GO; THEN ONCE HE WAS CLR; I ANNOUNCED AND DEPARTED FROM RWY 30. BEFORE I TURNED L XWIND AFTER DEP; HE ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS ON A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 12 AND HAD ME IN SIGHT. AFTER THE XWIND LEG; I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS DEPARTING THE ARPT AREA TO THE W AND CONTINUED CLBING. ONCE I REACHED 3500 FT; I LEVELED OFF AND THE ACFT STARTED ACCELERATING FROM THE CLB SPD OF 90 MPH TO 120 MPH. VERY SOON AFTER LEVELING OFF; I GLANCED L AND AT MY APPROX 10 O'CLOCK POS I NOTICED A NBOUND B737 SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE HORIZON; LESS THAN WHAT I WOULD GUESS TO BE 1/8 MI; DSNDING IN A SLIGHT R BANK. IT WAS CLOSING VERY FAST. (THIS B737 WAS CLOSE ENOUGH THAT I REMEMBER NOTICING IT WAS EQUIPPED WITH OLD TURBOJETS INSTEAD OF THE NEWER TURBOFANS; AND THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS STILL UP.) JUDGING BY THE FACT THAT THE B737 REMAINED IN THE SAME SPOT IN MY WINDOW; IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE ON A COLLISION COURSE. WITHIN WHAT SEEMED LIKE A FEW NANOSECONDS GETTING THE B737 IN SIGHT; I IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED AN EVASIVE MANEUVER BY PUSHING FORWARD AND ROLLING R ON THE YOKE HOPING TO DIVE OUT OF THE WAY AND ALSO HOPING THE B737 WOULD SEE ME AND CLB TO THE L. THE B737 PASSED ALMOST DIRECTLY OVERHEAD AS I LEVELED OUT AT 3200 FT. A FEW SECONDS LATER; I NOTICED THE B737 MAKING ONE SLIGHT COURSE CORRECTION TO THE R TO LINE UP WITH RWY 35 AT GRR. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT COURSE CORRECTION WAS THE RESULT OF AN EVASIVE MANEUVER OR IF THEY WERE SIMPLY MAKING THEIR FINAL LINE-UP WITH THE RWY; BUT IT WAS CLR FROM MY VIEWPOINT THAT THEY WERE LINING UP FOR RWY 35; WHICH WE ALSO HAD IN SIGHT. AFTER THE DANGER HAD PASSED; I THEN BEGAN TO WONDER HOW ON EARTH ATC COULD HAVE LET US GET SO CLOSE; AND; AS I BROUGHT MY EYES BACK INTO THE COCKPIT; THE FIRST THING I LOOKED AT WAS THE XPONDER -- STILL IN THE STANDBY POS. EVEN WORSE; THE STROBES WERE STILL OFF. MY ATTEMPT TO MAKE A MENTAL NOTE TO TURN THOSE ITEMS ON BEFORE DEPARTING HAD FAILED MISERABLY. I TURNED THE STROBES ON IMMEDIATELY; BUT WATCHED FOR OTHER TFC AND WAITED FOR A FEW MI OF SEPARATION FROM THE B737 BEFORE PUTTING THE XPONDER INTO MODE C. I DID THIS TO AVOID CREATING A PANIC ON GRR APCH'S RADAR SCREEN. CLRLY MY DECISION TO PLACE THE CHKLIST BACK INTO THE POUCH BEFORE COMPLETING ALL ITEMS WAS THE START OF THIS PROB. THUS; IN THE FUTURE; THE CHKLIST WILL REMAIN IN MY L HAND UNTIL FULLY COMPLETED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE MY FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID THIS ACFT; AND RWY CONFUSION AT THE UNCTLED HASTINGS ARPT (WHICH LED TO THE POOR CHKLIST DECISION). WOULD I HAVE CONSIDERED USING RWY 12 INSTEAD? NO; THE WINDS DEFINITELY FAVORED RWY 30; AND THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE ACTIVE RWY. IN THE FUTURE I WILL AT LEAST ENCOURAGE THE OTHER PLT TO USE THE WIND-FAVORED RWY INSTEAD OF JUST 'HINTING' AT IT.