ZFW CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL350 WITH 2 ACR'S DEVIATING AROUND WX.

Date: 2004-06 · Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing · Phase: cruise

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|conflict-airborne-conflict

Synopsis

ZFW CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL350 WITH 2 ACR'S DEVIATING AROUND WX.

Narrative

I HAD BEEN WORKING THE RADAR FOR 3 HRS 15 MINS; MOST OF THAT TIME WITH MODERATE TO HVY TFC AND COMPLEXITY DUE TO TSTMS IN THE AREA. 5 MINS BEFORE THE ERROR; MY D-SIDE WAS REPLACED AND THE NEW CTLR IS KNOWN TO BE WEAK AND INEFFECTUAL. I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT 2 FLOW CTL DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE THAT WOULD LIGHTEN THE WORKLOAD AND COMPLEXITY OF THE SECTOR; SO THE WEAK D-SIDE DIDN'T CAUSE ME ANY CONCERN AT FIRST. INSTEAD; THE SECTOR BECAME 'RED' AND RAPIDLY BECAME ALMOST OUT OF CTL. I RECEIVED A HDOF ON THE ACFT X AT FL350 AND IMMEDIATELY TYPED IN A 'POINTOUT' DATA BLOCK TO THE LIT-H CTLED AT ZME. WHILE TALKING TO ACFT; THE LIT-H CTLR CALLED MY SECTOR OVER THE LINE AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME I TOLD MY D-SIDE TO MAKE THE POINTOUT. I THOUGHT HE PICKED UP THE LINE AND MADE THE COORD (HE NEVER ANSWERED; THEY DID NOT CALL AGAIN). I THEN RECEIVED A HDOF FROM LIT-H ON THE ACFT Y AT FL350. BOTH ACFT WERE DEVIATING (AS WERE MOST ACFT IN MY SECTOR) AND I MADE THE FATAL ERROR OF ASSUMING THAT THEY WERE NOT IN CONFLICTION. WHILE I DEALT WITH ALL THE OTHER CONFLICTIONS GOING ON; MY D-SIDE APPARENTLY THEN CALLED AND POINTED OUT THE ACFT X. THE LIT-H CTLR ACCEPTED THE POINTOUT WITHOUT REF TO THE ACFT Y BECAUSE I HAD TRACK CTL OF BOTH ACFT. THE ONLY PERSON WHO MAY HAVE SEEN THE CONFLICTION MUST HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE ACFT X WAS ON AN ASSIGNED HDG TO GO BEHIND THE ACFT Y BECAUSE MY D-SIDE DID NOT TELL HIM THAT HE WAS ACTUALLY DEVIATING. SHORTLY AFTER THE ACFT X SAID HE WAS BACK ON COURSE AND I RESPONDED WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE DATA BLOCK BECAUSE I FELT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT; AND I WAS 'COVERED UP' IN OTHER AREAS. THE CONFLICT ALERT WENT OFF A FEW SECONDS BEFORE SEPARATION WAS LOST AND I WAS NOT ABLE TO SAVE THE SIT IN SPITE OF TURNING AND DSNDING THE ACFT Y AND TURNING THE ACFT X. WHEN I HEARD MY D-SIDE'S TAPE OF THE 10 MINS IN AND BEFORE THE ERROR; HE HAD MADE ONLY 1 PHONE CALL (THE POINTOUT TO ZME) AND WAS RESPONDING TO A CALL FROM ANOTHER SECTOR AS THE ERROR WAS OCCURRING. THE ENTIRE 5 MINS HE HAD BEEN WORKING BEFORE THE INCIDENT I HAD TOLD HIM TO MAKE NUMEROUS POINTOUTS TO OTHER SECTORS AND ZME SINCE VIRTUALLY EVERY ACFT REQUIRED COORD OF SOME SORT AND HE APPARENTLY HAD SIMPLY SAT THERE; STUNNED. THE FAULT OF THIS ERROR IS CLRLY MINE -- I NEVER SHOULD HAVE ASSUMED THAT SOMEONE ELSE WAS TAKING CARE OF A SIT NO MATTER HOW MUCH I HAD GOING; BUT; 1) I SHOULD HAVE HAD A HDOF MAN. 2) THE FLOW CTL RESTRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADHERED TO. 3) MY ORIGINAL D-SIDE SHOULD NOT HAVE LEFT WHILE THE SECTOR WAS SO BUSY. 4) THE INEPTITUDE OF THE REPLACEMENT D-SIDE IS A PERVASIVE PROB DUE TO BURNOUT; SENESCENCE; THE CHKOUT OF WEAK CTLRS; AND THE OVERWORK OF CTLRS IN GENERAL.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.