PIC OF AN MD80 RPTS ON A NON STANDARD LINE CHK RECEIVED FROM A VERY INTERRUPTIVE TYPE LINE CHK CAPT OUT OF STL.

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THIS IS A REVIEW OF AN UNUSUAL AND A TIMES UNSAFE LINE CHK GIVEN BY COMPANY CHK CAPT. THIS WAS A STANDARD LINE FOR ME AS CAPT; ON A FLT FROM STL TO TUL AND RETURN. MY CONCERNS ABOUT HAVING CHK CAPT X IN THE COCKPIT STARTED SOON AFTER PUSHBACK. JUST PRIOR TO PUSHBACK THE FO AND I DISCUSSED DOING A SINGLE ENG TAXI. THE FO COULD SEE FROM HIS SIDE THAT WE WOULD GET RIGHT OUT AND THAT IT WAS A SHORT TAXI. CHK CAPT WAS NOT LISTENING AT THIS TIME OR CHOSE NOT TO INTERVENE AT THAT TIME. DURING PUSHBACK WHEN WE STARTED THE SECOND ENG AS BRIEFED; CHK CAPT STARTED A LENGTHY SPEECH ON THE NEED TO DO SINGLE ENG TAXI PROCS. THIS SPEECH BY CHK CAPT DID HAMPER THE NORMAL COCKPIT FLOW AND THE AFTER START ENG CHKLIST. ON TAXI OUT CHK CAPT STARTED TELLING ME THAT AT AIRLINE; THE CAPT CAN MAKE PA ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE PAX DURING TAXI PROCS AND THAT I SHOULD DO IT AS WELL. THIS FURTHER INTERRUPTED OUR NORMAL TAXI PROCS THAT WERE BEING RUSHED SINCE WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF SINCE GETTING ON TXWY A. AFTER TKOF AT AROUND 4000 FT AFTER COMPLETING A DEP TURN; I CYCLED THE NO SMOKING SIGN AS PER THE NEWLY PUBLISHED PROC. CHK CAPT IMMEDIATELY INFORMED ME THAT I SHOULD HAVE CYCLED THE NO SMOKING SIGN AT 1500 FT AFL AND THAT IS HOW ALL THE COMPANY CAPTS DO IT. AFTER PASSING THROUGH 10000 FT I BROUGHT OUT THE BULLETIN THAT STATED TO CYCLE THE SWITCH NO EARLIER THAN 1500 FT AND AT THE CAPT'S DISCRETION. HE GOT UPSET WITH ME AND SAID THAT THAT BULLETIN WAS IN ERROR AND A CORRECTION WOULD BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY! HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT AT THIS AIRLINE YOU DO NOT QUESTION WHAT A CHK AIRMAN TELLS YOU. WHEN A CHK AIRMAN TELLS YOU SOMETHING; THAT IS HOW IT IS DONE AND YOU DO NOT XREF IT TO A PUBLISHED PROC. FOR THE REMAINDER OF CLB AND CRUISE AND DSCNT; CHK CAPT INTERRUPTED THE NORMAL FLT DECK FLOW WITH A STEADY BARRAGE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT PROCS AND EQUIP. HE ALSO SPENT TIME ON YET UNPUBLISHED COMPANY PROCS THAT HE FELT WE SHOULD BE DOING NOW. ON A FEW OCCASIONS HE POINTED OUT THAT THE FO AND I NEEDED TO GET ON THE TRAIN BEFORE IT LEFT THE STATION. THIS WAS IN REF TO THE YET UNPUBLISHED COMPANY PROCS AND TECHNIQUES. AT THAT TIME MANY WERE NOT PUBLISHED THAT HE WANTED US TO DO. THE MANNER IN WHICH CHK CAPT SAID THIS WAS VERY NEGATIVE; ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE FO HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE FURLOUGHED SHORTLY. ONE EXAMPLE OF THE MANY DISTRS MADE DURING THIS FLT WAS WHEN THE FO MADE THE 'PREPARE THE CABIN' PA ABOUT 10 MINS OUT. CHK CAPT WENT INTO GREAT DETAIL AT HOW WE NEED TO TIME THAT PA SO THAT IT IS MADE AND IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER WE PRESS THE CALL CHIME. AND THAT ALL THE PLTS TIME IT SO THAT THE CALL BUTTON IS PRESSED AS WE PASS THROUGH 10300 FT. THERE ARE MANY OTHER EXAMPLES OF INTERFERENCE INFLT AND DURING THE CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. WHAT GREATLY CONCERNS ME WAS CAPT'S CONSTANT INTERFERENCE WITH NORMAL FLT DUTIES AND THE RESULTING DECREASE IN THE SAFETY OF FLT CAUSED BY HAVING HIM IN THE COCKPIT. I HAVE RECENTLY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF GETTING A LINE CHK UNDER THE COMPANY CERTIFICATE AND SEEING FIRST HAND THE APPROVED PROCS. IT IS NICE TO FIND THAT FLT SAFETY IS PARAMOUNT UNDER THE CHK AIRMAN. LIKEWISE IT WAS REFRESHING TO HAVE A PROFESSIONAL CHK AIRMAN Y ABOARD. IT WAS ALSO GOOD TO LEARN THAT MUCH OF WHAT CAPT TEACHES WAS WRONG. PLEASE LOOK ON THIS LETTER AS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR SAFETY AND NOT MERELY A NEGATIVE CRITIQUE OF THE CHK CAPT. I AM WRITING NOW BECAUSE I HAVE HAD OTHER PLTS RELATE SIMILAR ANECDOTAL STORIES OF DIFFICULTIES WITH CAPT X AND BELIEVE IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF COMPANY TO BRING UP ONGOING PROB. HAVING A CHK AIRMAN ABOARD SHOULD BE A POSITIVE LEARNING EXPERIENCE ALONG WITH THE CHK RIDE. HAVING A CHK AIRMAN ABOARD THAT DIMINISHES SAFETY NEEDS TO BE ELIMINATED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THIS EVENT HAPPENED 2 YRS AGO BUT WAS BROUGHT TO THE COMPANY'S ATTN AS THE RPTR DID NOT WANT THE SUBJECT LINE CHK CAPT TO BE REAPPOINTED TO THAT POS IN THE FUTURE.