G4 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION ON RWY 27R AT OAK.

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OAKLAND GND CTL INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI FROM OUR HANGAR TO RWY 27R (THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL TAXI INSTRUCTION FOR US). APCHING THE HOLD SHORT FOR RWY 27R OAKLAND GND INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS RWY 27R AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT WE DISCOVERED IN CONVERSATION WITH OAKLAND GND THAT TXWY B FROM B1 TO TXWY S WAS CLOSED AND WE WOULD HAVE TO DEPART FROM RWY 27L AND NOT FROM RWY 29 AS WE EXPECTED AND WERE NORMALLY ASSIGNED. BOTH OF US WERE SURPRISED BY THIS UNUSUAL RWY ASSIGNMENT AND WHILE WE WERE DISCUSSING THE RWY CHANGE AND THE PERFORMANCE IMPACT THE CAPT (PF) TAXIED THE ACFT ACROSS THE APCH END OF RWY 27R TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. AT SOME TIME DURING OUR COCKPIT DISCUSSION WE EVIDENTLY MISSED THE CHANGE IN OUR TAXI CLRNC THAT WAS; 'NOW HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R' FROM OAKLAND GND CTL. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (THE UNEXPECTED RWY CHANGE) COULD HAVE BEEN LESS CONFUSING TO US HAD THE NOTAMS REVEALED THE TXWY CLOSURE. THE ATIS CLRLY DESCRIBED THE TXWY CLOSURE BUT AFTER MANY MONTHS OF THE SAME TXWY CLOSURE INFO AT OAKLAND ARPT I DID NOT LISTEN TO ALL OF THE ATIS INFO CAREFULLY ENOUGH AND MISSED THE INFO CONCERNING TXWY B. AS PART OF OUR PREFLT BRIEF; OUR CREWS NORMALLY REVIEW THE FLT PLAN; WX AND NOTAMS TOGETHER. DUE TO BAY AREA TFC THE CAPT WAS LATE GETTING TO THE ARPT AND WE DID NOT DO THIS AS DESCRIBED IN OUR SOP. AS WE WERE APCHING THE HOLD SHORT FOR RWY 27R GND CTL EXPLAINED THE TXWY CLOSURE SIT TO US AND WE WERE CONCERNED THAT WE MIGHT BE TOO HVY TO DEPART FROM RWY 27L AND; OF COURSE; WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN OUR LACK OF ATTN TO DETAIL TO THE CHIEF PLT. THIS CAUSED US SOME SERIOUS ANGST. NEEDLESS TO SAY WE WERE DISTR. WHILE TAXIING THE ACFT THE CAPT (PF) SIMULTANEOUSLY TAXIED THE AIRPLANE AND ATTEMPTED TO ENTER NEW RWY INFO INTO THE FMS' CDU. CONCERNED ABOUT A POTENTIAL TAXI ACCIDENT I SUGGESTED THAT I (PNF) INPUT THE DATA WHILE HE TAXIED THE ACFT. HE CONTINUED TO DO BOTH TASKS AND I OBSERVED ANOTHER JET ON ABOUT A 3 MI FINAL TO RWY 27R. AFTER OBSERVING ANOTHER JET ON FINAL I INFORMED THE CAPT AND SUGGESTED WE HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. THE CAPT REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE JET WAS LNDG ON RWY 29; THE S COMPLEX AND IGNORED MY SUGGESTION AND TAXIED ACROSS RWY 27R TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. THIS IS WHEN GND CTL EXPLAINED TO US THAT WE HAD CROSSED RWY 27R WITHOUT A CLRNC. WHAT COULD WE HAVE DONE BETTER? LISTENED CAREFULLY TO ALL OF ATIS. NOT LET CHANGES IN OUR 'PLAN' CAUSE OUR COCKPIT DISCIPLINE TO ERODE. CLRLY ADHERE TO COCKPIT SOP AND CREW DUTIES SO THAT NO CREW MEMBER IS OVERWHELMED BY EVENTS. STOP THE AIRPLANE WHEN ONE CREW MEMBER DETECTS A PROB. SLOW DOWN! THERE WAS NO NEED FOR US TO FEEL ANY URGENCY ON THIS FLT; IT WAS A DEADHEAD. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT MOST CPR OPERATORS ARE ALWAYS IN A HURRY. LASTLY; I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE AND INSISTED THAT THE CAPT (PF) STOP THE ACFT AT THE HOLD SHORT FOR RWY 27R FOR THE LNDG TFC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 635030: WE REQUESTED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND WERE CLRED TO RWY 27L. WE INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE NEEDED RWY 29. IN THE FUTURE WE WILL STOP TAXIING AND ACCOMPLISH FMS PERFORMANCE FOR ANY CHANGES PRIOR TO CONTINUING TO TAXI; TO ASSURE BOTH PLTS WILL BE ALERT TO ANY ATC CHANGES; AND NOT CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT A BACKUP CALL TO VERIFY THE XING CLRNC.