BE55 LEAD AND SAFETY PLT DEPARTING RDM IN FORMATION WITH AN A36 DEPART WITHOUT A TKOF CLRNC.
Synopsis
BE55 LEAD AND SAFETY PLT DEPARTING RDM IN FORMATION WITH AN A36 DEPART WITHOUT A TKOF CLRNC.
Narrative
I WAS PARTICIPATING IN THE FORMATION FLYING CLINIC WITH THE BONANZAS TO OSHKOSH GROUP AT REDMOND. ON THE THIRD FLT OF THE DAY; I WAS TO FLY 'LEAD' FOR THE FLT WITH MR X AS MY SAFETY PLT. MR Y WAS MY #2; IN AN A36 BONANZA; WITH HIS SAFETY PLT ON BOARD AS WELL. MR X WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS FOR ME; SO I COULD CONCENTRATE ON THE MECHS OF THE FORMATION FLT. I HEARD US CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD. I BELIEVE THAT MR X READ IT BACK. WE MOVED INTO POS ON THE RWY. MR X SIGNALED FOR BOTH AIRPLANES TO DO OUR 2000 FPM FINAL PWR CHK. I DID THAT; AND ENGS LOOKED GOOD. OUR #2 SIGNALED THAT HIS ENG WAS GOOD. MR X DROPPED HIS CHIN TO HIS CHEST; SIGNALING MY #2 THAT WE WERE ROLLING; AND HE TOLD ME TO GO. SO; I TOOK OFF; WITH MY #2 FOLLOWING; IN OUR FORMATION TKOF. I DO NOT RECALL HEARING ANY TKOF CLRNC. AS WE WERE DEPARTING THE PATTERN; REDMOND TWR TOLD US THAT WE WERE NOT ACTUALLY CLRED FOR TKOF. MR X ACKNOWLEDGED THE TWR WITH A 1-WORD ACKNOWLEDGEMENT; POSSIBLY 'ROGER.' IN RETROSPECT; IT WAS A MISTAKE TO LET MR X ASSUME RADIO COMS DUTIES BECAUSE IT MAKES THE PLT LESS IN CTL; AND LESS 'IN THE LOOP.' REGARDLESS OF MR X HANDLING THE RADIOS; I WAS PIC FOR THE FLT; AND SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN CRITICALLY MONITORING HIS RADIO COMS. I MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN TAKING OFF WITHOUT PERSONALLY HAVING HEARD ANY TKOF CLRNC. WHEN WE RETURNED TO THE REDMOND TWR AFTER OUR FLT; THEY ASKED US TO CALL THE TWR. THE TWR PERSON TOLD ME THAT HE WAS REQUIRED TO FILE A 'PLTDEV' ON ME; BECAUSE OF A LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN OUR FLT AND A FUEL TRUCK XING THE FAR END OF THE REDMOND ARPT.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.