B777-200 FLT CREW; THINKING CLRNC WAS GUARANTEED BY BEING ON CTRLINE OF TXWY C AT LAX; CONTACTS L WINGLET OF B747-400 WAITING TO PARK AT GATE.
Synopsis
B777-200 FLT CREW; THINKING CLRNC WAS GUARANTEED BY BEING ON CTRLINE OF TXWY C AT LAX; CONTACTS L WINGLET OF B747-400 WAITING TO PARK AT GATE.
Narrative
WE LANDED AT LAX ON RWY 25L WITHOUT INCIDENT AND BECAUSE OF CONGESTION ON EARLIER HIGH-SPD TXWYS; WERE ASKED TO ROLL TO THE HIGH SPD AT TXWY T. AS WE DID SO; WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 25R AND TO CONTACT GND. WE WERE STARTING TO TURN E ON TXWY B BUT WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE TXWY C. WE THEN TURNED ON TXWY C AND WERE TOLD TO TAXI EBOUND TO THE GATE. NO OTHER COM FROM TWR SUCH AS HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS; CAUTION; GIVE WAY; ETC; OTHER THAN CLRNC TO TAXI TO THE GATE WAS RECEIVED. AS WE APCHED INTL GATES; WE OBSERVED A FOREIGN B747-400 AND NOTICED THAT IT WASN'T IN THE BLOCKS AND APPEARED TO BE SHUT DOWN AND WAITING FOR SOMETHING. BOTH CREW MEMBERS OBSERVED THAT THE SPACING LOOKED CLOSE; BUT SINCE OUR NOSE WAS ON THE CTRLINE OF THE TXWY AND NO OTHER GUIDANCE WAS RECEIVED BY GND OR OTHER INDICATIONS OF CLRNC PROBS; WE PROCEEDED TO TAXI PAST THE B747-400. WHEN ABEAM THE TAIL OF THE B-400; WE FELT A THUMP THAT WE THOUGHT AT FIRST WAS LIKE A POTHOLE IN THE PAVEMENT. WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. WE WERE ADVISED BY GND TO CALL TWR UPON ARR. WE DID SO AND WERE INFORMED THAT OUR L WING MADE CONTACT WITH THE L WINGLET OF THE B747-400. ALL PAX DISEMBARKED NORMALLY WITH NO PROBS. WE OBSERVED THROUGH THE JET BRIDGE; A DENT IN THE LEADING EDGE OF THE L WING OF THE B777 AND WERE INFORMED OF THE DAMAGE TO THE WINGLET OF THE B-400. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 625934: REALIZING THAT SEPARATION CRITERIA WERE MET BY BEING ON CTRLINE AND TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT WHAT WE FELT WAS SUFFICIENT WINGTIP CLRNC; WE PROCEEDED ON. AFTER SOME TIME PASSED WE FELT A RUMBLE THAT RESEMBLED THE NOSE GEAR RUNNING OVER A ROUGH SPOT IN THE TXWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 625938 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH COMPANY PLT MGRS PRODUCED A REASONABLE SUGGESTION TO PREVENT FURTHER INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA. THE ARPT IS CLRLY AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL FOR COLLISIONS IN THIS AREA AS WITNESSED BY SEVERAL CAUTIONS ON THE ARPT PAGE. PER THOSE CAUTIONS; ACFT ARE NOT ALLOWED TO TAXI INTO GATE XXX BUT ARE REQUIRED TO STOP AT A POINT ON THE LEAD-IN LINE THAT IS ANGLED TOWARD TXWY C. THE RPTR FEELS THIS STOP POINT IS FAR ENOUGH INTO THE GATE TO MAKE IT APPEAR AS THOUGH PASSAGE IS 'CLOSE BUT POSSIBLE' FOR ACFT ON TXWY C. HE SUGGESTS THAT A SURER MEANS OF INSURING ACFT SAFETY WOULD BE TO PLACE THE STOP POINT ON THE LEAD-IN LINE FAR ENOUGH BACK THAT IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT PASSING WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. THUS; EVEN IF GND CTL FAILS TO ADVISE CAUTION OR RESTR TFC ON TXWY C TO HOLD SHORT UNTIL THE GATE XXX TFC ADVISES 'CHOCKS IN;' AN ACCIDENT WOULD NOT HAPPEN BECAUSE THE CLRNC WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INADEQUATE FOR PASSAGE AND THE TXWY C TFC WOULD STOP OF ITS OWN VOLITION.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.