A DC9-50 APU PREVIOUSLY DEFERRED AS INOP WAS REMOVED FROM THE DEFERRED ITEM LIST USING INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE DATA.

Date: 2005-01 · Aircraft: DC-9 50 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-mel-cdl|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance

Synopsis

A DC9-50 APU PREVIOUSLY DEFERRED AS INOP WAS REMOVED FROM THE DEFERRED ITEM LIST USING INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE DATA.

Narrative

I AM AN A&P MECH WORKING FOR ACR X IN ZZZ. I PERFORM ON-CALL RADIO DISPATCHED MAINT ON ACFT ON THE DAY SHIFT. I WAS CALLED BY MY LEAD TECHNICIAN TO GO TO ACFT X; TALK TO THE PLT ABOUT AN APU ON MEL DEFERRAL. THE PLT RPTED TO MAINT THAT THE APU WAS OPERATIONAL AND HE WANTED IT REMOVED FROM MEL. UPON ARRIVING AT ACFT X; I FOUND THE APU RUNNING. THE CTL CIRCUIT BREAKER COLLAR HAD BEEN REMOVED; APU STARTED; ELECTRICAL AND PNEUMATICS APPLIED BY THE PLT. THE PLT TOLD ME THE APU WAS WORKING NORMAL. I VERIFIED THE CORRECT OP OF THE APU. THE CREW ASKED IF I COULD CLR THE APU MEL. I SAID I WOULD CHK THE LOGBOOK AND IF CLEAN; I WOULD RETURN THE APU TO SVC. I VERIFIED THE ORIGINAL WRITE-UP (APU WOULD NOT START) AND DEFERRAL. I CHKED FOR SUBSEQUENT RE-DEFERRALS. I FOUND NONE. I CLRED THE APU FOR SVC. ON JAN/FRI/05; MY MGR RECEIVED A NOTE FROM THE MAINT MGR THAT STATED A ZZZ1 TECHNICIAN ON JAN/TUE/05 HAD FOUND AN AIR INLET DOOR ROD BROKEN; AND RE-DEFERRED TO MEL. WHEN I CHKED THE LOGBOOK ON JAN/WED/05; I DID NOT SEE THIS RE-DEFERRAL. THE RE-DEFERRED BROKEN ROD APPEARS IN COMPUTER DISPLAY DISCREPANCY HISTORIES. THE PROB IS; THE ORIGINAL WRITE-UP BY THE PLT IS IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK AS WELL AS ORIGINAL DEFERRAL; BUT SUBSEQUENT RE-DEFERRALS OFTEN ARE NOT IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. THE COMPANY USES CARDS FOR OVERNIGHT MAINT. THE CORRECTIVE ACTON IS ENTERED ON THE CARD AND THE MAINT COMPUTER; BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE ACFT LOGBOOK. I BELIEVE ALL WORK SHOULD BE IN ACFT LOGBOOK AS WELL AS THE MAINT COMPUTER. THE LT AND FLT LINE TECHNICIANS DO NOT HAVE EASY ACCESS -- SOMETIMES NO ACCESS TO THE MAINT COMPUTER. THEY ONLY HAVE ACCESS TO THE HARD COPY ACFT LOGBOOK. WITH REGARDS TO HUMAN PERFORMANCE; THE PLT SHOULD NEVER HAVE ACTIVATED A DE-ACTIVATED MEL'ED SYS. AS FOR MYSELF; I SHOULD HAVE COME TO THE CTL CTR AND LOOKED AT THE MAINT COMPUTER FOR DISCREPANCY HISTORY BEFORE CLRING THE APU ON MEL.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.