A B737-400 WAS DISPATCHED WITH #4 TIRE BELOW SVC CHK LIMITS. TIRE WRITTEN UP FOR REPLACEMENT BUT CLRED BY LEAD TECHNICIAN.

Date: 2005-04 · Aircraft: B737-400 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance

Synopsis

A B737-400 WAS DISPATCHED WITH #4 TIRE BELOW SVC CHK LIMITS. TIRE WRITTEN UP FOR REPLACEMENT BUT CLRED BY LEAD TECHNICIAN.

Narrative

TECHNICIAN X AND I GOT ACFT X ASSIGNED BY LEAD TECHNICIAN/SUPVR AS A SVC CHK FOR THE NIGHT OF APR/FRI/05. TECHNICIAN X DID ENGS AND INTERIOR; I DID EXTERIOR AND BRAKES AND TIRES. PER JOB CARD X; I FOUND #4 TIRE TO BE 150 PSI. I CHKED THE PRESSURE SEVERAL TIMES AND CAME DOWN TO BE 150 PSI; THEN I ASKED MY CO-WORKER TECHNICIAN X TO CHK THE PRESSURE. HE ALSO DID IT SEVERAL TIMES AND IT DID SHOW HIM THE SAME PRESSURE. TECHNICIAN X SUGGESTED TO CHK THE PAPERWORK SINCE HE RECOLLECTED THAT WHEN IT WAS MORE THAN 25 PSI IT WARRANTED A TIRE CHANGE AND PERHAPS A CHANGE OF BOTH TIRES ON THE SAME AXLE. I DID AS HE SUGGESTED AND INFORMED THE SUPVR OF MY FINDINGS (I TOOK HIM TO THE AIRPLANE TO VIEW THE TIRE). HE ALSO SUGGESTED TO WRITE THE PROPER PAPERWORK AND LET THE LEAD KNOW. I LET LEAD TECHNICIAN AND SUPVR Y KNOW. LEAD TECHNICIAN SUGGESTED TO MAKE SURE IT WAS DOCUMENTED ON THE NON ROUTINE WRITE-UP X AND THE NON ROUTINE WRITE-UP Y. I WROTE THE DISCREPANCY ON LOG PAGE XXXXX AND ALSO THE NON ROUTINE WRITE-UP X. UPON ARRIVING FOR WORK THE FOLLOWING DAY AND REVIEWING ANOTHER LOG PAGE; TECHNICIAN X AND I CAME ACROSS LOG PAGE XXXXX ON WHICH WE NOTICED MY INITIAL DISCREPANCY WAS CROSSED OUT BY THE NEXT SHIFT LEAD AND ALSO THE NON ROUTINE WRITE-UP X WAS MISSING AND A NEW ONE WAS CREATED; THE TIRE WAS NEVER CHANGED; BUT INSTEAD HE ENTERED ERRONEOUS INFO OF THE NON ROUTINE WRITE-UP Y. I BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTN OF MY LEAD AND ALSO TRAINER SINCE I HAD QUESTIONS AS TO WHO HAD THE AUTH TO CROSS OUT MY INITIAL ENTRY ON THE LOG PAGE PER THE GPM BUT MOREOVER; WHY THE TIRE WAS NEVER REPLACED AND AN ACFT WAS LET TO DEPART WITH A BAD TIRE. THE SUPVR GOT INFORMED BY MY LEAD AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH MAINT CTL ABOUT HAVING A MECH TO CHK THE TIRE IN QUESTION AT THE ROUTINE OVERNIGHT LOCATION FOR THAT NIGHT. SUPVR ALSO BROUGHT LEAD TECHNICIAN IN THAT NIGHT TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS; TO WHICH HE GOT VERY UPSET AND STATED THAT HE WAS THE LEAD AND COULD DO AS HE PLEASED; IN A VERY LOUD AND TREATING VOICE. I ASKED HIM IF HE KNEW WHAT WAS THE TIRE PRESSURE ON A B737-400; TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT LIKE BEING INTERROGATED. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THOSE WERE NOT MY INTENTIONS; BUT SINCE HE TOOK UPON HIMSELF TO DISREGARD THE SAFETY OF THE PEOPLE ON THAT PLANE WHEN HE CROSSED OUT MY INITIAL WRITE-UP INSTEAD OF GOING INTO THE BREAK ROOM AND ASSIGN A COUPLE OF MECH TO REPLACE THE NECESSARY TIRES.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.