C172 DEP FROM BFI INITIATES TKOF PRIOR TO ATC CLRNC AND PREVIOUS LNDG ACFT EXITING RWY.

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ACFT #1; B737. AT B-10; HOLDING SHORT OF RWY. ACFT #2; CITABRIA; AT A-10; HOLDING SHORT OF RWY OPPOSITE SIDE. ACFT #3 (ME); C172-SP; AT A-9; HOLDING SHORT OF RWY. THE RWY IN DISCUSSION IS 10001 FT. B-10 IS FULL LENGTH. A-10 IS LESS APPROX 2000 FT; AND A-9 IS APPROX 4000 FT LESS THAN FULL LENGTH (ESTIMATED CONSERVATIVELY). I CALLED TWR #3; AFTER THE B737 AND CITABRIA; STATING 'READY TO GO RWY 31L; A-9; HOLDING SHORT.' WE ALL HELD FOR THE LONG LNDG LEAR WHO TOUCHED DOWN APPROX 1000 FT BEYOND (UPWIND) OF ME. I STATED TO MY STUDENT THAT THE WINDS WERE MOVING ANY WAKE TURB CONCERNS AWAY FROM US. THEN THE B737 WAS INSTRUCTED POS AND HOLD; THE CITABRIA WAS INSTRUCTED POS AND HOLD AND THEN I WAS INSTRUCTED POS AND HOLD. I RESPONDED 'POS AND HOLD;' HOWEVER; I ROLLED INTO POS AND THEN EXPEDITED MY DEP WITHOUT A TKOF CLRNC. MY VFR DEP PROC CONSISTED OF AN EARLY L TURN AT 600 FT AGL. THE GRIEVANCE FILED AGAINST ME IS REGARDING ACFT SEPARATION DUE TO THE LEAR THAT WAS EXITING THE ACTIVE AT A-1; A STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE GREATER THAN 5280 FT FROM MY POS AND HOLD AND TXWY A-1. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) SITUATIONAL PRESSURE DUE TO BEING POSITIONED #1 OF 3 ACFT ON THE ACTIVE RWY (IN POS AND HOLD); ONE OF WHICH WAS A B737 THAT WAS HOLDING SHORT READY; LONG BEFORE MY TKOF REQUEST. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO MY PRE CLRNC LAUNCH. 2) I ANNOUNCED IN THE COCKPIT ON THE ROLL TO POS AND HOLD THE EXPECTED 'EXPEDITED DEP CLRNC;' AND BELIEVE THAT THIS CALLOUT IN THE COCKPIT DICTATED MY EXPEDITED BEHAVIOR. 3) THE FINAL AND MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN PLT FATIGUE. I PROCEEDED WITH THIS FLT EARLY MORNING AFTER A LONGER THAN EXPECTED NIGHT FLT. I HAVE NO OTHER EXPLANATION WHY I WOULD MAKE SUCH A CRITICAL ERROR. PLT FATIGUE: 5 HRS SLEEP; AND THE PRESSURE OF THE MORNING FLT. EXIGENCY OF THE SIT IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACTIVE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.